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ABSTRACT 
(This thesis is an attempt to apply literary criticism, 
specifically a narratological approach, to the reading of 
the biblical text. )There is an incongruity in the story of 
Isaac's (near) sacrifice by Abraham insofar as it is too 
economical with language in what is otherwise a complex set 
of important issues about obedience and sacrifice. 
Interpreters throughout the centuries have tried to resolve 
the textual difficulties created by the incongruity. Yet 
the variety of their conclusions are evidence of the 
impossibility of overcoming the ambiguities of the story. 
But these ambiguities are scarcely given any thorough 
investigation by the interpreters, whose assumed duties are 
commonly to clarify the story either for the sake of 
religious or moral obligation or, in the pursuit of 
intellectual satisfaction as is apparent in many historical 
readings of the text. A closer look at the story reveals 
that there are many ambiguities that can be grasped from 
many angles. By using the focalization theory of 
narratology one can illuminate differing points of view 
involved in the process of narration. The narrator's voice 
should not be regarded as the only representation of the 
events as there are also the characters' ways of looking at 
the related events. one should be careful so as not to 
follow slavishly the narrator's voice while neglecting 
others' standpoints in the narrative which may contradict 
the narrator's voice. There should be communicative links 
seen amongst the voices or focalizations in the narrative 
which may or may not be verbally said. Here, it is proposed 
that reading is experiencing the multilayered world of the 
narrative. Reading is not necessarily and ultimately bound 
with the task of producing meaning, although, it may mean a 
threat towards rational objectivity. But the pursuit of 
objective meaning has, consciously or unconsciously, always 
been under the threat of disarray once the narrative is 
allowed to manifest its conflictual nature. Interpretations 
which claim to establish the meaning of the story can only 
do so by hiding, repressing, putting aside, masquerading, 
or even by misrepresenting the undermining existence of 
other elements or meanings in the story. There is a growing 
awareness of the manipulativeness of interpretation 
together with a realization of the sense of indeterminacy 
in biblical stories. It may well be that, as anticipated by 
this thesis, biblical hermeneutics should make itself more 
available to a task of uncovering the indeterminacy of the 
text, the whole point in the narrative, said or unsaid; 
rather than to provide a means by which the text can be 
elucidated, which itself is illusory. 
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PREFACE 
My interest in the Akedah began in the final year of my 
bachelorship in Indonesia, as a topic that I had chosen as 
my final thesis. The study, that is made mainly on the 
basis of historical criticism as well as an analysis of 
Kierkegaard's thought in Fear and Trembling, is ended with 
an awareness that the story of the sacrifice of Isaac needs 
greater appreciation in terms of its aesthetic value rather 
than as a piece of historical documentation. The recent 
development of biblical studies in its relation with 
literary criticism, although, to my knowledge, it is still 
much confined to a Western context, provides a great deal 
of opportunity for my attempt to recognize the aesthetic 
dimension of the story. At the same time, I am also 
interested in the influence of the issues in modern 
hermeneutics on biblical interpretation which seems 
indisputable and opens the way for important discussions 
about the objectivity and subjectivity of the readers. 
These aspects give a background for this dissertation. 
There is no doubt that my former supervisor, Dr Gerrit 
Singgih, has made a major contribution towards my encounter 
with the above stated problems. I am grateful to him for 
that and for his constant support during the three and half 
years of my study in the place which is also his almamater. 
Without his guidance and recommendation in the first place, 
my study in Glasgow would not have been possible. 
My debts to my supervisor, Professor Robert P. Carroll, are 
immeasurable. Words would not be enough in describing his 
patient and carefulness in supervising my work and in 
correcting my failings- after all, writing in a foreign 
language and under pressure of time (read: money) is not 
easy. I have greatly benefitted from the inspiration- and 
enthusiasm that I could derive throughout my discussions 
with him. I am most grateful that his guidance has brought 
not only valuable scholarly knowledge to me but also deep 
spirituality, in these all I am only a beginner. 
I would also record my gratitude to Hugh Pyper who, during 
his busy times of teaching and writing his own thesis, has 
helped me so much with correcting my English and improving 
my knowledge of literary criticism. As far as literary 
criticism is concerned, I am also helped a great deal by 
lectures from and discussions with Dr David Jasper. A few 
opportunities for discussion were also kindly given to me 
by Mr Alastair Hunter. I am in debt of them all, though, 
the responsibility for the views expressed in this 
dissertation is mine. 
As an overseas student, the problems such as cultural and 
gastronomic bewilderment seem unavoidable. For this, I am 
indebted to Leslie Hilton who introduced me to the real 
life of Scottish pubs and for his friendship; to the 
families of the lecturers who have invited me, and later 
on, my wife, to dine; and also to John Bradley for his 
caring'treatment. 
This study is made possible financially by Postgraduate 
Research Scholarship of University of Glasgow; Faculty of 
Divinity, Glasgow University; Trinity College, Glasgow 
University; overseas Student Fund of the Faculty; my 
church, GKI Diponegoro, Surabaya, Indonesia which also has 
allowed me to study abroad for a few years. 
Last but not least, I would like to most of all thank to my 
wife, Susan, who has given a wonderful company during her 
stay in Glasgow over the past one and half years. Her 
understanding and relentless encouragement provided me with 
a conducive atmosphere that I really need to complete my 
writing. May her sacrifice never be in vain. 
RS 
January 1993 
In the Apse of the Cathedral at Canterbury there is a 
window which can tell us a good deal about the controls 
operating on the image in the art of Christian 
Europe .... The window displays a marked intolerance of any 
claim on behalf of the image to independent life. Each of 
its details corresponds to a rigorous programme of 
religious instruction. To prevent the occurrence of those 
alternating crises of adoration and iconoclasm which had 
troubled the Church in Byzantium, the image in Wetern 
Christendom has been issued with a precise but limited 
mandate: 'illiterati quod per scripturam non possunt 
intueri, hoc per quaedam licturae lineamenta contemplatur'. 
Images are permitted, but only on condition that they 
fulfil the office of communicating the Word to the 
unlettered. Their role is that of an accessible and 
palatable substitute. And not only must the image submit 
before the Word, it must also take on, as a sign, the same 
kind of construction as the verbal sign. Speech derives its 
meanings from an articulated and systematic structure which 
is superimposed on a physical substratum. Its signs resolve 
into two components: the acoustic or graphic material- the 
I signifier'; and intelligible form- the 'signified'. With 
the linguistic sign, interest in the sensuous materiality 
of the signifier is normally minimal except in certain 
highly conventional ised art situations; we tend to ignore 
the sensual 'thickness' of language unless our attention is 
specifically directed towards it. And the Canterbury window 
similarly plays down the independent life of its signifying 
material, which progressively yields, as we approach it, to 
a cultivated transparency before the transcendent Scripture 
inscribed within it. The status of the window is that of a 
relay or a place of transit through which the eye must pass 
to reach its goal, which is the Word. Qualities that might 
detain the eye during that transit are to be carefully 
restrained .... Next, the legends in the margins of the lesser panels, which function by question and answer, like 
catechism .... With pedagogic imagery such terminal 
signposting is essential- left to his own devices the 
spectator might prolong his contemplation beyond the 
requirements of instruction. 
Norman Bryson, Word and Image 
Just as literary critics have called for an interpretive 
evaluation of classic works of art in terms of justice, so 
students of the Bible must learn how to examine both the 
rhetorical aims of biblical texts and the rhetorical interests emerging in the history of interpretation or in 
contemporary scholarship. This requires that we revive a 
responsible ethical and political criticism which 
recognizes the ideological distortions of great works of 
religion. Such discourse does not just evaluate the ideas 
or propositions of a work but also seeks to determine 
whether its very language and composition promote 
stereotypical images and linguistic violence. 
Elisabeth S. Fiorenza, "The Ethics" 
In Christian as in Platonic tradition, the material script 
is devalued in favour of a spiritual writing imprinted 
directly on the soul without the aid of material 
instruments. This 'simulated immediacy' then becomes the 
source of all authentic wisdom and truth. What cannot be 
acknowledged within this Platonic scheme is the fact that 
it depends on a root metaphor of writing, one that it 
strives to repress even while perpetually playing 
variations on its terms. Deconstruction insists- 
paradoxically- on the literal status of this otherwise 
self-supporting metaphor. It is not, as Derrida says, 'a 
matter of inverting the literal meaning and the figurative 
meaning but of determining the "literal" meaning of writing 
as metaphoricity itself' (Derrida 1977a, p. 15). It is here 
that deconstruction finds its rock-bottom sense of the 
irreducibi'lity of metaphor, the differance at play within 
the very constitution of 'literal' meaning. It finds, in, 
short, that there is no literal meaning. 
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Harold Bloom in his contemplation of the works of the J 
writer (to use the term assigned by modern scholarship to 
one of the authors of the Hebrew Bible) sees that the 
narrative of Genesis 22 reflects so much of J's 
characteristics which are thought of as being censored by 
the Elohistic author, the supposed author of the 
narrative. ]. He says, "the story of the Akedah, of Abraham 
being ordered by God to sacrifice Isaac, does not show any 
stylistic traces of i but is from a literary perspective 
clearly bowdlerized from J by the Elohistic author or 
school". 2 What is borne in mind here is the high literary 
quality of the story of the Akedah, which is recognized by 
Bloom as the hallmark of Js work. Bloom comes to the 
admiration of J through the realisation of the radical 
irony in the writer's works. The irony arises not in terms 
of the contrast or gap between expectation and fulfillment, 
nor in the inconsistency between saying and meaning (saying 
of one thing while meaning quite another). "It is the irony 
of J's Hebraic sublime, in which absolutely incommensurate 
realities collide and cannot be resolved. "3 one may only 
look at i's Yahweh to notice the irony. According to Bloom, 
the representations of Yahweh by the Priestly writer, or by 
'Bloan uses the terms J or E pragmatically, that is, only in 
order to compare and analyze the literariness of the stories of these 
authors with the attention particularly on J. 
2Harold Bloom, Ruin the Sacred Truths: Poetry and Belief fran 
the Bible to the Present, 1989, p. 9. 
3Blom, ibid., p. 4. 
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the Deuteronomist, or by the Elohist, or even by the 
prophets differ substantially from the appearance of Yahweh 
in i's writings. one of the dominant elements of Js Yahweh 
is surprise, unprecedented emergence in manner and logic. 
It is impossible therefore for i's Yahweh to be 
appropriately understood in a certain fashion or to be 
assimilated, because there will always be another element 
that is not included. 
Bloom's claim for the Akedah that it mirrors i's 
characteristic of unassimilated originality, can 
unmistakenly be justified. 4 This thesis which is intended 
to study the literariness of the Akedah will show that the 
narrative does have the irony of a collision among 
incommensurate realities which is most obvious in the 
commands of God. If Elohim- the name itself may indicate, 
as argued by Buber, the hiddenness or mystery of God who 
will reveal Himself only then5- declares the command that 
Isaac must be sacrificed, the messenger of Yahweh announces 
the Opposite, the cancellation of the sacrifice. Elohim's 
command itself comes as a surprise or, more suitably, a 
shock which will remain so since its motive is unheard 
until the end of the story. We are introduced to the word 
nissah (to test) which, despite the vagueness of its 
meaning (is the sacrifice to be seen as real? ), might 
4Here we are not dealing with the problem of authorship, that 
is, whether Genesis 22 is J's or E's and so on, since our present focus 
as well as our study as a whole is about the literariness of the 
narrative. 
5Martin Buber, Biblical Humanism: Eighteen Studies by Martin 
Buber, ed. Nahu-n N. Glatzer, c. 1968, p. 41. 
13 
reduce the tension caused by the accomplishment of the 
sacrifice of Isaac. The word is perhaps evidence of the 
attempt by E to bowdlerize J as claimed by Bloom. Should 
God not be seen as sadistic in commanding the sacrifice? If 
this is the case, however, the impact of the message would 
not be quite satisfying because the motive of the command 
is still concealed, the horror of God remains hanging 
around unrepudiated. But such a bowdlerizing attempt 
continues as far as the history of interpretation is 
concerned. 
In chapter II we will see a variety of interpretations of 
the Akedah throughout the centuries which in one way or 
another, consciously or unconsciously, tend to suppress the 
irony. As the irony of the Akedah lies mostly in the 
concealment of the motives of the characters' acts and 
wishes, it undoubtedly attracts the interpreters to show 
their skills in providing the narrative with clear 
backgrounds as to what the characters have in mind so that 
there is no more unexplained ambiguity. The book of 
Jubilees, for instance, gives the story a prologue, similar 
to that of the story of Job, in which God and the prince 
Mastema, a satanic figure, are involved in a bet on the 
faith of Abraham. The writer of Jubilees might not see that 
nissah in itself would solve the problem of God's enigmatic 
motive which prompted him to extend the story to include 
the background of the celestial court. The addition results 
in a very different picture from that of the Hebrew since 
not only the sacrifice demands to be viewed as a temporary 
14 
means for getting the evidence of Abraham's loyalty but God 
is in any way fenced off from being seen as the initiator 
of the horror of the sacrifice. The sacrifice does not 
originate from God's but Satan's will. But, who could not 
see that the addition in Jubilees is a major reconstruction 
of the Hebrew version, logically and ideologically? The 
work of Jubilees and certainly other interpretations may 
indicate the impossibility of reading the narrative in its 
mystery and irony without introducing the elements that 
could lead to the clarification of the narrative and 
therefore to the finding of the meaning. It must be said 
however that the ways interpreters deal with the narrative 
are so different from one another that it is impossible to 
talk about meaning in singular form rather than plural. As 
this chapter is intended to delineate the differences in 
the way the Akedah has been read, it will not go into 
detail about the background and context of each 
interpreter. There is no doubt that the context of 
tradition, culture, ideology of the reader influences as 
well as forms his reading. Here we may think of the three 
different versions of Abraham's sacrifice as it is 
portrayed in Jewish, Christian and Islamic traditions. The 
first and the last traditions have an obvious difference in 
terms of the character of the son, namely, Isaac in Judaism 
and Ishmael in Islam. The Christian, however, while 
adopting. the Akedah tends to understand the narrative in 
the light of the Crucifixion of Christ. The openness of the 
Akedah to different interpretations is evident in these 
three traditions let alone if we take into account the 
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variations of reading within the traditions. Nonetheless 
the interpretations in the end work to achieve their 
conclusions in the exclusion of some other elements. The 
interpretations are certain and authoritative while the 
text is equivocal and polyphonic. As a result we may always 
find something that is repressed or marginalized by the 
interpretations. 
In chapter III we will try to look at the many 
possibilities that we can find in reading the text. It is 
implicitly or explicitly a response to the already-given 
interpretations since it is virtually impossible for us to 
get away from the previous interpretations either by way of 
acceptance or by way of negation. Having said that, our 
mode of reading should remain to be seen as different from 
the other interpretative modes including the one based on 
historical-criticism presuppositions. To use the 
structuralist distinction, it is a synchronic reading with 
the concern on the literary phenomenon of the text rather 
than a diachronic reading. our attention is not directed at 
finding the living context of the author(s) or the author's 
intention, although there is nothing to prevent us from 
thinking that such a real author or, at any rate, redactor 
existed and wrote his fiction about the Akedah. As our 
study impinges on the text, it is the narrator instead of 
the author that we will deal with. We know the narrator 
through its voices in the narrative. We would not, however, 
regard the narrator as a human being. The narrator is a 
narrative device whose voice leads us to accept some 
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images. The narrator does not always work straightforwardly 
so that we can understand the story without any difficulty. 
In fact it works with many voices which are often 
incoherent, even conflictual. In analyzing the way Abraham 
is portrayed in the book of Genesis, we will find the many 
voices or points of view in which Abraham can equally be 
seen as a pious believer and as a selfish husband and 
father, or, he may indeed be seen as a God's foolish 
puppet. In the Akedah the many and competing voices will in 
turn become an unresolvable paradox between the desire to 
end Isaac's life and the desire to save Isaac'. 
Chapter IV f ocuses on the paradoxical desires. The desire 
to annihilate Abraham's descendant is not at all unique to 
the Akedah as both Lot and Ishmael have also experienced a 
lethal danger in their lives. The Akedah is different only 
because God overtly states his will in the form of the 
sacrificial command. Does God demand human sacrifice? In 
this chapter we will discuss this question and its impact, 
that is, the violent desire of God which is deeply rooted 
in the Akedah. Different from the previous chapter, the 
Akedah here is studied almost exclusively as an independent 
story. It is made possible since the Akedah is an unbroken 
narrative that could also be read as a separate story. 
Our reading in Chapter IV inevitably raises a moral problem 
since we live in the modern era in which human sacrifice 
and its violent effects are simply intolerable. Chapter V, , 
while considering the answers of some modern commentators 
17 
to the problem, also looks at the possibility of deriving a 
message from the narrative. To say that a biblical 
narrative like the Akedah has a significance for life 
today, we would surely have to face the moral dilemma of 
the sacrifice. Kierkegaard, in this case, has attempted to 
highlight the dilemma although in the end he comes to a 
conclusion that repudiates the absoluteness of modern 
morality as well as rationality. But, Kierkegaard's answer, 
if it can be said so, is by no means plain though, as he 
would maintain, it is paradoxical. Abraham is a paradoxical 
being who believes in the absurdity. As we cannot 
understand Abraham, we cannot follow his deed either. In 
other words, there is nothing that we can learn from 
Abraham except that we shadow him in his journey into 
absurdity. Surely, apart from the paradox of Abraham's 
faith, as Kierkegaard contends, the Akedah consists of a 
few more paradoxes. There are paradoxes which, taken 
together, would take us nowhere. As a matter of fact, this 
is the feeling of nothingness that we find in the end of 
the Akedah as Isaac vanishes from the story. The end of the 
Akedah where Abraham is seen as walking back home with his 
servants is in fact a suspended end. We are reminded again 
of J's irony since the clash of voices makes the story 
indeterminate and the disappearance of Isaac raises the 
indeterminacy to the level where the readers are simply 
left in despair. 
There remains a problem of the interpretation of the 
indeterminate narrative, especially if the reading is 
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expanded to an end in which the meaning of the story must 
be shown. This is also a problem of the commentaries 
produced on the basis of historical criticism where, 
despite the claim of objectivity, their conclusions remain 
to be regarded as interpretative and bearing the 
commentators' ideologies. one may say that despite the 
awareness of the indeterminacy, this thesis has one or two 
times also become entangled with the business of meaning 
production which, if true, would more appropriately 
describe a basic need to understand, even of a mystery that 
is equivalent to the basic will for survival rather than a 
deliberate effort to impose upon the narrative a meaning. 
However, we are ready to admit that there is no 
interpretation that can represent the whole conflicting 
phenomena of the text. There is always insuffiency of 
interpretation in writing down the unstable images in the 
narrative. As Meir Sternberg says, "in principle there is 
always a difference between what we reconstruct from the 
given text and what we find constructed on the text's 
surface, between what happened in the world of hi(story) 
and what unfolds in the art of hi(story) telling". 6 
Interpretation should therefore at best be related with the 
task of recognizing and spelling out all the possibilities 
a text may contain without attempting to canalize them into 
a specific meaning. Perhaps in the chaotic moment in 
hearing the many voices of the narrative as well as being 
placed in uncertainty, we may find a strength or even a 
6Meir Sternberg, "Tim and Space in Biblical (Hi)story Telling: 
The Grand Chronology, " in The Book and the Text: The Bible and Literary 
Theory, ed. Regina M. Schwartz, 1990, p. 98. 
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meaning, not primarily the meaning of the story rather it 
is a meaning of life. In the end, since the main concern of 
this thesis is on interpretation and hermeneutics, I would 
like to quote Regina M. Schwartz who says, "these questions- 
about the design of the narratives, about gender 
construction, about repression in the Bible, about 
prophetic sublimity, about multiplicity of interpretations, 
about the politics of interpreting, about decentered 
subjects, about the Bible in ancient popular culture, and 
about biblical understanding of space and time- these 
questions are difficult to cordon off from the preserve of 
biblical theology and hermeneutics, even when they are 
broached from a secular perspective ... Biblical authority is 
not safe from all of these questions- in part because 
theological questions are more difficult to separate from 
literary theory than they were from the discoveries of 
archeologists and philologists; in part because questions 
of faith are matters of theory". 7 
7Regina M. Schwartz, "Introduction: on Biblical Criticism, " in 
The Book and the Text: The Bible and Literary Theory, 1990, p. 14. 
CHAPTER 11 
RECEPTION HISTORY OF THE ZUKEDZU1 
To doubt one's own capacity to be free from 
preunderstanding which necessarily colors 
the perceptions and interpretations of 
reality is the beginning of epistemological 
wisdom. None may claim "Archimedean vantage 
point" from which to peer at truth. 
Duncan S. Ferguson, Biblical Hermeneutics 
20 
Judah Goldin in his introduction to Spiegel's The Last 
Trial remarks on the reception of the story of the binding 
of Isaac in this way, "each generation has its own 
experiences and its own concerns. These inevitably affect 
the conception of the story; they also affect the ways the 
story is used. "I This remark reminds us of what is commonly 
argued by recent literary critics about the relativity of 
interpretation with regard to the entanglement of the 
readers' subjective points of view. The power of reading 
actually lies in the reader's own experience and concerns 
that one way or another form his strategy of reading and, 
therefore, the product. Thus, each generation or even each 
community produces its own readings that may entirely 
differ from another community (although not necessarily 
unrelated) that is separated by time as well as ideology. 
In this chapter we will look at the differences that take 
place either in translational texts or in various 
I. S. Spiegel, The Last Trial: On the Legends and Lore of the 
Canand to Abraham to offer Isaac -as a Sacrifice: The Akedah, 1967, 
P. xvi. 
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interpretations of the Akedah. At the same time we may also 
perceive what Goldin indicates as the use of the story. 
Since, as much as the story is interpreted it is also used 
in many ways to provide the ideological basis of action. 
From time to time, the interpretation of a biblical passage 
has to face such a practical demand. A tension may arise as 
the biblical narratives do not always furnish the readers 
with satisfactory answers to their problems, or, that the 
historical context of the readers demands another solution 
from the one suggested in the Bible. The opacity of the 
narrative -is certainly another problem that the readers 
have to deal with whether or not the problem can be solved. 
lation: the Septuaqint and Ta 
The Septuagint2 
As a (Greek) translation the Septuagint (LXX) follows 
closely the Hebrew version. Reconstructions mainly emerge 
as a necessary attempt to clarify the obscurity in the 
Hebrew version. To keep the sequence flowing orderly and 
logically, the LXX diminishes the paratactical performance 
which is typical of the Hebrew Bible. There is no doubt 
that the syntactical style of the Hebrew which mainly 
avoids any intrusive notion of causation is "a style that 
2 The version which is used here is septuaginta: Vetus 
Testarwnt= Graec= Auctoritate Acadendae Scientiar= Gottingensis 
editun, vol. I, Genesis, 1974, ed. J. W. Wevers. 
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cries out for interpretation". 3 The LXX must first of all 
have responded to it, as it needed to produce a plausible 
translation. The Hebrew, conjunction waw that marks the 
beginning of the sentences in vv. 3,6,7,8a, Sb, 9 for 
instance, does not have its Greek equivalent (kai) in the 
LXX. As a consequence the sentences of the LXX look more 
interconnected and therefore the narrative easier to 
follow. A case in point is vv. 8 and 9, when Abraham 
finishes replying to Isaac's question it is said, 
"poreuthentes de amphoteroi hama (8b) elthon epi ton topon 
(9)(both having gone together (they)came to the place)... " 
While the MT notes, "wayyelekhu Sveneyhem yahdaw (8b) 
wayyabho'u 'el-hammaqom (9) (and they went both of them 
together and they came to the place). LXX links the 
sentence in 8b with the following sentence that reveals the 
event of the arrival at the sacrificial place. "Both having 
gone together", therefore, forms an introduction for 
"(they) came to the place". It portrays poignantly the 
intimate relationship between the father and the son in the 
last seconds of the life of the son as if they are united 
in the sacrifice. In the MT, the two sentences have a 
different depiction. They disclose two consecutive events, 
the moment when the characters still walk together towards 
the terminal point and when they get to the place. Besides 
in v. 8b the sentence wayyeleku sveneyhem yahdaw also appears 
in v-6. Between the two verses is the brief dialogue of 
Isaac and Abraham in which Isaac's question is answered 
3David Lawtm, Faith, Text and History: The Bible in Ehglish, 1990, p. 93. 
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ambiguously. The togetherness in v. 8b might have been 
superficial as Isaac keeps wondering over his question and 
Abraham has just deceived his son. It is the tension 
between the father and the son that probably occupies the 
moment of arrival at the sacrificial site rather than the 
intimate unity that we find in the LXX. But, surely it is 
another logical chain, apart from and in contradiction to 
the LXX, that may be concluded from the seemingly loosely 
connected phrases of vv. 8b and 9. 
For the sake of clarity, the LXX may also choose 
expressions which are not a word-for-word translation of 
the Hebrew Bible. The name of the sacrificial site (v. 2) 
indicated as 'eres hammoriyyah (the land of Moriah) by the 
MT is rendered as ten gen ten hupselen (the high land) by 
the LXX. The difference may show the inclination of the LXX 
to avoid using unfamiliar names, the names which were 
unrecognisable for its audiences such as hammoriyyah. On 
the other hand, the high land may perhaps point to the 
Temple in Jerusalem where religious sacrifices ý were 
commonly held. If this is true, we may say that the LXX 
reflects a tradition which constituted an ideological link 
between the biblical story of Akedah and the sacrifices 
performed in the temple of Jerusalem. As Spiegel says, "one 
may regard the biblical Akedah story as a kind of 
confirmation from Heaven and approval by the Most High, of 
the rightness, the propriety of the Temple-service in 
Jerusalem. 114 of course, we cannot be absolutely sure that 
4 Spiegel, Last Trial, p. 73. 
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what the LXX means by "the high land" is the Temple. For us 
who are not the real readers to whom the, passage was 
originally addressed, "the high land" can mean anywhere. 
But, the definite article ten may indicate that the LXX 
refers to a particular high land that only its 
contemporaries could understand without any further 
information as to its exact location. 5 At any rate, "the 
high land" may be understood as an indication of a 
sacrificial site since many sacrifices took place on high 
ground. By assigning "the high land" for its translation 
the LXX may probably try to demonstrate the sacrifice of 
Isaac by Abraham as being one of sacrificial rites. If we 
read the passage within the hypotactical nature of the LXX, 
we may have an unmistakable depiction of a ritual exercise 
executed step by step by the character. The LXX seems to 
put stress on the worship of Abraham as well as his piety. 
Seeing the emphasis on the process of the sacrifice, one 
may wonder if the LXX overlooks the distinctiveness of the 
sacrificial victim. The sacrifice is peculiar because of 
the human object, but it is the more so as Isaac is 
promised to be the bearer of Abraham's name (21: 12). In the 
MT Isaac is even seen as the only son of Abraham (22: 2). 
The LXX notes Isaac as ton uion sou ton agapeton (your son, 
your belov'ed one). 6 The unique status of Isaac seems to be 
S 5The cultural and historical context of the LXX is U'UallY 
understood as Jewish Diaspora around third to first centuries B. C. E. 
However, evidence for the canTunities where the LXX was written is not known. 
6Scm other texts besides the LXX render ton =nogene (the only 
me) for the Hebrew yehidka. See Wevers, Septuaginta: G5ttingensis, 
p. 213. 
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less significant to be put in the fore than the emotional 
bond between the father and the son. A question such as the 
continuation of Abraham's clan that has been put in 
jeopardy by the sacrifice of the only son is apparently no 
more the issue here than in the MT. 
Furthermore, the Hebrew word used by the MT to describe 
Abraham's activity aimed at Isaac: 'aqad (to bind) has 
apparently lost its appeal as a unique word in its 
translation in the LXX. The Greek word sumpodisas (to bind 
hand and foot, sometimes only the feet) is also used in the 
case of binding a criminal, e. g., Dan. 3: 20ff. It may 
complete the LXX's portrayal that hardly bears the sense of 
the distinctiveness of the sacrifice. 
In v. 19, the LXX renders the etymological explanation of 
Beersheba: the well of the oath. It may reflect an 
exegetical method that by deciphering Hebrew names one may 
grasp the meaning of the story. But the meaning would never 
come straightforwardly (the deliverance of meaning through 
a name itself clearly indicates the indirectness) and only 
by way of allusion. Although the translation of the Hebrew 
name itself still does not provide a clear message and 
direction as to which part of the story it must be linked 
to obtain the intended meaning, it has moved one step 
forward from the obliqueness of allusion towards plainness 
of meaning. While one still doubts if the Hebrew narrative 
contains a plain and coherent meaning, the translational 
text seems to lead the readers to encounter such a meaning. 
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Here are two texts of a different nature. 
The LXX is, after all, not merely a translation, if there 
is any such thing at all, but also an interpretation that 
seeks to set up a clear meaning of the story so that the 
story could be easily digested by the audiences. Moreover, 
as J. Dines indicates in her note on the subjectiveness of 
Septuagint translation, "a translation may-thus also be a 
% re-reading' of the parent text in the light of the 
convictions, needs and prejudices of the community from 
which it emerges. 117 
Targum Onqelos 
Targum Onqelos is a translation of the Hebrew Bible, as the 
LXX, in Aramaic. It is generally known that the Targum was 
written for the needs of Jewish communities, in the time 
when Aramaic was the lingua franca, for those who wanted to 
study Torah but no longer had access to the Hebrew. 'D Its 
function as representing Scripture itself is apparent in 
that it stays reasonably loyal to the Hebrew text. 
Considering its interpretative elements, the Targum can be 
7 J. Dines, "Septuagint, " in A Dictionary of Biblical 
Interpretation, ed. R. J. Coggins and J. L. Houlden, 1990, p. 622. 
OTarguns existed probably in Babylonia before the end of the 
third century C. E. but it involved a long and complex development before reaching its present form. Bowker says, "it was a deliberate 
atteffpt to rake an Ararraic translation, and that it rray well have been 
a part of the general atteffpt in Judaism from the second century A. D. 
onward to provide authoritative translations as a safeguard against 
Christian interpretations, of scripture based on LXX. " J. Bowker, The Targu= and Rabbinic Literature: An Introduction to Jewish 
Interpretations of Scripture, 1969, pp. 24-5. 
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said to lie half-way between the LXX (which incorporated 
interpretation but remained relatively close to the Hebrew 
text) and those works which set out to retell the biblical 
narrative in their own words, often for their own 
particular purposes, for examples, another Targum: Pseudo 
Jonathan, the book of Jubilees. These books follow the 
Hebrew narrative only very roughly, and they were prepared 
to introduce incidents or comments to make the narrative 
more meaningful. 9 Differing from them Targum Onqelos makes 
an attempt to translate the text verse by verse, yet at the 
same time it introduces its own interpretati-ons for the 
sake of clarity in expression, adjustment with contemporary 
knowledge as well as ideological reassessment. 
Our first encounter with Targum Onqelos' own reading 
deviating from the Hebrew text is in the indication of 
Abraham's destination as commanded by the divinity 
(consistently represented with the Tetragrammaton, perhaps 
to avoid giving the impression of the plurality of God as 
in the term 'elohim while confining itself to the 
monotheistic depiction) as "the land of worship" instead of 
"the land of Moriah" (MT). In the MT the exact location of 
a place named Moriah itself is unclear and has no other 
mention except that in 2Chron. 3: 1 which gives the location 
of the Temple of Jerusalem on mount Moriah. There is little 
wonder that 2Chron. 3: 1 is part of the tradition in Judaism 
that linked Mount Moriah with the Jerusalem Temple. In 
itself, Moriah would have been an unknown place. This 
9Bowker, ibid., pp. 8,9. 
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tradition could have influenced the knowledge of the 
authors of Targum Onqelos which, rather -than rendering the 
unknown place Moriah, writes the land of worship to mean 
the Temple. But, how can we possibly assume that the land 
of worship refers to the Jerusalem Temple? It is known that 
the origin of the targumic traditions was closely connected 
with the synagogue which in this early period of 
development still, referred to a place, or better an 
assembly (the meaning of synagogue), in which Torah was 
read and studied. our knowledge of the development of the 
synagogue itself is unclear due to the lack of direct 
evidence from this period. However, as Bowker says, "the 
origin of the synagogue in Judea was closely connected with 
the ma'amadoth", i. e., "divisions of the people throughout 
Judea, which were intended to correspond to the twenty-four 
courses of the priest in the Temple ... Each ma'amad 
assembled, when its turn came, to read passages of 
scripture corresponding to the sacrifices taking place in 
Jerusalem. "10 After the destruction of the Temple by the 
Romans in 70 C. E., the synagogue became the traditional 
place where not'only Torah was read and studied but where 
worship, which had been normally enacted in Jerusalem, was 
conducted. A similar process happened in the diaspora where 
the link with Jerusalem was cut off. Physically, no more 
attachment could be made to the Temple in this kind of 
situation, but there is little doubt - that the Temple 
Possessed significant meaning in the ideology of Judaism. 
Since the Temple was important both before and after its 
10 Bowker, ibid. , p. 9. 
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destruction, it was apparently necessary for the Jews to 
associate the Templ& with the past events in order to 
obtain the historical significance of the place and the 
activities in it as well as to underscore its authority. 
Evidence from the life of the Patriarchs was possibly 
employed as a confirmation of the authority and legitimacy 
of the worship particularly the sacrifice-related ones that 
were connected with the Jerusalem Temple. It might be 
achieved by drawing a line of continuity between the events 
in the past (the sacrifice of Isaac by Abraham) and the 
present sacrifices so that the latter is to be seen as a 
consequence of the former. "The land of worship" itself was 
more a reflection of the latter generation who looked back 
to the history of the Patriarchs in the light of their own 
experience which resulted in such a rendering. 
At the same time when worship is emphasised, there emerges 
the problem of whether the sacrifice of Isaac itself can be 
thought of as worship. The Targum might have been alert to 
the possibility that the sacrifice is understood negatively 
(as a crime, for instance), that it shows the need to 
confine the accomplishment of the sacrifice in a special 
way. "Offer him up there as a burnt offering before me" 
(v. 2). It cannot be done anywhere except before God at a 
specific place. One may observe that in this particular 
case the Targum sought to personify the divinity, a style 
that is practically taboo in the writings but has to be 
used in order to make a clear statement that the sacrifice 
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has got to be done under divine control. " The reverse 
might also be possible. Abraham is perhaps understood not 
as an ordinary-man. As a terrestrial being he, unlike other 
men, has a privilege to conduct a face-to-face meeting with 
the divinity. The sacrifice is a private matter between God 
and Abraham which nobody else could see, which inevitably 
underlines a conspiratorial act by both of them. 
The avoidance of anthropomorphism in the Targum is 
conspicuous in v. 8, "Before adonai (it) is revealed (which 
is) the sheep, for the burnt offering, 0 my son. " The MT on 
the other hand records "God will provide himself the lamb 
for a burnt offering my son. " It is commonly recognised 
that, as Grossfeld says, "the general tendency in the 
Targum is towards the transcendentalization of God. In line 
with this view, a characteristic of Targum Onqelos is 
reverence for God in all ways of speaking about or to Him. 
Consequently, the Hebrew, which is characterized by a 
certain freedom of expression and by colorful, idioms, is 
invariably paraphrased. 1112 Emerging from the Targum's 
paraphrase'. - however, is not only the sense that the animal 
is not directly provided by the divinity but it is not 
necessarily provided by the divinity. The above sentence 
may well be accepted as an alternative expression for the 
same content of the Hebrew version. But, in its own right 
the sentence lacks clarity. God passively receives the 
burnt offering while we are not informed as to who provides 
"Carpare with vv. 8,14,16 which obviously paraphrase the Hebrew 
anthropomrphic expression so that God can be seen as transcendental. 
12B. Grossfeld, The Targun Cnqelos to Genesis, 1988, P-19. 
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the sheep. As an answer to Isaac's question, this statement 
is perplexing. The tendency of transcendental i zing God in 
targumic translation has lessened the clarity of the story. 
Nonetheless, the ambiguity over who will provide the animal 
seems to match up to the description of the mysterious 
emergence of the animal (v. 13). 
Targum Onqelos renders 'hd (a/one) as the attribute for the 
ram in v. 13 rather than 'hr (behind) as does the MT. This 
a 
attribution endorses the mysteriousness of the origin of 
the ram. In MT's reading we are still made aware of the 
location of the ram. Whether the ram has been there, behind 
Abraham, since Abraham arrived at the site we do not know 
but, at least, the ram comes from behind Abraham at the 
time he sees it. On the other hand, the Targum's portrayal 
has made the ram as if it had arisen out of soil. It 
suddenly presents itself in front of Abraham. Possibly the 
Targum wants to show that the ram is provided by the 
divinity himself. The ram will eventually be sacrificed in 
Isaac's stead. The spontaneous intiative by Abraham to 
sacrifice the ram comes as a sudden act too. 
The Targum opens up the event as "and Abraham raised his 
eyes. after these (things/words)". The HT does not have the 
phrase "after these". The phrase, however, is reminiscent 
of the beginning of v. 1. If in v. 1 the phrase functions to 
introduce a new event that follows, so it does in v-13. The 
sacrifice of the ram is a new development in the story. It 
happens after the former preparation and consummation of 
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Isaac's sacrifice is cancelled by the angel of adonai (this 
celestial being is another targumic transcendentalized 
translation of the Hebrew messenger of Yahweh). Although 
the sacrifice of the only son has been stopped, the 
sacrificial worship itself is to be continued -by the 
sacrifice of the ram. It is a further emphasis on worship 
which has actually been apparent since v. 2 and that will 
become more obviousIn the next verse. 
The Targum reads v. 14 differently from the MT, "and Abraham 
worshipped and prayed there, in that place, and he said, 
"Here, before the Lord, shall ffuturej generations worship" 
Therefore, it is said on this day: on this mountain did 
Abraham worship before the Lord. " The Targum translates the 
Hebrew qr: to call as "to pray". it 'is observed by 
Grossfeld that "this Targum, consistently renders the 
Hebrew qr' in this context as signalizing 'prayer'.... In 
addition to prayer (Hebrew sl'), plk (worship) occurs in 
some instances either by itself (Gen. 33: 20) or together 
with pray. "13 So that instead of naming the place, Abraham 
is seen as praying and worshipping. This is thought to 
provide a basis for the worship of the generations after 
Abraham. Thus, the story functions as an aetiology of the 
place where traditional worship is to be held. It is 
important to notice the attempt to establish a continuation 
of the past event with the present tradition. The 
translation of v. 14 might reflect the view of the Akedah in 
the tradition because of its strong reference to the future 
13Grossfeld, ibid., p. 65. 
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generations. 14 However, the sentence has been reconstituted 
in relation to the Hebrew text. 
The MT's version is densely occupied by puns that surround 
the naming of the place. "wayyiqra' abhraham S"em-hammagom 
hahu' Yahweh yiz-'eh 'as"er ye'amer hayyom behar Yahweh 
yera'eh (and Abraham called the name of that place 
'Yahweh 
will provide/see' as it is said to this day on {the) mount 
Yahweh will be seen or it (refers to the animal) will 
be 
seen or it will be provided). "Is The 'words yir'eh and 
yera'eh enshroud at least four puns: yir'eh (he will see) 
the resonance of which can be found in v. 8, yera'eh (he was 
seen), yore' (one who fears) that resounds in v. 12, wayya'r' 
(and he saw) that appears twice in v. 4 and v. 13. What in 
the past was still in the form of hope and belief of the 
father and son (v. 8) has now become real by the sacrifice 
of the ram. And the place that was seen by Abraham from a 
distance (V. 4) probably with an anxious mind calculating 
the time of the sacrifice of his son that was nearer than 
ever, turned out to be the place where the substitute 
animal was revealed in front of Abraham. The belief that 
Yahweh would provide the animal sacrifice can, therefore, 
be proved (although perhaps Abraham did not really mean it 
when he replied to Isaac's question). The puns therefore 
link several events and images by assonance. The common 
14Concerning the Akedah in the tradition, see Chapter 11.2, for 
example, pp. 45-47. 
15The obscurity of Yahweh yeraleh rray possibly be explained in 
the light of the atteapt to transcendentalize the divinity as shown by 
Targ= Onqelos so that it is an oblique expression of "Yahweh will 
provide the sacrificial animal" whereas the literal translation will 
say "(to) Yahweh it will- be. provided! '. 
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motive of puns is clearly expressed by Walter Redfern, 
Vipuns appeal to those who want to say several things at 
once, and for whom unambiguous utterance is too linear and 
restricting. "16 
The link between what Abraham has done in the Akedah and 
its effect for the future generations is highlighted again 
in the context of transmission of the blessings. The 
declaration of the blessings is opened with an oath by the 
angel of adonai "By my Memra I swear, says adonai,. o. 
if As 
in the MT it is not clear whether this is the angel's 
utterance or God's. The Targum seems to complicate the 
identification of the subject by inserting memra as "a 
circumvention for the idea of God. "17 So there are the 
angel, Memra and God who are possibly involved in giving 
the utterance. Meanwhile, the language of the blessings is 
virtually linear, replacing some metaphorical terms of the 
Hebrew with semantically straightforward words. The Targum 
renders "your descendants" for the Hebrew "your seeds", 
"the cities of their enemies" for "the gates of their 
enemies" (v. 17). And for the ambiguous Hebrew phrase 
hithbarakhu bhezar-P 'akha kol goyey Wares (by your 
descendants shall all nations of the earth bless 
themselves), the Targum offers the paraphrase: "on account 
of your descendants shall all people of the earth be 
16Walter Redfern, Puns, 1984, p. 177. 
17M. Ginsburger as quoted in Grossfeld, Cnqelos, p. 25. The Memra 
can also be understood as "a world-permating force, a reality in the 
world of rmtter or rrdnd, the immanent aspect of God holding all things 
under its amipresent sway. " J. Abelson as quoted in Grossfeld, Cnqelos, 
p. 27. 
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blessed because you have accepted my Hemra". it is 
indicated that the deeds of Abraham and his descendants 
determine the divine blessings for other peoples. So that, 
in this understanding, whether the people are blessed 
depends entirely on the merit of Abraham and his 
descendants. It shows the exclusive right possessed by 
Abraham's descendants as the only mediator of divine 
blessings, simply because they are Abraham's descendants. 
The Targum does not seem doubtful in expressing, what one 
might call, the chauvinistic idea of the people who claim 
themselves as Abraham's descendants. This might arise as an 
attempt to defend the national identity and dignity of the 
Jews who at that time lived under foreign rule (Roman). 
Another possibility is that the Targum was written when the 
rise of Christianity was felt as a challenge to the 
existence of the Jews as Abraham's descendants who had been 
chosen to be the source of the blessings for the nations. 
It is known that Targum Onqelos was used within the context 
of worship. In this context, the unity between events in 
the past and the present plays an important role in the 
mind of the worshippers. In their understanding, the divine 
blessings derive from the merit of the Patriarchs as well 
as their own obedience. The blessings as a reward for the 
merit of the Akedah were understood not only for the 
Patriarchs but also for the succeeding generations. This 
understanding became more obvious in the so-called doctrine 
of the merit of the Akedah in Rabbinic tradition. Thus, the 
emphasis of the Targum is most of all on the link between 
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the history of the Patriarchs and the following generations 
in the context of worship and blessings. In this case, it 
virtually differs from Targum Ps. jonathan and much Rabbinic 
literature in that Onqelos alone takes for granted the 
command to sacrifice Isaac which for others seems to be 
problematic. 
II. 2. Midrashic readings 
Targum Ps. Jonathan's and Genesis Rabbah19 reflect the need 
for explaining the reason for the command to sacrifice 
Isaac which in the MT as well as in the translation texts 
is simply taken for granted. Both texts mention a quarrel 
between Ishmael and Isaac, who want to prove who is the 
most beloved son of their father. The quarrel appears as a 
prelude to the sacrificial command. 20 In the end Isaac 
declares an unrivalled challenge to Ishmael by allowing 
himself to be sacrificed. This story does not only provide 
a reason for the divine command that initiates the Akedah 
but at the same time it deliberately shows the great 
courage of Isaac. Isaac is known as a 37 years old man who, 
therefore, would have been able to resist his aged father 
had he wanted to. "The testing of Abraham thus becomes a 
testing also of Isaac. Abraham's offering of his son 
18 See Bowker, Targmis, pp. 224-6. 
191lidrash Rabbah: Genesis, tr. Rabbi Dr. H. Free&= and Maurice 
Simon, 1939. 
20Another Targm (Neofiti) explains that the Akedah was brought 
about by God's desire to test Abraham. It renders the test as the tenth 
of such tenvtations, the same rendering as that of the book of 
Jubilees. 
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becomes Isaac's self-oblation. "21 
Genesis Rabbah fortifies the depiction of Isaac as the 
beloved son of Abraham, "said He (God) to him (Abraham): 
'. take, I pray thee- I beg thee- thy so ' 'Which son? ' he 
asked. Thine only son, replied He. 'But each is the only 
one of his mother? '- whom thou lovest- 'is there a limit to 
the affections? ' even Isaac, said He. And why did He not 
reveal it to him without delay? In order to make him 
(Isaac) even more beloved in his eyes and reward him for 
every word spoken. " Is it necessary for Abraham to be urged 
to love Isaac more? Did the Rabbis realise that Abraham's 
love for Isaac is unconvincing? The comment astonishingly 
implies so. But the biblical narrative may support this 
implication. 22 
The comparison of the worthy son, Isaac and the less worthy 
son, Ishmael f orms another part of the story in the Targum 
in which Ishmael is disclosed as one of the two servants 
(the other one is Eliezer) . The servants are regarded as 
inferior as they cannot see what Abraham and Isaac can, 
that is, the cloud over the hill that marks God's presence. 
On this basis, they are left behind with the asses (the 
Bible does not have any explanation for this event). The 
servants do not deserve to worship (this is the overt 
motive of Abraham going up the hill as he declares to the 
servants) with Abraham and Isaac in the holY place. The 
21 Philip S. Alexander, "Aqedah", in A DictionarY of Biblical 
Interpretation, ed. R. J. Coggins and J. L. Houlden, 1990, p. 45. 
22 See Chapter III 
38 
belittling depiction of Ishmael may possibly be perceived 
as having its basis primarily in the Bible. God, regardless 
of Ishmael, describes Isaac as the only (yýd) and beloved 
son of Abraham. In the hands of the Rabbis, the marginal 
place of Ishmael in Abraham's family is rationalized 
therefore becomes more apparent. It may doubtlessly happen 
because the Rabbis themselves would have a claim of 
inheritance in Isaac. With the emergence of Islam, which 
established itself as originating from Ishmael, the Rabbis, 
one may imagine, would have more strongly than ever 
projected Isaac's exceptional figure. 
Only the righteousness of Abraham makes possible the divine 
test, "when a man possesses two cows, one strong and the 
other feeble, upon which does he put the yoke? Surely upon 
the strong one. Similarly, God tests none but the 
righteous... " explains a midrash. The burdensomeness of the 
test makes it appropriate only for certain men. The analogy 
of the working cow may indicate that the test is part of a 
series of tests, like a daily job. The test is more like a 
contest of somebody's strength rather than a way to find 
out whether somebody is strong enough to endure the test. 
In other words, the Rabbis indirectly rejected any 
supposition that the test was given because God was 
doubtful about Abraham's obedience or righteousness. 23 The 
demonstration of Abraham's righteousness may also have an 
implication that the sacrifice is not in any way a popular 
23 The supposition that is indicated by the irddrash of Pirke de 
Rabbi Eliezer, for instance. 
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test. 
The test is, first of all, considered as problematic since 
it seems to contradict the other divine wishes. 24 The 
Rabbis used an illustration of a teacher who says "do not 
lend money on interest, yet himself lent on interest. " It 
obviously bewilders his student, "master, you tell me, 'do 
not lend money on interest', yet you yourself lend on 
interest! " He then replies, "I tell you not to lend on 
interest to an Israelite, but you may lend on interest to 
other nations". Another example of contradictory wishes is 
picked up from God's own statements. Israel appeals to God, 
"thou didst write in thy Torah, thou shal t not take 
vengeance, nor bear any grudge (Lev. xix, 18), yet thou doest 
so thyself, as it says, the Lord avengeth and is full of 
wrath, the Lord taketh vengeance on his adversaries, and he 
reserveth wrath for his enemies (Nah. i, 2). "25 God's answer: 
"I wrote in my Torah, 'thou shalt not take vengeance, nor 
bear any grudge' against Israel; but in respect of the 
nations- avenge the children of Israel, etc. 
(Nah. xxxi, 2). "26 SO, to avoid being trapped in a 
contradiction, one should place each command in its 
particular context. The commands are circumstantial, 
depending on to whom and when they should be applied (in 
24Which one of the divine wills that is in contradiction with 
the will to test Abraham is never specified but the Rabbis' explanation 
is no other than a response to God's contradictory wills. 
25 The quotations f ran biblical verses are taken by the Rabbis 
f rcm midrashic version, dif f ers f rom the MT. 
26Undoubtedly, Rabbinic interpretations are much coloured by 
nationalistic sentinmt that the treatnv--nt of Israelites should be more 
respectful than of other nations. 
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any way Israel should gain the benefit). By the same token, 
the test in the Akedah is specifically designed for Abraham 
at that particular moment so that God's will is not 
necessarily to be seen as in opposition to his other 
wishes.. 
Concerning the land of Moriah, some Rabbis have regarded 
the name as a pun and derived various meanings in 
conjunction with its pronounciation. The name has been 
understood as the place from where instruction (hora'ah) 
emerges, emanating religious awe (yir'ah), etc. All 
understandings are seemingly geared towards the idea that 
this is a kind of religious education centre in which one 
learns religious ethics. It apparently is interwoven with 
the - understanding that in the Akedah, Abraham is 
undertaking religious training from God so that the place 
is to be interpreted not far from it. There is also an 
interpretation which relates the Moriah to myrrh (mor). 
This myrrh is usually used as an incense in the preparation 
of worship. In this context, the emphasis is to be given to 
the worship to which Abraham's journey to the land of 
Moriah leads. In the translation of Targum Onqelos worship 
in fact emerges as the dominant theme of the Akedah, this 
text even replaces the Moriah with 'the land of worship'. 
In the MT itself the word worship, (nisvtaýaweh) appears only 
once, that is, in Abraham's message before he leaves his 
servants for the sacrificial site (v. 5). In response to 
this verse, Rabbinic interpretations accentuate the affects 
41 
of worship. "Everything happened as a reward for 
worshipping. Abraham returned in peace f rom Mount Moriah 
only as a reward for worshipping ... Israel were redeemed 
only as a reward for worshipping ... The Torah was given only 
as a reward for worshipping... " The theme of worship, as we 
have seen, is also employed by Targum Onqelos and 
apparently is very common in Jewish literature. 
Interestingly, the Rabbis did not mention the return of 
Isaac from the worship but only Abraham. The deletion is 
probably an anticipation of the absence of Isaac from the 
journey back to Beersheba at the end of the Akedah which 
the Rabbis were very much aware of. To fill the gap of 
knowledge concerning the absence of Isaac, it is said that 
Isaac was sent off to study Torah with Shem. A Jewish 
legend also mentions that Isaac was taken to Paradise in 
order to be healed from the incision made in him by his 
father when he began to offer him up as a sacrifice. 27 
Another speaks about Isaac being left on Mount Moriah for 
three years until he reached the age of forty, and then he 
married Rebeccah. 28 The Rabbis could hardly ignore the 
absence of Isaac. However, the indication in Abraham's 
message that he and Isaac will come back to his servants 
after the worship did not entail a question for the Rabbis. 
They did not regard Abraham's conflicting utterance that he 
will return with his son as ambiguous. Perhaps it was the 
naive belief in the candid piety -of Abraham that prevented 
27Spiegel, Last Trial, pp. 6,7. 
20Spiegel, Last Trial, p. 5. 
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the Rabbis from having a thought even of the slightest 
chance of the deceitfulness of Abraham. or it might be the 
mission of the Rabbis, based on their ideological belief, 
to protect Abraham from being seen as a cunning individual. 
Targum Ps. Jonathan records another reason, besides the 
worship, of what Abraham was going to do when he left his 
servants behind with the asses, i. e., to witness how the 
divine promise of many descendants is to be reestablished. 
Although the nature of the promise itself is in fact a 
contradiction of the nature of Isaac's sacrifice, the 
Targum does not have any doubt about it. Abraham's reason 
is accepted as logical. 
The attempt to bowdlerize Abraham's, image as well as 
Isaac's image may have found a problem when Isaac breaks 
the silence and asks a critical question of Abraham. Since 
Isaac is always described as a compliant son who loyally 
follows his father's plan, his question appears 
contemptuous. The Rabbis responded by presenting the 
satanic figure, Samael who first of all tries to make 
Abraham aware that he should not kill his son, given to him 
at the age of a hundred. Samael's role is reminiscent of 
the friends of Job. Having failed to deflect Abraham from 
his purpose, Samael comes to Isaac. If only for a self-, 
sacrifice Isaac is zealously ready (we may remember that 
Isaac's sacrifice is primarily based on his challenge to 
Ishmael to prove who deserves to be the dearest son) but 
when Samael reminds Isaac of so much that Sarah has done 
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for him that would be in vain had he been sacrificed, Isaac 
is prompted to beseech his father the truth of the matter. 
The existence of Samael was probably intended to avoid the 
impression that Isaac is the sole initiator of the 
question. Isaac is not to be responsible entirely for 
questioning his father because he does so under influence 
of Samael. This event ends with Abraham's answer which 
reveals the possibility of Isaac being "the animal 
sacrifice": "at all events, God will provide himself the 
lamb, 0 my son; and if not, thou art for a burnt-offering, 
my son. 1129 From this moment onwards, Isaac would remember 
that he would be the sacrificial victim. 
The biblical version is much more oblique than Genesis 
Rabbah and Targum Ps. jonathan in that it never clearly 
discloses Isaac's willingness with regard to his sacrifice. 
On the contrary, the other two texts have indicated that 
Isaac is ready to sacrifice himself from the very beginning 
(the challenge of Isaac to Ishmael) and if Isaac eventually 
launches a question, according to the Rabbis, it is because 
Samael reminds him of his mother and all her care for him. 
Isaac is much more concerned about his mother than himself. 
once again Isaac's courageous manner is depicted. 
on the arrival of Abraham and Isaac at the sacrificial 
site, the alert eyes of the Rabbis noticed "where was 
Isaac? ". Abraham builds the altar on his own, Isaac who 
apparently has helped him since the servants were left 
29 Sin-tilar expression can be f ound in Targ= Neof iti. 
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simply disappears. One of the Rabbis gives his answer by 
saying "he (Abraham) had taken and hidden him (Isaac) lest 
he who sought to seduce him throw a stone at him and 
disqualify him from serving as a sacrifice". Despite the 
seemingly contrived answer and therefore fanciful, we 
hardly disagree with the Rabbis over the gap of knowledge 
caused by the disappearance of Isaac at the sacrificial 
site. 
In the Bible, the disappearance of Isaac might be an 
allusion to Isaac's opposition to the sacrifice. As we 
know, in the Bible it is not clear whether Isaac complies 
with his father's intention. He might in the end agree to 
be sacrificed but possibly after his father forced him to 
do so which the Bible for some reason cannot disclose. 
Abraham in any way acts like a dictator in implementing the 
divine command. He hardly acts upon Isaac's consent (if it 
is necessary at all). And, as this event shows, he does not 
care whether Isaac will help him with building the altar. 
Abraham may build the altar alone because Isaac deserts him 
or is tied up to a tree as he rises in rebellion against 
his father. 
The voluntary sacrifice of Isaac plays an important role in 
the Targum as well as in Rabbinic interpretations. 
According to Geza Vermes, "the most pregnant illustration 
of Isaac's role in the sacrifice comes from R. Meir, who 
cites R. Akiba's interpretation of the commandment of the 
love of God in Deuteronomy vi. 5 (You shall love the Lord 
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your God'... with all your soul): 'like Isaac, who bound 
himself upon the altar' . 1130 The voluntariness will also 
lead to the acceptance of the sacrifice as an unblemished 
sacrifice. The Targum writes Isaac's utterance as follows, 
"bind me well that I may not struggle at the anguish of my 
soul, and that a blemish may not be found in your offering, 
and that I may not be cast into 'the depth of destruction". 
Another tradition even goes further as saying that one 
quarter of Isaac's blood was spilled on the altar, if onlY 
the sacrifice is to be legitimate. 31 
The consent of Isaac to the sacrifice of his own life is 
central in the tradition. The Akedah is celebrated as 
commemoration of the nobility of Isaac's sacrifice that 
produces a reward for his descendants too. In fact the 
virtue of the Akedah exists in almost every, if not all, 
sacrificial event in Judaism as clearly seen by Geza Vermes 
through Rabbinic literature, 
Rabbinic writings show clearly that 
sacrifices, and perhaps the offering of all 
sacrifice, were intended as a memorial of 
Isaac's self oblation. Their only purpose 
was to remind God of the merit of him who bound himself upon the altar. 32 
The sacrifices of the following generations are intended to 
invoke the sacrifice of Isaac in front of God who, then, is 
hoped to assist them during difficult times as well as to 
grant his mercy upon the people's sins. For this reason, it 
30 Vermes, "Redenptim and Genesis xxii" in scripture and Tradition in Judaimn, 1973, p. 197. 31Spiegel, Last Trial, p. 46. 
32Vermes, op. cit., p. 209. 
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is important that Genesis 22 is regarded as a real event 
that happened in the past. 
If eventually the substitution of the sacrificial victim, 
of the ram for Isaac, did take place, in the eyes of the 
Rabbis it would not change the significance of the 
sacrifice. The ram was accepted as though it were Isaac 
himself. Isaac and the ram are considered inseparably as 
the sacrificial victim. The combination of sacrifices of 
Isaac and the ram is believed to be able to atone for the 
sins of Isaac's descendants. "According to ancient Jewish 
theology, the atoning efficacy of the Tamid offering, of 
all the sacrifices in which a lamb was immolated, and 
perhaps, basically, of all expiatory sacrifice irrespective 
of the nature of the victim, depended upon the virtue of 
the Akedah, the self-offering of that Lamb whom God had 
recognized as the perfect victim of the perfect burnt 
offering. "33 On Rosh ha-Shanah the atoning merit of the 
Akedah is most highlighted. The emergence of the ram also 
gives rise to an eschatological hope of the Messianic day, 
in the present time'which is memorialised in conjunction 
with Rosh ha-Shanah, that will be made public by blowing a 
shofar (a horn of a ram) which is thought to be one of the 
Akedah ram's. "The shofar is ubiquitous in Jewish art in 
late antiquity., being found frequently in synagogues, on 
tombstones, and on small objects. "34 Thus, the Akedah is 
used to provide a mythical basis for the ideological 
33Vern-es, op. cit., p. 211. Here, Vern-es quotes Gen. Rab. lxiv. 3. 
34P. S. Alexander, "Aqedah, " p. 46. 
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understanding of redemption from sin and of liberation from 
oppression in the present time as well as a type of the 
Messianic action that is linked with the resurrection of 
the dead in the future. 
Nevertheless, the biblical story of the Akedah never 
obviously demonstrates the voluntariness of Isaac in his 
sacrifice-as--the in. terpre. tati-v-e-texts and the tradition do. 
There is certainly a lack of strong will in the biblical 
Isaac but beyond this, Isaac remains an enigmatic 
character. We cannot know how willing he is to let his 
father sacrifice him. Neither does the Bible show the 
speciality of the substitute ram. It is just a ram which 
happens to be on the site which inspires Abraham to make a 
substitution for Isaac's sacrifice. Moreover, the 
voluntariness of Isaac's sacrifice and the fact that Isaac 
is to be bound to be the sacrifice on the altar may look 
incongruous. He would not have needed to be bound had he 
voluntarily offered his life to be sacrificed. This 
incongruity may or may not have been observed by Josephus 
who simply omitted the event of the binding of Isaac from 
the story so as to take Isaac's willingness to an 
extreme. 35 
Another eschatological motive in interpretation can be 
found in Rabbinic comments on the naming of the, place. 
Yahweh yir'eh is related to Jerusalem or the Temple that 
35ThaTa. -, W. Franxman, Genesis and the "Jewish Antiguities" 01 
Flavius Josephus, 1979, p. 161. 
48 
probably had already been destroyed for the second time by 
the time Genesis Rabbah was written. A midrash, for 
example, shows that Yahweh Yir'eh "alludes to the Temple 
built"; the phrase 'as it is said to this day: in the 
mount' refers to it destroyed"; and " 'where the Lord is 
seen' refers to it rebuilt and firmly established in the 
Messianic era". Jubilees even more clearly identifies the 
place as 'mount Sion' (XVIII: 13), a term which in 
apocalyptic texts is generally used to refer to spiritual 
Jerusalem built by the Messiah. Symbolically the 
reestablishment of the Temple in the Messianic era can be 
understood as the reestablishment of the nation itself 
since at that time the Jews were either living under Roman 
colonialization in Palestine or scattered in the countries 
of the Diaspora. Therefore, the hope for national 
reestablishment was presumably alive. 'While hoping for the 
Messianic era, there was also a need for divine protection 
in times of distress. 
Targum Ps. jonathan writes of Abraham's prayer (targumic 
interpretation of the event in Gen. 22: 14) as containing a 
prayer for future generations, "when I prayed for mercy 
from before you, 0 Lord, it was revealed before you that 
there was no deviousness in my heart, and I sought to 
perform your decree with Joy, that when the descendants of 
Isaac, my son, shall come to the hour of distress, you may 
remember them, and answer them, and deliver them; and that 
all generations to come may say, In this mountain Abraham 
bound Isaac, his son, and there the Shekina of the Lord was 
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revealed to him. " This prayer may reflect the need of 
the 
writers and their contemporaries who were in a time of 
distress for the above stated reason. 
The Targum and Rabbinic comments in Genesis Rabbah work on 
the basis of filling the gaps of the story. Many 
difficulties in the biblical version of the Akedah are 
explained and, therefore, made plain. Another example is 
about the death of Sarah. In the Bible, after the Akedah 
and the news about the children who were born by Milcah for 
Nahor, Abraham's brother, there is a statement of the death 
of Sarah (Gen. 23: 1,2). The Targum explains the death of 
Sarah as caused by bitterness after hearing of the 
slaughter of Isaac from Satan. The death ot Baran is 
related to the Akedah in which Sarah is entirely absent. 
Her innocence of the event eventually proves to be fatal as 
Satan's information shocks her deadly. The sudden death of 
Sarah is therefore accentuated. No matter whether one is 
satisf ied with such a story of the death of Sarah or with 
the presentation of a strange figure like Satan, the gap- 
filling process that has been introduced by the Targum and 
Genesis Rabbah may well represent largely the desire to 
explain away the ambiguities of the biblical narrative, or, 
the necessity of making sense of the huge gaps in the 
story, that is commonly shared amongst commentaries. 
We have acknowledged that in interpreting Abraham and 
Isaac, both the Targum and Rabbinic 'commentaries 
emphatically maintain the spiritual heroism of the 
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Patriarchs. This in fact might represent a popular belief 
in the Patriarchs in and around the time of those 
interpretations. The book of Jubilees might provide another 
example of the eulogy to the Patriarchs as it surfaces, 
in 
a courtroom setting similar perhaps to that of Job, in 
the 
grandeur of Abraham's faith in God. 36 D. S. Russell analyzes 
this general tendency as follows, 
In the years that follwed Ben Sira (writing 
about 180 BC) and on into Christian era the 
patriarchs gained a new prominence and 
popularity within Judaism. The stories told 
of them in scripture came to be embellished 
or amplified or altered in such a way as to 
enhance their reputation out of all 
recognition. Legends grew up around them, 
miracles were attributed to them and rewards 
were given by a grateful God by reason of 
the merit they displayed. 37 
In the case of Jubilees, important events in the lives of 
the Patriarchs are also framed within the chronology of 
Jewish festivals. 38 Jubilees 17: 15 gives the date of the 
Akedah as 15 Nisan, three days (18: 3, Gen. 22: 4) after "the 
voice in heaven" that reveals the plan to test Abraham was 
heard. At the end of the story, Abraham is recorded as 
celebrating the seven-day feast which is also celebrated 
every year thereafter (18: 18). This dating suggests that 
for the writers of Jubilees the Akedah is to be understood 
36"Jubilees", tr. R. H. Charles revised by C. Rabin in The 
Apocryphal Old Testament, ed. H. F. D. Sparks, 1984. 
37D. S. Russell, The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha: Patriarchs and 
Prophets in Early Judaism, 1987, pp. 1-2. 
380. S. Wintermute perceives, "the writer (of Jubilees) has a 
theological concern for time which is reflected in the structure of the 
book. The author believed that there was a theological value inherent 
in certain special times. " Wintermute, "Jubilees: A New Translation and 
Introduction" in The old Testament Pseudepicirapha, vol-2, ed. 
J. H. Charlesworth, 1985, p. 38. 
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in conjunction with the Passover. 39 The principle of the 
festival is to remember the liberation and salvation 
granted by the divinity. However, the context of Jubilees' 
time was far from such a liberation as people still lived 
under foreign rule and for the conservatives, to which the 
writers presumably belongedi popular hellenization as well 
as skepticism towards Jewish laws surely increased that 
concern. 40 Here, the Akedah undoubtedly possessed an 
important function in strengthening the hope of the people 
for divine liberation. The sacrifice of Isaac, like the 
sacrifices of the Passover, is a reminder of the divine 
covenant to make Israel his people, to bring them out from 
slavery and to protect them from, the enemy. 41 After all, 
Jubilees seemingly rejects the assumption , that the 
sacrifice of Isaac by Abraham was once and for all. The 
incorporation of the seven-day festival, contemporaneous 
with the writers, seems to suggest that what had been done 
by the Patriarchs was still preserved or vice versa, the 
39R. Daly, "The Soteriological Significance of the Sacrifice of 
Isaac", CBQ 39(1977), p. 55.; R. Hayward, "The Targun-dc account of the 
Sacrifice of Isaac", JJS (32)1981, pp. 145. 
40According to G. W. E. Nickel sburg, "the dating of the Book of 
Jubilees can be determined in two stages. Several factors indicate ca. 
175 and 100 B. C. E. as the outer limits. The terzTdnus post quem is 
provided by passages reflecting matters that were at issue in the 
Hellenistic reform .... Explicit citation of the Book of Jubilees in the 
Qumran Damascus Document (CD 16: 3-4) indicates a lower limit ca. 100-75 
B. C. E. Paleographical evidence from Qumran manuscripts of Jubilees 
suggests a date closer to 100 B. C. E. Within this tim span, two dates 
are possible. " Nickelsburg, Jewish Literature Between the Bible and the 
Mishnah: A Historical and Literary Introduction, 1981, p. 78- 
41The blessings at the end of the Akedah in fact refer not only 
to the liberation of Abraham's descendants but also to their 
superiority over other nations. As Jubilees writes, "and your 
descendants shall take possession of their enemies' cities (Hebrew: 
gate). And in your descendants shall all the nations of the earth be 
blessed (Hebrew: by/through your seeds all the nations shall bless 
themselves). " Similar interpretation can be found in Targumic texts as 
well as LXX. 
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existing festival had actually an antiquarian root in the 
experience of the Patriarchs and therefore was respectable. 
The mode of Jubilees, and certainly many Rabbinic 
interpretations, in recasting the biblical Akedah by 
bringing in some aspects of contemporary tradition might 
well be intended to persuade the readers to be insiders of 
the (hi)story. The (hi)story is no longer an unrelated 
event that happened in the past but is a part of the 
readers' lives. Reading is actually a dialogical 
relationship between the readers and their contemporary 
world on the one hand and the story world on the other 
hand. What happens here is that while the story projects 
its images into the readers' mind, the readers will 
understand the story only by responsively projecting their 
own values, knowledge, ideologies, and cultures into the 
story. The projection of the readers' world into the story 
is in fact essential, otherwise the story will remain 
strange to the readers. The writers of Jubilees might have 
realised very well that it deliberately provides 
interpretative keys in af orm of contemporary events and 
let the readers understand the story only in this light. 
This makes Jubilees' reading arbitrary in a sense that for 
a reader who does not belong to its community it is 
possible either not to understand or, to understand the 
story differently. A reader who has never practised or 
indeed seen the seven-day festival would be unlikely to 
grasp Jubilees' reading. But, it certainly was not the case 
in the community where Jubilees existed, for them this kind 
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of presentation could result in a better understanding of 
the story. 
one may notice that although like some Rabbinic 
interpretations Jubilees expresses the need for explanation 
of, the enigmatic elements in the Akedah such as the 
unprecedented divine command for Isaac's sacrifice, it may 
take a different way of explanation. Jubilees does not 
suggest that the reason for such a command lies in human 
affairs like the quarrel between Ishmael and Isaac, nor 
does it understand it as God's capricious desire. Instead, 
it casts a theatrical setting which takes place in heaven 
where first of all it is revealed that Abraham "had been 
faithful in doing everything he (the Lord) had told him to 
do, and that he loved the Lord, and that in every 
affliction he had been faithful"(xvii: 15). Afterwards comes 
the prince Mastema, a satanic accuser who in his curiosity 
asks God to once again and more severely test Abraham. It 
appears that the prince Mastema is the only member of these 
heavenly beings who is skeptical about Abraham's faith. 
Accordingly, it is also he who at the end is put to shame 
as Abraham shows no lack of faith in God (xviii: 11). Hardly 
in the book of Genesis can we find a depiction of divine 
conference as detailed as this, especially with regard to 
the presence of the opposite representative such as the 
prince Mastema. The presentation itself may simply reflect 
the Popular belief at the time Jubilees was written. 42 But 
42 In the Bible a sirdlar model of the divine council can only be 
read in the book of Job, with hints and allusions elsewhere (cf. Isa. 
40: 1,6: 6ff). 
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what can also be thought about it is that it might be an 
attempt to elucidate the opposing wills of the divinity 
that is ultimately pervasive in Genesis narratives. The 
presence of the prince Mastema as the initiator of the test 
may give the background of the destructive will of God's 
command which in Genesis remains mysterious. At the same 
time Jubilees makes itself apologetic for God since after 
all it was the prince Mastema who provoked the command and 
not God himself since God had already known that Abraham 
would be loyal to him. 43 The notion of the divine 
omniscience was later rejected by a midrash of Pirke de 
Rabbi Eliezer from probably eight century C. E. which does 
not assume that God, in fact, knows Abraham's mind without 
testing him. Acknowledging the tradition about the ten 
trials of Abraham, which appears also in Jubilees, this 
midrash seems to believe that all the tests, not only the 
Akedah, were designed so that God would discover both 
Abraham's mind and his capacity to follow-through. 44 The 
most attempted refinement of the story by Jubilees is, in 
fact, no longer about the exclusion of the destructive will 
from God than in the deletion of any possibility that 
Isaac's sacrifice might end up in a real sacrifice. Even 
the prince Mastema, the satanic accuser, is never recorded 
as really suggesting a real sacrifice of Isaac. His demand 
43 The strongest apologia can be read in Josephus' declarations 
that God had not issued the cannand f rom a craving for hu-nan blood; nor 
had He made Abraharý a father only in order to rob him in so inpious a fashion of his offspring. See Franxrran, Genesis, p. 161. 44 Lewis M. Barth, "Introducing the Akedah: A ccnvarison of Two 
Midrashic Presentations. " in A Tribute to Geza Verrms: Essays on Jewish 
and Christian Literature and History, ed. P. R. Davies and R. T. White, JSOT SS 100,1990, p. 132. 
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would never exceed a mere test. Thus, when Abraham succeeds 
in accomplishing the sacrifice, the prince is put to shame. 
This is the farthest possible condition that the skeptic 
has to suffer. The prince could never be punished in 
connection with murder since the death of Isaac is never 
his intention. Unlike Jubilees, the book of Genesis does 
not seem to eliminate the possibility that Isaac's 
sacrifice could be real. 45 
The apologetic nature of Jubilees, however, seems to 
prevent it from penetrating deeply into the disappearance 
of Isaac at the end of the story which might be the cause 
of the speculation as to the death of Isaac. In the 
prologue of his book which reveals the many tragedies in 
Jewish history inspired by the Akedah Spiegel says, 
Even the ancients, long ago, were surprised 
that immediately after the Akedah- after 
Isaac was bound on the altar to be 
sacrificed by his father at God's command, 
and then just as categorically ordered to be 
released and not to be even so much as 
bruised- that immediately after that, all 
traces of Isaac son of Father Abraham 
disappear. 46 
But if the ignorance of the absence of Isaac was perhaps 
caused by Jubilees' insensitivity and not necessarily due 
to distortion, - Rabbinic interpretations consciously 
dismissed it as a gesture of the death of Isaac. 47 Josephus 
took a stronger stand against the death of Isaac by 
twisting the end of the story, transforming it to a happy 
45 More discussion about the real sacrifice of Isaac as a strong 
possibility is in Chapter III. 
46Spiegel, Last Trial, p. 3. 
47 See pp. 41,42. 
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end altogether. The father and son, restored to each other 
and elated with the promises, embrace. They then offer the 
sacrifice, return home to Sarah and live happily. 48 This 
viewpoint was seemingly anxiously intended as a complete 
rejection of the tragic interpretation of the Akedah. 
II. 3. Jewish historyand literature: between traqedy-and 
comedy 
As a matter of fact the comic denouement as obviously 
represented by Josephus and for some also by the Bible 
itself, although the reverse is also true, has never passed 
without a challenge from the opposite view. It is noticed 
by Harold Fisch who says, 
It would seem that the Akedah in its naked, 
original form, where Isaac is saved and the 
father and child walk together into the future, 
has to fight not only against the pagan mythical 
heritage of our (Jewish) culture but also against 
terrible historical realities that press 
themselves upon us in life itself. 49 
Fisch ref ers to two kind of tragedies that surround the 
history of reception of the Akedah. One of them is the 
pagan rite of human sacrifice that is supposed to be a part 
of ancient life. And the other is the tragic killings of 
many Jews throughout the history of Western/Christian 
civilization. "History recounts many instances of parents 
killing their children in the face of persecution and 
calling upon the story of the Akedah as justification. " 
48 FranmTk-m, Genesis, P. 162. 
49H. Fisch, A Remmbered Future: A study in Literary Mythology, 
1984, p. 93. 
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Glenda Abramson reminds us bitterly. 50 
Surely Rabbinic interpretations time after time in history 
have never missed the opportunity to mention the deadly 
fate of Isaac. Perhaps the most extreme depiction of the 
killing of Isaac which might stretch the imagination to 
breaking point is Rabbi Ephraim's poem: 
Down upon him fell the resurrection dew, and he revived. 
(The father) seized him (then) to slaughter him once more. 
Scripture, bear witness! Well-grounded is the fact: 
And the Lord called Abraham, even a second time from 
heaven. 
The ministering angels cried out, terrified: 
Even animal victims, were they ever slaughtered twice? 
Instantly they made their outcry heard on high, 
Lo, Ariels cried out above the earth. 51 
"Scripture, bear witness! " claims the poem while referring 
to the divine voice that truly sounds twice in the biblical 
narrative. But, can the poem also base its thought of Isaac 
being slaughtered twice by Abraham on the biblical story? 
it is hardly the case. The story may well spark off a grim 
image of Isaac's sacrifice but it never pushes itself to 
such an extremity. on what basis then was the poem written? 
The answer must be the real experience faced by the poet 
and his contemporaries. The poem produced as a 
contemplation in the time of the Crusades in 11th century 
C. E. where thousands of Jews were killed or killed 
themselves to preserve their honour. "For the victims of 
the Crusades it was impossible not to feel that their 
sufferings and sacrifices exceeded by far everything 
SO. G. Abrarmon, "The Reinterpretation of the Akedah in Modem 
Hebrew Poetry", JJS, 41(1990), p. 101. 
"Cited in Spiegel, Last Trial, pp. 148-9. 
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endured by the original Akedah father and son. "52 There are 
many stories recorded from this time that may only 
increase the shocking affect of the zealousness of the Jews 
in defending their belief against Christian conquerors. 
People cut each other's throats before they cut their own 
throats when the "mobsters had broken through into the 
castle courtyard and there was no way out except through 
apostasy". The people found the model of their gruesome 
acts in the story of Isaac's sacrifice. "The memory of 
Mount Moriah had not faded; it continued to instruct every 
one who followed the course of Sanctification of the 
Name. 1153 Hardly one could separate experience from reading 
or reading from experience. A deep question is raised by 
Spiegel in this regard, "are we to suppose that in the 
consciousness of that generation the haggadah about Father 
Abraham took deep roots, that in the end he did do what 
would have been almost impossible to defend? "54 The answer 
is likely to be yes, not because the biblical story itself 
can readily provide justification for their conviction that 
Abraham killed Isaac, since there is no such 
straightforward evidence. But, only the tragic world of the 
Jewish believers enabled them to grasp the tragic fate of 
Isaac that remains as a possibility inherent in the story. 
In modern times, the tragic image still persisted as the 
Jews continued to suffer under persecution. "Its meaning to 
the persecuted European Jew is not difficult to comprehend: 
52Spiegel, Last Trial, p. 21. 
53Spiegel, Last Trial, p. 21. 
54Spiegel, Last Trial, p. 27. 
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Isaac represented the Jewish people, constantly being 
called upon to make the supreme sacrifice as martyrs. "55 It 
furthermore developed with the establishment of the yishuv 
and the State of Israel in which Isaac became a flamboyant 
figure whereas Abraham became less honourable as a father. 
Jewish legends about Isaac clearly indicate 
his hostile impulses towards Abraham, in 
fact his anger at his father's intention to 
sacrifice him .... Rather than exclusively 
presenting the historically validated 
Abraham as God's blameless and trusting 
servant confronted by a test of faith- in 
which Isaac is a compliant partner- in 
Israeli literature Abraham's holy innocence 
is perceived as potentially murderous, and 
Isaac reacts with a murderousness of his 
own. 56 
Isaac gains much more sympathy in the new outlook of 
Israeli thought, while, on the other hand, there is 
skepticism about Abraham's role. Abraham is often portrayed 
as a weak father who could not give the needed protection 
to his son. Instead, he had endangered his own son in order 
to obey the divine mandate. The resentment towards Abraham 
relates to a bigger issue of the growing resentment towards 
predecessors, old traditions as well as God himself- in 
contemporary Hebrew poetry the image of God is so 
interwoven with that of the human father that we can hardly 
distinguish which is a symbol of which- that is generally 
seen as the cause of the present crises and weaknesses in 
allowing submissiveness. 
In many of the poems about the Akedah the 
father is too weak to withstand God's 
command, and he betrays the son's trust by 
his readiness to agree to the sacrifice. 
Because of this dogged preparedness to 
55Abrarmon, "Reinterpretation, " p. 103. 
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perpetrate the sacrifice for -the sake of 
some incomprehensible vision, the son 
destroys the father's tradition, the cause 
both of the vision and of the weakness. 57 
From a sympathy for and identification with Isaac 
follows an unequivocal rebellion against Isaac's role in 
the Akedah amongst the post-Shoah Israeli artists. In 
Yizhar's The Days of Ziklag (1958) one of the characters 
protests: 
Who created such a rotten world! We can't 
live without giving life or taking life... I 
hate Abraham our forefather who goes off to 
sacrifice Isaac. What is his right over 
Isaac? Let him bind himself. I hate God who 
sent him to be bound, closed every avenue 
other than sacrifice. I hate the fact that 
Isaac is no more than the material for 
experimentation between Abraham and God. 
This proof of love, this demand for proof of 
love. The sanctification of God in the 
binding of Isaac. I hate ... the bastards, why 
must the sons die? 58 
The rebellion against Isaac's role practically amounts to 
repudiation of the tragedy itself as it is not Isaac's 
dignity against which they rebel but Isaac's inability to 
defend himself against God/his father. Isaac with whom they 
want to identify themselves is not the pitiful biblical 
Isaac but the one who can stand up to demand and defend the 
basic right of life. Here Isaac is no longer appreciated as 
a martyr, as he used to be in the tradition (cf. Philo and 
Josephus), whose sacrifice must be held up but as an 
unfortunate defenceless son. In the wake of the new Israeli 
nation, along with the deeper influence of rationalism, 
tragedy may not have a place in the consciousness of the 
516Abramon, "Reinterpretation, " pp. 103-4. 
57Abrarmon, "Reinterpretation, " p. 105. 
58 Cited in Abrarmon, "Reinterpretation, " p. 107. 
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people. Its existence is a part of the past history, the 
history of the fathers for whom devotion often resulted in 
irrational as well as submissive acts. The new generation 
has to stand up against that weakness in order to build a 
solid nation. Here-we may hear the echo of Kant who accepts 
the sacrifice as not commanded by God himself, which, 
therefore has to be rejected as a religious or moral 
demand. Amongst the recurrences of the Akedah characters in 
modern Israeli art there is a momentous absence of God. 
With the disappearance of God the command loses its divine 
justification and nothing remains but a human drama of 
victim and victimiser. 59 
As a matter of fact the repudiation of tragedy is not 
typical of the secularized development of modern Israeli 
generation. Even in the ancient legends where Isaac is 
killed by Abraham, it is usually told that he is 
resurrected in the end. 60 The rejection of Isaac's fate as 
a mere victim does not only belong to modern mind but also, 
inAts, own way, to the ancient myth. Perhaps we should take 
into account what critics commonly say that Judaic thinking 
does not permit the moral structures of tragedy. It is 
claimed by George Steiner that, 
tragedy is alien to the Judaic sense of the 
world... Jehovah is just, even in His fury. 
Often the balance of retribution or reward 
seems fearfully awry, or the proceedings of 
God appear unendurably slow. But over the 
sum of time, there can be no doubt that the 
ways of God to man are just. Not only they 
are just, they are rational. The Judaic 
spirit is vehement in its conviction that 
59Abramon, "Reinterpretation, " pp. 110-11. 
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the order of the universe and of mants 
estate is accessible to reason. The ways of 
the Lord are neither wanton nor absurd. We 
may fully apprehend them if we give to our 
inquiries the clearsightedness of obedience. 
Marxism is characteristically Jewish in its 
insistence on justice and reason, and Marx 
repudiated the entire concept of tragedy. 
"Necessity", he declared, "is blind only in 
so far as it is not understood. ". 61 
Nonetheless, as we have seen, tragedy cannot just be 
detached from the lives of so many Jewish believers who 
because of zealousness to their God had to sacrifice 
themselves during the periods of persecution. It also 
remains as an inherent potency in the story, despite what 
appears to be a rejection of human sacrifice, that permits 
Israeli poets to associate the weakness of the believers 
with Isaac's fate on the sacrificial altar. Tragedy 
therefore still holds, at least partially, true in Jewish 
thoughts of the Akedah. 
IIA. In the Christian tradition 
The portion of the awareness of tragedy becomes in one 
respect less obvious as the story of Genesis 22 enters the 
realm of the Christian interpretation. It may prove that 
experience moulds the model of reading. While the Jews have 
many times gone through a tragic life during the 
persecutions which enabled them to discern the undercurrent 
tragedy of the Akedah story, the Christians hardly have the 
same experience. At least one rarely sees it reflected in 
6OSee Spiegel, Last Trial, pp. 28ff. 
61G. Steiner, The Death of Tragedy, c. 1961, p. 4. 
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the writings of the theologians, that consequently 
alienated them from the tragic view of the Akedah. 
"Christianity reached the world as a sacrificial religion 
without sacrifice and as a means to avert disaster. The 
liturgical order recalled the strife in order to ensure 
liberation and eternal ý victory, " claims Ulrich Simon. 62 
Martin Luther clearly indicates this lack of tragic 
experience when he says:, "we merely talk about these 
things, but Abraham and Isaac actually did -them". 63 
Christian interpreters, notably within the typological 
model of Isaac-Jesus, tend to bowdlerize the Akedah so that 
tragic images- which, are, however, inevitable- are 
ultimately only a step to a happy ending. Because of the 
mythological performance of the salvific story about Jesus 
that he, having died and been buried, rises again to be the 
saviour of life then its anachronistic application, which 
is characteristic of typological interpretation, to the 
Akedah is made to endorse such an idea. 
Augustine in his "City of God" (book xvi, ch. xxxii) 
typologically relates the sacrifice of Isaac/the ram to the 
Crucifixion of Jesus. 64 He maintains that Abraham not only 
never believed that God delighted in human sacrifices, but 
he all along believed that his son, on being offered up, 
would rise again. The latter may be the first indication 
that Augustine sees what happened in the Resurrection of 
62Ulrich Simon, Pity and Terror: Christianity and Tragedy, 1989, 
P. AV. 
63J. Pelikan, Luther's Works, vol. 4,1964, p. 123. 64See W. J. Oates, ed., Basic Writings of Saint Augustine, vol. 2, 1948, pp. 352-3. 
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Christ would also have happened in the event of the Akedah 
provided Isaac had to die. The second description of the 
Isaac-Christ symbolic relationship is in the declaration of 
Isaac's status as the promise bearer. "In order, then, that 
the children of the promise may be the seed of Abraham, 
they are called in Isaac, that is, are gathered together in 
Christ by the call of grace. " Augustine compares Ishmael 
and Isaac since they both according to him received divine 
assertion of being Abraham's seed. 65 The distinction is 
then made in relation to what is written in Rom. 9: 7,8, 
i. e., Ishmael represented "the children of flesh" and Isaac 
illustrated "the children of promise". It follows that 
Isaac himself carried the wood on which he was to be 
offered up, "just as the Lord Himself carried His own 
cross. " 
The action of Abraham in willingly sacrificing Isaac is 
understood as a reminiscence of that of God the father who, 
quoting Rom. 8: 32, "spared not His own Son, but delivered 
Him up for us all". The beginning of this verse is strongly 
reminiscence of the LXX version of Genesis 22: 16: "ouk 
epheiso tu *uiu su tu agapetu di eme (because you have not 
withheld your son, your beloved son)". But this verse 
assumes a real sacrifice of the Son of God by the Father 
while this never happens with Isaac in Genesis 22 where the 
ram is sacrificed as a substitution. This suggests that 
65 In Genesis 20, the indication as Abraham's of f spring is only 
attached to Ishmel (v. 13) meanwhile Isaac is declared by the divinity 
as the bearer of Abraham's name but never as Abraham's seed. Augustine has clearly misread this passage. 
65 
Paul was influenced by Jewish traditions of the Akedah of 
Isaac where "Isaac's self-oblation was regarded as a true 
sacrifice in its own right" and "the effects of the Akedah 
were believed to be redemptive" (Isaac's sacrifice is 
real). 66 How true this claim is, will remain debatable 
because of the lack of evidence. 67 
Finally, the sacrifice or more precisely the blood of the 
ram is for Augustine the prototype of Jesus' blood and the 
event when the ram is caught in a thicket by its horns is 
seen as representing Jesus who "was crowned with thorns by 
the Jews. 1168 
Augustine takes as a model of his symbolic/allegorical 
reading of Genesis 22 the paradigm of Crucifixion- 
Resurrection of Christ. As a result, even though Isaac has 
had to be siacrificed, as Christ, he would also have been 
resurrected. It appears only as a matter of belief in 
Abraham's mind when he considered the outcome of what will 
happen on the altar. In fact, Isaac was never sacrificed. 
This fact should have inevitably put an end to the Isaac- 
Jesus typology, because differently from Isaac, Jesus ended 
up on the cross and died. Augustine seems to blur the 
difference by presenting the substitute ram as the 
continuation of the typology, namely, the ram is now 
representing Jesus in the last seconds of crucifixion. How 
66See R. Daly, "Soteriological, " pp. 63-4. 
67P. R. Davies and B. D. Chilton, "The Aqedah: A Revised Tradition 
History", CW, 40(1978), pp. 514-46 
680ates, Basic Writings, p. 353. 
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could the substitution in Genesis narrative maintain the 
connection' with the event of Jesus which clearly lacked 
such a substitution, is not made clear. The word tahath (in 
substitution -of) in Genesis 22 conspicuously indicates the 
distinction between Isaac as the real victim who escapes 
the sacrifice and the ram as the surrogate victim which is 
slaughtered on the altar. The same word may also divide the 
event before and after the substitution is revealed- the 
ram is not the one who brings the sacrificial wood and, 
conversely, Isaac is not the one whose horns (however weird 
an image it is) are caught in a thicket. However the 
differences-do not apparently exist in Augustine's reading. 
Regardless of the alteration of the characters, the 
sacrifice of the ram is considered to be the completion 
(not the substitution) of Isaac's sacrifice. Undoubtedly, 
Augustine has reconstructed the Akedah narrative in 
accordance with the event of Jesus Christ, in which the 
actual death of the character really takes place. This 
confusion between human and animal sacrifice is lessened by 
the application of "as -if " notions in Rabbinic 
interpretations in which the ram sacrifice is regarded as 
if it is Isaac's own sacrifice. 69 The recurrences of the 
ram in Rabbinic literatures are no more often in relation 
to the sacrifice than in the symbolical use of its horn as 
the signal of the Messianic day. 70 
Genesis 22 does not conspicuously reveal the death of 
69Spiegel, Last Trial, pp. 41ff. 
70 See pp. 4 6,47. 
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Isaac, let alone his resurrection. But again Augustine's 
typological approach- which, as we have just seen, is not 
really typological since the two stories scarcely have the 
same type- embeds the notion of the Resurrection in the 
story. Bearing in mind that what is revealed later on is a 
discussion. about the divine promise about Isaac's future, 
its function is, then, to prevent God from being seen as 
capricious. The resurrection of Isaac would have reassured 
the promise had it been broken by the sacrifice. It is also 
interesting to notice that Augustine in quoting Rom. 9 does 
not indicate Isaac as the bearer of Abraham's name (Genesis 
21: 13) but simply "the seed". 71 The deletion of the Genesis 
attribution, which in itself may reflect the ideology of 
Jewish nationalism, might well be intended to spiritualize, 
or for that matter to christianize Isaac. 72 It becomes 
obvious in the statement that those who are gathered in 
Christ by the call of grace is equivalent to those who are 
called in Isaac, in this way they are reckoned as Abraham's 
descendants. 
In the end, after quoting the blessing to the nations 
through Abraham's seed, Augustine comments, "in this manner 
is that promise concerning the calling of the nations in 
the seed of Abraham confirmed even by the oath of God, 
71 The echo of Genesis is in f act sti 11 apparent in Rcm. 9 but not 
in Augustine's own translation. 
72 The need to retain Abraham's name would be more appropriate 
for the Jews rather than the Christians since the latter tend to relate 
thamelves to Abraham spiritually or in terms of faith while the former 
prioritises its physical relation with Abraham. Note also Augustine's 
translation "in Isaac shall thy seed be called' whereas Rcm. 9: 7 writes "through Isaac shall your descendants be named'(RSV). 
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after that burnt-offering which typified Christ. " Augustine 
clearly changes the blessing of the nations to the calling 
of the nations. Since the seed of Abraham has been known as 
no one other than Christ or his followers then the calling 
of the nations logically refers to the Christians or non- 
believers who are called to be Christian. In other words, 
the promise is used by Augustine to endorse the conversion 
of people to Christianity and the expansion of the church. 
To add to its power, Augustine underlines the unusual 
appearance (in Genesis) of the divine oath. "He (God) had 
often promised, but never sworn. " he says. We should have 
no doubt that Augustine is talking about proselytisation 
and confirmation of Christian faith here, after hearing his 
last sentence: "what is the oath of God, the true and 
faithful, but a confirmation of the promise, and a certain 
reproof to the unbelieving? ". 
Thus, Augustine's symbolical comment includes everything 
from the Crucifixion and Resurrection of Jesus Christ to 
the expected result, that is, the confirmation of God's 
promise- presumably the same promise declared in the 
Akedah- to Christians. By Putting the emphasis on the 
sacrifice, and its reward, Augustine differs from others who 
focus the interpretation on the faith of Abraham. 73 
Luther and Calvin's comments on Genesis 22 contain some 
73 More evidence that Augustine wants to put stress on the 
sacrifice is in his understanding of Heb. 11: 17-19. While the phrase danonstrates, Abraham's faith, Augustine uses it as an indication of Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac as it is ccrrpared with God's sacrifice of Jesus Christ. 
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recurrent points made earlier by Augustine. 74 Typical of 
these commentaries is an apotheosis of Abraham's faith. 
Calvin even tries to disclose Abraham's mind in accepting 
and realising the controversial divine command. Written in 
modern times Kierkegaard's Fear and Tremblingmay represent 
a work in which Calvin's understanding of Abraham's 
"spiritual conflict of conscience" (Calvin's terminology) 
reaches its zenith of expression. What Calvin-wants to show 
is the solidity of Abraham's faith amidst the suffering he 
undergoes throughout the sacrifice. It is clear that 
Abraham has to go through some tormenting contradictions. 
It was sad. for him to be deprived of his 
son, sadder still that his son should be 
torn away by a violent death, but by far the 
most grievous that he himself should be 
appointed as the executioner to slay him 
with his own hand ... His contest, too, was not with his carnal passions, but, seeing 
that he wished to devote himself wholly to 
God, his very piety and religion filled him 
with distracting thoughts. For God, as if 
engaging in personal contest with him, 
requires the death of the boy, to whose 
person He himself had annexed the hope of 
eternal salvation. So that this latter 
command was, in a certain sense, the 
destruction of faith. 75 
If Abraham could endure it is because his faith teaches him 
to "leave the -unknown issue to Divine Providence. " and "as 
with closed eyes, he goes whither he is directed". 76 If 
Isaac has to die he must accept it as God's will on which 
he has no power but trust. Although Calvin seems to suggest 
74 For Calvin's cannentary see his Cbmmentaries on the First Book 
of Moses called Genesis, tr. John King, The Calvin Translation Society, 
Edinburgh, 1847. For Luther see J. Pelikan, Luther's Works, vol. 4, 
Lectures on Genesis, Concordia Publ. House, St. Louis, 1964. 
75Calvin, ibid., pp. 559-60. 
76Calvin, ibid., p. 563. 
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this as some kind of solution, perhaps the only solution, 
of Abraham's loyalty to God "had it failed, faith must have 
perished", he still holds to the fact that the sacrificial 
command contains a moral dilemma. Abraham has "to endure, 
before the world, the disgrace of shameful cruelty". 77 
Faith, according to Calvin, "ought not to lie idle, without 
trial". At this point Calvin unveils the function of the 
divine test, that is, to dematerialize human hopes so as to 
leave only spiritual adherence to God. "God tempts his 
servants, not only when he subdues the affections of the 
flesh, but when he reduces all their senses to nothing, 
that he may lead them to a complete renunciation of 
themselves. "78 
Luther also perceives a contradiction in the test of 
Abraham which he tends to label as primarily on the nature 
of the, divine command to sacrifice Isaac. 
This trial cannot be overcome and is far too 
great to be understood by us. For there is a 
contradiction with which God contradicts 
Himself. It is impossible for the flesh to 
understand this; for it inevitably concludes 
either that God is lying- and this is 
blasphemy- or that God hates me- and this 
leads to despair. 79 
Several times Luther states that human reason cannot 
decipher the contradictory trial . However, like Augustine, 
Luther 'believes that "Abraham understood the doctrine of 
the resurrection of the dead, and through it alone he 
77Calvinp ibid., p. 564. 
78Calvin, ibid., p. 564. 
79Pelikan, Luther's Works, p. 93. 
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resolved this contradiction, which otherwise cannot be 
resolved". 80 Luther eventually reveals that Isaac also 
shares this belief so that he may willingly present his 
throat and wait to be reduced to ashes on the altar. 81 In 
his faith that God shall always keep his promise no matter 
the outcome of the sacrifice, Abraham's faith deserves 
praise and is exemplary for the Christians. "These trials 
of the saintly patriarch have been set before us in order 
that we may be encouraged in our own trials ... 
11912 
Besides the emphasis on Abraham's faith, Luther and Calvin 
do not apparently relate the sacrifice of Isaac 
typologically to the sacrifice of Jesus Christ as it is 
done by Augustine. Calvin even subtly rejects such an 
interpretation when he comments on the sacrifice of the 
substitute ram. 83 
The emphasis on faith and work which we may read in the 
writings of Luther and Calvin are probably taken from 
themes in the'New Testament writings. Hebrews 11: 17-20 and 
James 2: 21-23 mention the event in Genesis 22. "By faith 
Abraham, when he was tested, offered up Isaac" says 
Heb. 11: 17. It is, in fact, not so much the uncalculating 
faith of Abraham as he actually "considered that God was 
able to raise men even from the dead" (v. 19). We have heard 
about this belief mentioned in Augustine's as well as 
80 Pel ikan, Luther's Works, p. 96. 
81 See Pel ikan, Luther's Works, pp. 119,114. 
02 Pelikan, Luther's Works, P. 97. 
83Calvin, Ccmnmtaries, p. 571. 
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Luther and Calvin's commentaries. But what those 
commentators do not say is the fact that Heb. 11 does 
indicate that Isaac was really offered up, based on which 
Abraham's faith is vindicated. This is also the case with 
James 2 as it says or questions, "was not Abraham our 
father justified by works, when he offered his son Isaac 
upon the altar? " Since the context of James 2 is the 
vindication of works as an urgent completion of faith, then 
it practically implies the completion of the sacrifice of 
Isaac by Abraham. Both texts do suggest that the sacrifice 
of Isaac is not only imagined by Abraham but actually 
accomplished by him. While not reflecting what happens in 
Genesis 22, they very much underline the belief of what 
happens on Golgotha with Jesus Christ. Thus, the impression 
of the New Testament writings about the Akedah is 
influenced, if not mixed up, by their understanding of 
Jesus. on this basis, they may conceive the sacrifice as 
real and also on the same basis they can express the belief 
about the resurrection of Isaac. The closeness of the time 
of those writings with the life of Jesus or, at any rate, 
with the new emergence of the belief of Jesus Christ who 
was crucified and rose again, resonably prompted them to 
read the Akedah in this light. On the other hand, it is 
also understandable for Luther and Calvin to frame their 
readings within the notion of sola fide_, that was a common 
theme during the Reformation period. 
In Luther's and Calvin's commentaries we may understand 
that the aim of interpretation is to substantiate the 
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significance of the story for the readers' faith, namely, 
what the readers can learn about their relationship with 
God through the story. This tendency is also common in the 
periods following the Reformation up to the rise of 
historical criticism in the study of the Bible. Also 
typical of these times is the influence of Rationalism in 
which faith is always believed to be reasonable. A faith 
that contradicts reason is untenable. The same case is to 
be applied to God. Concerning the events as told by the 
Bible, it is generally accepted that the events actually 
took place in history. God indeed commanded Abraham to 
sacrifice his son, it was not merely Abraham's illusion. 
David Pailin who studied commentaries (mainly by English 
authors) of Genesis 22 from the seventeenth century to the 
nineteenth century says, "consciously or not the canon of 
reason was applied to God in this period, so that most 
commentators were not prepared to entertain the notion that 
God's motives might be unfathomable to them or his actions 
gratuitous. 1184 It was also understood that everything that 
comes from God is morally good. Most of the commentators, 
as represented by Thomas Chubb, believe that "God will not 
prostitute his authority by using it to answer no good 
purpose". 85 To answer the question of why God commands 
Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, most of the commentators 
explain that it is a test to prove the quality of Abraham's 
84David A. Pailin, "A Hermeneutical Problem Before Kierkegaard" 
in Kierkegaard's Fear and Trenbling: Critical Appraisal. 11 ed. R. Perkin, 
1981, P-13. 
"Thanas Chubb, Sarie Observations ... Occasioned by the Opposition 
made to Dr. Rundle's Election, 1735, p. 31. Cited in Pailin, ibid., p. 13- 
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faith. Others say, .- rat-her like, - . Augustine, 
that the 
event was intended by God as a prophetic foreshadowing of 
Christ. 86 Pearson tries to explain away the difference of 
Isaac's and Christ's experiences by denying it, "the saving 
of Isaac alive doth not deny the death of the Antitype, but 
rather suppose and assert it, as presignifying his 
resurrection from the dead". 87 But, structurally Christ's 
story is similar to the Akedah tradition in which Isaac is 
dead and resurrected rather than Genesis 22. 
Another, thought like that of Waterland indicates that the 
event is intended "to discourage and discountenance human 
sacrifices". 88 The thought has an echo in the works of 
historical critics such as Wellhausen and Gunkel which 
consider the story as a polemic against human sacrifice-89 
Voltaire suggests that the story "seems to show that, at 
the time when this history was written, the sacrifice of 
human victims was customary amongst the Jews". 90 This 
comment seems to be part of general sentiment in the 
Western world that the human race develops evolutionarily 
from the primitive to the modern one of which Western 
societies are the representative. This sentiment may also 
be perceived in the language of S. R. Driver's claim, "the 
86Pailin, ibid., p. 14. 
97 John Pearson, An Exposition of the Creed, 1880, pp. 290ff, 306, 
366. Cited in Pailin, ibid., p. 14. 
88Daniel Waterland, Scripture Vindicated in Answer to a Book 
entitled Christianity as Old as the Creation in Works, Vol-IV, 1843, 
p. 204. Cited in Pailin, ibid., p. 14. 
89See Westermann, Genesis 12-36: A Cbmentary, tr. John 
J. Scullion, c. 1985, p. 354. 
90Voltaire, A Philosophical Dictionary, vol. I, 1843, p. 18. Cited 
in Pailin, ibid., p. 15. 
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custom of human sacrifice was widely spread in the ancient 
world, as it is still among savage or half-civilized 
tribes". Although he tends to assign the custom to Israel's 
neighbours. 91 
The moral justifiability of God's action in commanding 
Abraham to sacrifice his son is a much more disturbing 
dilemma for many commentators. None of the interpreters, 
according to Pailin, "seemed to feel that there was any way 
of arguing that the killing of Isaac could be regarded as a 
positive good". 92 "Bayle" who seeks to follow the practices 
of his contemporaries in order "to give to the true God" a 
"testimony of love and faith" suggests that the idea of 
sacrificing Isaac was originally Abraham's. While God was 
pleased with its motive, he, nonetheless, abhorred the 
sacrifice itself and therefore stopped Abraham from 
carrying it oUt. 93 This suggestion obviously runs counter 
to Gen. 22: 1,2. But at any rate it describes a possibility 
that Abraham does not lack personal ambition in sacrificing 
Isaac despite following God's command. Some in defending 
God's moral perfection attribute to him unlimited rights 
even to destroy human life. The reason is that God is the 
creator of human life and he may take his creatures back by 
any means. This idea is rejected by Chubb who considers 
that God in his parental sovereignty has a duty to foster 
91S. R. Driver, The Book of Genesis, In t publ. 1904, p. 221. 
92Pailin, "Hern-eneutical, " P. 19. 
93"Bayle" refers to the additional note on Abraham in Bayle's 
General Dictionary, Historical and Critical, ed. John P. Bernard, 
T. Birch, J. Lockman, and others, 1734, p. 95. Cited in Pailin, ibid., 
p. 17. 
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his creature's good, not bestowing a right to do whatever 
he -likes with his son. 94 Chubb regards the sacrificial 
command as a deceptive "try-on" that God never intended to 
be carried out. It can be proved by the evidence that God 
finally withdrew the command. God's command therefore did 
not impugn his moral goodness. In this case, however, God 
remains to be seen as cheating Abraham since the Patriarch 
does not know that the command should not be taken as such. 
It seems that in any 'way God's moral goodness is 
indefensible. This is apparently what urges Kant to 
renounce the sacrificial command as coming from God. There 
is no divine will that contradicts moral goodness in Kant's 
opinion. Since the command of Isaac's sacrifice cannot be 
morally justified, it must not be accepted as originating 
from God. 95 But the last claim is probably no more true in 
the Genesis narrative than in Kant's thought, in which 
Abraham's obedience to the sacrificial command is an 
example of false belief. Perhaps as an implicit response to 
the Kantian claim, Driver demonstrates the dissimilarity 
between Abraham's barbaric cultural context and the 
conscience of modern readers, "... we live in an age, and 
under a moral light, in which we could not regard as Divine 
a command to violate not only our sense of what was morally 
right, but even our natural instincts of love and 
affection. It was possible for Abraham so to regard it, 
because he lived under the mental and moral conditions of 
an age very different from ours ... The command would not 
94Pailin, ibid., p. 20. 
9SMore discussion about Kant and Kierkegaard can be found in 
Chapter V. 
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therefore shock the moral standard to which Abraham was 
accustomed, as it would shock ours". 96 It may describe the 
difficulty of modern readers in accepting the violence of 
the command and, therefore, the command itself. 
Similar to that of the modern Jewish writers, the modern 
writers in the context of Western Christianity, began to 
question-the moral exactitude of Abraham's religious motive 
in sacrificing his own son. Isaac's submissiveness at the 
same time seems problematic. Emily Dickinson wrote in 1874 
a poem that contrasts the portrayal of Isaac as an urchin 
and Abraham as an old man. In the end Isaac does not only 
survive but proves the domination of moral (against the 
immoral command? ). 
Abraham to kill him 
Was distinctly told- 
Isaac was an Urchin- 
Abraham was old- 
Not a hesitation- 
Abraham complied- 
Flattered by obeisance 
Tyranny demurred- 
Isaac-to his children 
Lived to tell the tale- 
Horal-with a Mastiff 
Manners may prevail. 97 
The readings of writers who lived in this era became a 
symbol of rebellion against the figure of an older 
generation who had come to represent the weight of a 
particular tradition, specifically, the law and custom of 
96Driver, Genesis, pp. 221-2. 
97Thamas H. Johnson, ed., The Poems of Emily Dickinson, 1955, 
poem nunber 1317, p. 911. 
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Western Europe engrafted on a Christian evangelical past. 98 
The spirit excited Europe during the French Revolution as 
well as the nineteenth-century movements of revolt that 
came to substitute freedom and light for restriction and 
darkness. "The young Gosse rises up against his Puritan 
father in Father and Son (1907) in the name of freedom and 
the pursuit of happiness in a perceived future. Oswald 
Alving in Ibsen's Ghosts and Ernest Pontifex in The Way of 
All Flesh share his revolt. "99 Fisch selects Melville's 
Billy Budd (circa 1888) as a peak example of the myth about 
the crisis of generation gap. Here a "father", Captain 
Vere, sacrifices his "son", Billy Budd, on the altar of 
inherited law and custom. Vere is the archetypal father, 
just as Billy is the archetypal son, and their drama is the 
reenactment of the ageless war of the generations. The bond 
of love between them makes the agony of their confrontation 
the more acute. 100 
The Akedah may allude to the conflict between generations. 
Be that as it may, and there is no doubt that the story is 
fraught with backgrounds like that, the sacrifice of the 
ram would, however, signal the end of the conflict. This is 
the complexity that would negate any kind of univocal 
interpretation. The older interpretation that tends to 
emphasize Abraham's obedience and the newer interpretation 
that questions the submissive role of Isaac cannot do 
98H. Fisch, Remenbered, p. 84. 
99H. Fisch, Remmbered, p. 84. Several other examples, can be found 
in Fisch's chapter. 
10OFor further exposition on Billy Budd, see Fisch, Renxmbered, 
pp. 84-86. 
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justice to the complex and equivocal story of Genesis 22. 
The reason for those readings lies elsewhere than in the 
biblical Akedah, namely, in the historical reality of each 
reader. The historical reality of the readers who lived in 
the more humanisticallyminded nineteenth century onward is 
supportive of the anti-tradition sentiment. 
II. 5. Conclusion: a multi-dimension readinq 
No one would deny that the story of the Akedah of Isaac has 
been so richly interpreted notably within Tewish 
communities over considerable period of time. Neither can 
one ignore the diversity of the interpretations. While the 
Hebrew Bible basically reveals Abraham as the dominant 
actor, the early (Jewish) traditions tend to make Isaac the 
focus of their readings in which his sacrifice is regarded 
either as redemptive or as a symbol of martyrdom. With 
interruption in the Medieval centuries when the character 
of Abraham moves to the centre of attention of 
interpretations, Jewish artists in the modern era 
furthermore see Isaac as the important figure to highlight 
as he may symbolize the sufferings of Jewish people. This 
generation of Israelis, particularly after the Shoah, for 
whom death and suffering are not unquestionable fates, 
rejects the submissive role of Isaac in the Akedah. The 
rejection, which is shared by modern Christian writers, is 
also based on the ethical absurdity of a father who has to 
sacrifice his own son as a religious duty. In the meantime 
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it suggests how the understanding of the Akedah is to be 
reconstructed to fit the new cultural spirit of the 
readers. The biblical portrayal of Isaac as a submissive 
victim may be fai from problematic for the authors and even 
inspiring or strengthening the faith of the generations to 
come after them. But, it is certainly problematic for the 
modern writers who can-no longer accept its value as such. 
Further criticism is of Abraham who is no longer seen as a 
pious believer but a murderer. 101 The influence of Kantian 
criticism against the acceptance of the sacrificial command 
as a divine duty undoubtedly endorses the defiant 
interpretations. 
The multifarious reception of the Akedah which is not only 
represented in form: painting (it is described in mosaic on 
the floor of the sixth-century synagogue of Bet Alfa, k, at 
the foot of Mount Gilboal and also painted on a wall in the 
Dura-Europos synagogue on the Euphrates of the third 
century C. E. ), poems, novels, liturgies, even academic 
criticism, but also in content: secular and religious, 
Jewish and Christian, prevents us f rom speaking about the 
meaning of the story. Instead we have to admit the many 
possibilities of how the story can be understood. It is 
apparently made possible because each reader is placed 
within the confinement of his own ideological background 
that frames his reading which, as a result, may differ from 
10 1 It is obvious in Wilfred Owen's poem, The Parable of the old 
Man and the Young. The same spirit can be f ound in Yehuda Amichai's The 
True Hero of the Akedah that cynically puts the rarn as the hero of the Akedah, innocent of the whole affair it has to stand alone while the 
others go hane. See Abramson, '! Reinterpretation, " pp. 109-110. 
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another's. 
Stanley Fish observes that an interpretation is an activity 
that "is determined by the literary institution which at 
any one time will authorize only a finite number of 
interpretative strategies. MII As a result, a text may be 
interpreted in a variety of way: s, according to the literary 
institutions in which they are produced. It is the case 
where not only the text is interpreted differently but, 
more precisely, the interpreters read the text variably, or 
for that matter, the interpreters read "different texts". 
Disagreements among the interpretations are likely to 
happen affectively. But, in Fish's understanding the 
disagreements are ultimately not to be judged by what the 
original texts say or do not say. An interpretation cannot 
be seen in terms of its rightness or wrongness with regard 
to the facts of the original text. "Disagreements must 
occur between those who hold (or are held) different points 
of view, and what is at stake in a disagreement is the 
right to specify what the facts can hereafter be said to 
be. Disagreements are not settled by the facts, but are the 
means by which the facts are settled. 11103 It is by no means 
certain that a text may be read in whatever way the readers 
want. The pluralism should not be perceived as this kind of 
freedom. There are certain possibilities which might not be 
acceptable in reading too. Fish takes Wayne Booth's point 
that there are justified limits to what we can legitimately 
102Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class?: The Authority 
of Interpretive Camxmities, 1980, p. 342. 
103Fish, ibid., p. 338. 
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do with a text, for "surely we could not go on disputing at 
all if a core of agreement did not exist". 104 
Although he agrees with Booth over this point, Fish needs 
to emphasize that "the text cannot be the location of the 
core of agreement by means of which we reject 
interpretations. " It is, in Fish's perspective, no more a 
matter of the text than the readers, that is, the 
commitment made by the readers concerning the limits for 
interpreting the text. As to the text Fish assertively says 
that it serves only as the function of interpretation, 
namely, it only exists as a pretext within the interpretive 
strategies which attempt to articulate its meanings. In 
T. K. Seung's expression, "in its own right, a text is like a 
fish out of water. It has no power; it is neither 
autonomous nor heteronomous. "]. 05 
"We are right to rule out at least some readings"-says Fish 
in citing Wayne Booth. 106 The process of reading in fact 
consists of a series of rejectionsor suppressionsof other 
readings that leads to the production of one's own reading. 
Nonetheless, as times change and the accepted ideology is 
transformed, what reading is accepted or rejected also 
changes. According to Fish, "the change is not random but 
orderly and, to some extent, predictable. A new 
interpretive strategy always makes its way in some 
104Fish, ibid., P. 342. 
IOST-K-Seung, Sefrdotics and Theffatics in Hermneutics, 1982, 
p. 37.10 
6 Fish, Is There a Text, pp. 342f f. 
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relationship of opposition to the old, which has often 
marked out a negative space (of things that aren't done) 
from which it can emerge into respectability. 1'107 The 
relationship, though by way of differentiation, between the 
previous interpretation and the present one is virtually 
undeniable. The things that aren't done by the previous 
interpretation stimulate the emergence of the present one. 
Fish's notion of relative (depending on the community of 
interpreter), and, consequently polyphonic, interpretation 
seems tenable in the light of the history of reception of 
the Akedah. After all, the Akedah itself is a complex and 
opaque text. For this sort of text it seems that 
interpretation will never be enough despite many which have 
been produced. "Its extraordinary, frightening dimension, " 
says Westermann, "one can only experience with empathy; a 
commentary can do no more than hint at it. "108 Westermann 
is right, there is no commentary- by this we mean also any 
kind of retelling- that can represent the whole dynamics 
which underlie the Akedah. It is also true that, as Harold 
Fisch deduces, the story "requires that we ourselves find 
ways of fulfilling its meaning and promise (by experiencing 
it). It is not only Abraham who is tested: the reader is 
tested also: he must discover in himself the meaning of 
that survival, its portent and challenge". 109 
10 7 Fish, Is There a Text, p. 349. 
10 8 C. Westermam, Genesis, p. 355. 
10 9 Fisch, Remembered, P. 90. 
CHAPTER III 
POLYSEMIOTIC REIADING OF THE AIKEDAH 
For Nietzsche, for Homer, and for the bulk 
of the Bible,..., the world is multifarious, 
always in transformation, and can only be 
grasped through juxtaposition and 
discontinuities and in the dimension of 
time: our partial vision is itself the 
guarantor of the world, and our attitude to 
it should be one not of focus but of 
participation. 
Gabriel Josipovici, "The Bible in Focus" 
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Since Auerbach's Mimesis there has been an awareness that 
characterization in biblical narrative is multilayered, 
especially in the light of the knowledge that what emerges 
in the foreground is fraught with background of previous 
events. 1 Faced with this complexity some critics attempt to 
find the reason that may explain it. Robert Alter, for 
example, conceives that the biblical device of multilayered 
characterization reflects certain understanding of human 
nature. He says: 
IE. Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western 
Literature, 1974. 
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since art does not develop in a vacuum, 
these literary techniques (of depicting the 
character unequivocally) must be associated 
with the conception of human nature implicit 
in biblical monotheism: every person is 
created by an all-seeing God but abandoned 
to his own unfathomable freedom, made in 
God's likeness as a matter of cosmogonic 
principle but almost never as a matter of 
accomplished ethical fact; and each 
individual instance of this bundle of 
paradoxes, encompassing the zenith and the 
nadir of the created world, requires a 
special cunning attentiveness in literary 
representation. The purposeful selectivity 
of means, the repeatedly contrastive or 
comparative technical strategies used in the 
rendering of biblical characters, are in a 
sense dictated by biblical view of man. 2 
Biblical personage are paradoxical beings who bears the 
omnipotent quality of God as well as the imperfectness of 
human being. The life of biblical personages is seen as 
oscillating between those two poles. This view is argued by 
Alter as underlying biblical depiction of man. 
consequently, what primarily may appear to be a bundle of 
disordering descriptions of human beings in the Bible can 
now be seen as an expression that is constrained by the 
ideological view of human nature. 
If we follow Alter's argument, the portrayal of human 
nature in the Bible is to be understood as purposely made 
to impose upon the readers the ideology. "All these means 
to control what we (the readers) learn and what we are left 
to ponder about the characters and the meaning of the 
story". (my emphasis)3 Despite a realisation that biblical 
characters often perform enigmatically sometimes even 
2Robert Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative, 1981, p. 115. 
3Alter, ibid., p. 157. 
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impenetrably, the narrator is still in control of the 
meaning. "We are never in serious doubt that the biblical 
narrator knows all there is to know about the motives and 
feelings, the moral nature and spiritual condition of his 
characters-114 If, however, there remain ambiguities Alter 
argues, "he (the narrator) is highly selective about 
sharing this omniscience with his readers". 5 The narrator 
is omniscient but at the same time is selective. It is not 
only the source of knowledge in the narrative but also the 
guard of the knowledge. It knows everything that the 
readers may not. The readers may have gaps of knowledge but 
certainly not the narrator. 
Nevertheless the omniscient narrator can be problematic 
when the readers' desire for knowledge is dissatisfied by 
gaps that are never fillable in the narrative. The 
narrator's omniscience only becomes obvious when it 
unfolds, in the later stage of the story, the answers to 
obscurities produced by the previous events. But, the 
problem arises at the point when the readers are left with 
questions that remain unanswerable until the end of the 
story; in which the readers are either actually intended to 
experience an inconclusive state or induced to create their 
own gdp-fillings to articulate the story. In both cases, 
however, the narrator is no longer omniscient. The needed 
information does not emerge from its report. In the second 
case the readers could even be said, to be more omniscient 
4Alter, ibid., p. 158. 
SAlter, ibid., p. 158. 
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than the narrator since they know what the narrator does 
not. In the process of reading, the narrator's voice hardly 
represents the whole meaning that a story may produce. The 
narrator may provide the starting-points but on the other 
side of the meaning production process the readers' 
imagination always plays an indisputably important - role. 
When a biblical narrator tells a story, the meaning(s) of 
the story is by no means plain. There . 1. % much obliqueness, 
many mysteries, even inconsistencies that may or may not be 
recovered. The history of interpretation gives us plenty of 
evidence of this fact. So, it is hard to prove the 
omniscience of biblical narrator as it , appears in the 
narrative. The omniscience would allow, one way or another, 
a homology of biblical narratives which is hardly the case. 
The ambiguities of ,a story may not be caused by the 
selectivity of the narrator as Alter argues but the 
narrator's lack or simplicity of knowledge or just by some 
unobvious reason. 
since the depiction of the character is intentional in 
Alter's point of view, he furthermore analogises biblical 
narratives with the fictional narratives such as Tom Jones 
rather than Summa Theologiae or the cabbalistic Book of 
Creation the books - that presumably incorporate an 
overwhelming claim of reality. 6 Alter, however, argues that 
the phenomena disclosed in such fictional narrative do not 
utterly depart from our ordinary reality. "The writer has 
cunningly projected out of an intuitively grasped fund of 
6Alter, ibid., p. 156. 
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experience not dissimilar to our own, only shaped, defined, 
ordered, probed in ways we never manage in the muddled and 
diffuse transactions of our own lives. " 7 This kind of 
fiction is, according to Alter, "a mode of knowledge", the 
writer's manipulation in steering the readers towards a 
knowledge he wants them to share and sunressing 
disqualified forms of knowledge. It aims not to reject but 
rather to explain systematically according to its framework 
the so-called historical reality. 
But, asýStephen Prickett argues, biblical narrativity tends 
not to be approachable through a perspective that maintains 
the dualistic ýdistinction of fiction and reality. 0 If 
biblical narratives are regarded as fiction, they, however, 
contain many similarities of historical books based on 
reality. On the other hand, the admittance of the real 
history of the narratives must not overlook its fictional 
elements- Isaac is born when Abraham is a hundred years old 
and Sarah is ninety. The fiction and reality are so 
interwoven in biblical narratives that that makes them 
difficult to be differentiated as such. Biblical narrative 
is not a purely and consciously narratorial invention that 
the narrator has a "perfect knowledge" about the disclosed 
phenomena and control over the meanings. 9Prickett sees that 
7Alter, ibid., P. 156. 
$Stephen Prickett, Words and The Word: Language, poetics and 
biblical. interpretation, 1986, pp. 204-209. 
9Alter argues, "there is a horizon of perfect knowledge in 
biblical narrative, but it is a horizon we are perrdtted to glinpse 
only in the most momentary and fragmentary ways. " Alter, The Art, 
p. 158. But, the perfect knowledge is more likely to be Alter's than the 
narrative's. 
89 
Alter's understanding of fiction is based upon a conceptual 
framework that, is fundametally opposed to some others such 
as represented by A. D. Nuttall's. 10 
In his book A New Mimesis: Shakespeare and the 
Representation of Reality, Nuttall demonstrates the 
underlying tension in Shakespeare's plays between what he 
calls the "formalist" qualities (displayed in their 
ideological and theoretical structure) and the "real" or 
mimetic (the degree to which they are "true-to-life"). In 
the drama, there would be an active interplay between 
differing impressionT projected by the formal structure and 
the mimetic quality. The mimetic reflection may criticize 
or even subvert what appears to be the reflection of the 
dominant ideology. 11 It represents one side for which the 
main ideology is the other side of a movement so that the 
life of the drama is formed by the fluctuation, a pendulum- 
like motion, between them. This kind of mimesis is actually 
very similar to Alter's depiction of human nature in the 
Bible. They are identified as being unsettled, 
unpredictable, polysemiatic. They exist to produce a 
rivalry against any expression out of the rigidity of 
ideology. But, while for Alter "this way of representing 
10"The positions of Alter, Frei, and Frye, which assume the 
creation of deliberate 'fiction' in biblical narrative, are subtly but 
fundarmntally opposed to that of Nuttall, who sees mimesis in tems 
of the creative gravitational pull, conscious or unconscious, of 
reality on an otherwise formal and philophically schematized literary 
structure. " Prickett, op. cit., p. 208. 
11"The qualities of Tudor monarchist ideology, which any 
historical understanding of the play mmt recognize as central to its 
fomal structure, are actively criticized and even subverted by what 
Nuttall sees as mimetic and poetic qualities in the dramatic 
presentation! '. Prickett, op. cit., p. 204. 
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the world is a matter of conscious literary convention", 
for Nuttall on the contrary, the mimetic "reality" is 
urgently needed, in Shakespeare's plays, in the face of the 
schematized historical 'narrative, the material of 
Holinshed's history for example, that otherwise would be 
the only rigid fact. Nuttall does not argue against, or 
even see as problematic, , the assumption, such as 
demonstrated by Alter's dualism, that Shakespearean 
narrative as a mimesis of reality is systematically formed, 
is fictionalized, detached from the disorderly phenomenon 
of the reality itself. What does interest him most is the 
tension that may always appear between the fictional 
construct and the "universally recognizable element of 
common experience that is constantly and actively present 
in all fiction, modifying, and even undermining its 
9official' programme in order to achieve mimesis". 12 The 
tension is very much in the process of the creation of an 
artist such. as Shakespeare, or we might also say the 
biblical author and reflected through their poetical works. 
Biblical narrative is created out of a realisation of the 
ambiguity of reality, even sometimes demonstrating 
nescience (a lack of knowledge). Rather than putting aside 
the ambiguity, the Bible expresses an active dialogue with 
it. The ambiguity in biblical characters' performances 
would not in any time and way succumb to the narrator's 
ideological voice for the sake of consistency. The 
characters' points of view would in a sense remain 
independent from the narrator's so that they can be a rival 
12Prickett, OP-cit., p. 206. 
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or, at any rate, a partner in a dialogical relationship 
with the narrator. 
Here, we are reminded by Bakhtin's theory of the novel that 
would bring us to the recognition of multiplicity of voices 
and viewpoints. The language of the novel is, according to 
Bakhtin, not a unilinear language: "literary language is 
not represented in the novel (as it is in other genres) as 
a unitary, completely finished off, indubitably adequate 
language - it is represented precisely as a living mix of 
varied and opposing voices. 1113 It correlates to an ordinary 
communication between people where it is ostensible that 
every time a word is used, it is one way or another 
recontextualized, pulled in a different direction according 
to the new context of the speaker(s), and given a different 
inflexion and resonance. 
The word, directed towards its object, 
enters a dialogically agitated and tension- 
filled environment of alien words, value- 
judgments and accents, weaves in and out of 
complex interrelationships, merges with 
some, recoils from others, intersects with 
yet a third group. 14 
This complexity of human language is still detectable in 
discourse, it "may leave a trace in all its semantic 
layers, may complicate its expression and influence its 
entire stylistic profile. "15 
13M. M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Irwgination, tr. Caryl Brierson and 
Michael Holoquist, 1981, p. xxvii. 
14Bakhtin, ibid., p. 276. 
IsBakhtin, ibid., p. 276. 
92 
As we could imagine, in the process of reading a human 
discourse the multilayeredness would be amplified by the 
entanglement of the readers in their own contexts. Bakhtin 
encourages the readers' creativity in the meaning(s) of 
every literature that is not at all straightforward (as in 
the authoritarian text): "the language of the novel is a 
system of languages that mutually and ideologically 
interanimate each other. It is impossible to describe and 
analyse it as a single unitary language. "16 
Not to analyse a text as a single unitary language means 
that there would not be the omniscient narrator or writer, 
such as Alter has argued about the Bible, from where any 
meaning should only be originated and united. The readers 
are also admittedly involved in producing the meaning(s). 
in this way of looking, the text is never regarded as a 
complete work that the readers should merely accept. 
According to the narratologist Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan in her 
lVarrative Fiction published in 1983, this kind of reading 
represents a new orientation in literary criticism: 
"whereas the Anglo-American New Critics and the French 
structuralists treated the text as a more or less 
autonomous object, the new orientation stresses the 
reciprocal relations between text and the reader". 17 She, 
furthermore, quotes Wolfgang Iser's theory where the stress 
on the reciprocal relationship sounds loudly. 
26 Bakhtin, ibid. , p. 47. 17 Shlanith Rimnon-Kenan, Narrative Fiction: CanteMorary 
poetics, 1983, P. 117. 
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A text can only come to life when it is 
read, and if it is to be examined, it must 
therefore be studied through the eyes of the 
reader. (my emphasis)18 
In contrast to traditional interpretation, which has sought 
to elucidate a hidden meaning in the text, Iser reflects 
meaning as a result of an interaction between text and 
reader, as "an effect to be experienced, " not an "object to 
be defined". 19 It is important for Iser, however, to fix a 
balanced interrelationship of the text and its reader in 
the mode of reading he contends. The involvement of the 
subjectivity of the reader is conceived to be inescapable. 
Monetheless, the text one way or another does not at all 
withdraw its original images. Thus the freedom possessed by 
the reader, throughout his 5ourney in experiencing the text 
events is not unlimited. 20 Since this is no less than a 
dialogical interaction that, however vague, persists the 
distinction between both parties, Iser's theory of reader- 
19 Rimmon-Kenan, ibid. , p. 117. 19The sentence is Robert C. Holub's. see R. C. Holub, Reception 
Theory: A Critical Introduction, 1989, p. 83. 
20This insistence on the distinction between the text and the 
readers has provoked criticism on the part of the critics who see the 
inevitability of text dissapearing in the reading process. Stanley 
Fish, for instance, considers: "it is just that the distinction itself 
is an assuaption which, when it informs an act of literary description, 
will produce the phenainena it purports to describe. That is to say, 
every carponent in such an account (of Iser) - the determinacies or 
textual segments, the indeterminacies or gaps, and the adventures of 
the reader's 'wandering viewpoint' - will be, the products of an 
interpretive strategy that den-ands them, and therefore no one of those 
cmVonents can constitute the independent given which serves to ground 
the interpretive process. " cited in Holub, ibid., p. 103. If judging 
from the entire performance of the reading me would hardly disagree 
with Fish since, after all, the conclusion about textual eleiments is 
the reader's, mde to justify her/his, first of all intendedly, 
objective reading. But, Iser's theory, that leads to the general theory 
of can=dcation, seems to be more sensitive to the existence of text 
as another damain different from its readers which would be inperative 
in reading biblical text as a product of different time and culture 
from that of the readers'. 
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response would ultimately correlate with an understanding 
of human(e) communication. 
A communication assumes an existence of two persons, 
exchanging, the already recognised, words and worlds, 
withinaspecific context, while the process continueg many 
(re)new(ed) understandings, realisationz, meanings, 
unforseeable prior to the process, crop up. Arguing from 
within the sphere of fiction, Iser, furthermore, defines 
what he calls, "the asymmetry between text and reader". It 
consists of two deviations from the norm. First, the reader 
is unable to test whether her/his understanding of the text 
is correct. And second, there is no regulative context 
between text and reader to establish intent; this context 
must be constructed by the reader from textual clues or 
signals. 21 This creates a gap or gaps, which Iser describes 
as the "no-man's-land of indeterminacy", between 
schematised views. Through the gap the communication 
between the text and its readers is established. The 
readers enter the world of the text, experiencing it by 
filling the gap. But,, this should be seen as different from 
Alter's or Sternberg's mode of gap-filling process. In 
iser's view, the gap is grasped by the reader, as a "no 
rnanfs land", rather than intended by the narrator/ writer. 
It is also filled by the reader through a communicatory 
process with the text; neither the reader nor the text 
would, in the first place, come with a clear idea of what 
is going to be the form of the gap-filling. 
21Holub, ibid., p. 92. 
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R. C. Holub wonders as to what exactly constitutes the gap, 
which for him has not yet been made clear despite a great 
length of exposition of it by Iser in his "Indeterminacy 
and the reader's response". 22 "One can", he says, "imagine, 
however, that this lack of definition was intentional on 
Iser's part; - for in response to a criticism of his 
undifferentiated category of indeterminacy 
(Unbestimmtheit), Iser remarked as follows: 'I share the 
opinion that indeterminacy is an extremely undifferentiated 
category and is therefore at best a universal of 
communication theory. To define it, however, would 
eliminate it as a universal that determines 
communication. "' Iser's remark is, in fact, reminiscent of 
Bakhtin's view of human discourse which, according to him, 
is not only polyphony but also marginal: it "lives, as it 
were, on the boundary of its own context and another, alien 
context. 1123 It is impossible to differentiate a language 
that places itself in an alien context, in a "no-man's- 
land" context. A communicatory language is not a 
conceptualized language, graspable beyond the communication 
itself. 24 We could hardly apply a conceptual meaning of a 
22J. Hillis Miller, ed., Aspects of Narrative: Selected papers 
fran the Ehglish Institute, 1971, pp. 1-45. 
23Bakhtin, Dialogic, p. 284. 
24 Iser's objection to any kind of conceptualized. language is 
also apparent in his criticism against structuralist theories: "the 
system of language is a natural me, which changes the semantic fields 
of words when new el ements cmrie- on the scene, for the whole system must 
adapt itself to new elements if it is to incorporate them. This alone 
. Shows 
that the structure concept is an artificial system, whose mode of 
operation differs considerably from that of natural system sinply 
through the fact that its taxonomic classifications can be indefinitely 
extended without affecting the system, let alone changing it 
altogether. " W-Iser, The Current situation of Literary Theory, 1979, 
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word into a communication, what -exists is its derivative, 
the second meaning of the word which is indeterminate and 
always (re)new(ed). "An utterance is never just a 
reflection or an expression of something already existing 
outside it that is given and final. It always creates 
something that never existed before, something absolutely 
new and unrepeatable, . -something created is always created 
out of something given (language, an observed phenomenon of 
reality, an experienced feeling, the speaking subject 
himself, something finalized in his world view, and so 
forth)". 25 Interpretation (of biblical narratives), after 
all, is a matter of experiencing the indeterminate world of 
the text. The world with many voices and points of view 
that is reflected in the text, through the narrator's and 
the characters's voices (each represent individual voices), 
as well as through the involvement of the readers. 
III. 1. In interpreting the characters 
. W. - 
We are, now, going to study the Abraham narratives in the 
light of the theory of Polysemiotic meanings. The focus of 
our study is the characterization of Abraham as well as 
other characters of the Akedah. 
There are two reasons why literary study of the Akedah 
P. 
25Bakhtin, "The Problem of the Text in Linguistics, Philology 
and the Hunan -Sciences: " An Experirnent in Philosophical Analysis" in 
14. M. Bakhtin, Speech and Genres and Other Late Essays, tr. Vern McGee, 
1986, p. 119,120. 
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particularly and Genesis narrative generally should at 
least include, if not prioritise, the study of 
characterization. Firstly because they are a narrative 
about people, the so-called Patriarchs of Israel. The main 
focus of the story is on the life of the individual, that 
is his/her relationship with the divine and the other human 
beings. 26 The meaning(s) of the narrative is, therefore, 
interrelated with how the character is to be understood. 
But having said this, it does not mean that there would 
only be a single common understanding of the character 
based on the textual investigation. The dynamic 
performances of the character in the book of Genesis are 
inevitable and to know about the character is to gather all 
the information that relates to him without intending to 
reduce them into a simpler conclusion for the sake of 
certainty. Characterization study allows the character to 
be seen from different angles depending who perceives and 
when, where, how he/she is perceived. This will provide us 
a rich and lively understanding of the character. And for 
this second reason we argue that chracterization study is 
important. 
in modern literary criticism (more precisely the 
narratological approach) ,a text is understood to produce 
some indicators by which the readers construct the 
character in the process of reading. Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan 
explains the character construction as this: 
26 As Erich Auerbach explains, "it is this history of personality 
which the old Testament presents to us as the formation undergone by 
those whom God has chosen to be exan-ples. " Auerbach, Xirwsis, p. 18. 
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Character, as one construct within the 
abstracted story, can be described in terms 
of a network of character-traits. These 
traits, however, may or may not appear as 
such in the text. How, then, is the 
construct arrived at? By assembling various 
character-indicators distributed along the 
text-continuum and, when necessary, 
inferring the traits from them. 27 
it is obvious that the form of the character also depends 
on the readers' judgments and perception. The text does not 
essentially provide a ready-made character nor does it tell 
the readers about how the character should or should not be 
understood in such a way that the readers can accept it 
unequivocally. Rimmon-Kenan's suggestion for a reader 
inference when necessary implies the inevitability that the 
readers are to be involved in articulating the characters. 
it does not mean, however, that there is room for the 
readers' being completely arbitrary. The text always 
provides the readers with some information about the 
character which in turn functions as "a fence" so that the 
result of the (re) construction is not and should not be 
alien to the text. This theory basically offers a system of 
dialogical control between the text and its readers which 
is not only true for chracterization study but also true 
for the reading process in general. Rimmon-Kenan has shown 
the inevitable role of the readers in embroidering textual 
27Rimnon-Kenan, Narrative, p. 59. See also Gerald Prince's 
Dictionary of Narratology, 1987, p. 13., which also rmntions the four 
Aristotelian principles of characterization: "the agent should have a 
certain mral elevation (chreston); s/he should be endowed with traits 
appropriately related to the action (harmtion); s/he should have 
idiosyncrasies and be like an individual (hctmios); and s/he should be 
consistent (hamalon)". We can only perceive these principles in the 
biblical narrative by way of contrast. Biblical characters scarcely 
gieet the Aristotelian characterization as this study will show. 
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information to make a character become plausible. At the 
same time, it cannot be denied that each reader may respond 
to the textual information in different ways so that the 
multivariety of the character depiction may originate from 
the way it is read (by the readers) as well as the way it 
is composed (as it is in the text). 
The work of the readers is not as easy as it looks. once a 
character begins to appear as a result of the 
(re)construction, the readers must realise that it all 
happens while some other materials have got to be put 
aside. And although those discarded materials are perhaps 
not as directly linked as the applied ones, they are still 
part of the image of the apparent character. The problem 
is, while on the one hand the character depiction has to be 
plausible though not necessarily static, on the other hand 
the character-indicators from which the character is 
(re)constructed are quite often densely interwoven in the 
text-continuum. A report on the character's actions, 
utterances, thoughts is often disseminated over several 
occasions and ways and in the case of the biblical 
narrative it can be entangled with the narrator's own 
judgment directly or indirectly. 
Meir Sternberg for example says that to get to know the 
characters in f act amounts to maintaining a contact with 
the narrator which in Sternberg's point of view is an 
omniscient narrator, the supposedly shaper of the narrative 
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world. 28 While we may take Sternberg's point, it must be 
understood that the narrator may characterize its character 
by way of paradox or sometimes it invites the readers to 
imagine an event that itself for some reason, apparent or 
not, prefers to leave blank. To have a contact with the 
omniscient narrator does not necessarily result in 
admitting the ultimate authority of the narrator's 
utterances and assuming that this is the only voice in the 
discourse. As a matter of fact, the narrator always needs 
us, the readers, to make its story alive and intelligible 
by means of interpretation, including interpretation on its 
own voice. 
A study of characterization is intended to highlight all 
the appearance of characters collectively and/or 
individually. It must be distinguished from defining the 
characters in terms of who they are. The aim of this study 
is to characterize the characters in terms of what they are 
and how do we, the readers, find oUt. 29 We can even say 
that it is virtually impossible to fix who the character 
really is as if s/he would have everything that we real 
human beings have, simply because s/he is not real. As the 
biblical literary critic Robert Alter perceives, "Although 
a character's own statements might seem a straightforward 
enough revelation of who he is and what he makes of things, 
20Meir Sternberg, The Poetics of Biblical Narrative: ideological 
Literature and the Draw of Reading, 1985, p. 161. 
2 9Mieke Bal, ivarratol ogy: Introduction to the Theory of 
Narrative, trans. by Christine van Boheenen, 1985, p. 80. For a similar 
argu-nent with a specificatim in biblical narratology see Sternberg, 
op. cit, P-327. 
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in fact the biblical writers are quite as aware as any 
James or Proust that speech may ref lect the occasion more 
than the speaker". 30 Mieke Bal describes the fact about the 
character as this, "The character is not a human being, but 
it resembles one. It has no real psyche, personality, 
ideology, or competence to act, but it does possess 
characteristics which make psychological and ideological 
description possible. "31 of course it is clear that the 
character is not a human being. But, Bal's argument is 
intended to show the ut1lizability of the characters in the 
discourse as , wel 1 as in the interpretation of the 
discourse. Unlike a real human being, the characters are 
not free to express themselves. They are part of the 
discourse that is used to implement a goal and which 
reflects some ideology which does not originate from the 
character. 
It is also true that in the process of interpretation the 
psychological and ideological description are often made up 
by the readers themselves. Perhaps more than any ancient 
narrative, biblical narrative works with many reticences, 
silences of the character and mostly through this device 
the influence of the readers along with their ideologies in 
fleshing out the character is inevitable. Sternberg says, 
"they (the characters) are subsumed by the general strategy 
of disclosure whereby the given does not suffice and the 
sufficient is not given in time or at al 111 . 32 He, 
30Alter, TheArt, p. 117. 
31Bal, Narratology, p. 327. 
32Sternberg, Poetics, p. 323. 
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furthermore, comes to a conclusion, "so reading a character 
becomes a process of discovery, attended by all the 
biblical hallmarks: progressive reconstruction, tentative 
closure of discontinuities, frequent and sometimes painful 
reshaping in face of the unexpected, and intractable 
pockets of darkness to the very end". 33 
The immediate problem that the readers have to face in 
penetrating biblical characters is that they are not always 
open in evoking their inner feelings, their thoughts, their 
judgment. Although in some cases, the reticence of the 
characters is temporary and as the story goes on the 
readers will gradually perceive their original motives of 
action, but it cannot always be the fact. A character may 
remain mysterious from the first time s/he appears to the 
end of the story. 
Not only being dumb, the character might also behave in a 
morally confusing way. It is a real question from time to 
time as to whether the character keeps a moral standard at 
all. our reading, however, will only reveal the character 
as it is that may or may not be appropriate to the morality 
we acknowledge in our time. The character is not a human 
being in whom moral standards would have been essential for 
life. The decisions taken by a character are by no means 
consistent- somehow depending on the context when the 
decisions are made. Abraham brings Sarah along to the 
promised land only to use her later on in the time of 
33Stemberg, Poetics, p. 323. 
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crisis (ch. 12). If it is true for human beings, it is also 
true for God. The Akedah is undoubtedly a good example 
where the divine reveals his oppositional demands- the 
sacrifice of the promised son which is as dramatic as the 
cancellation of the sacrifice solemnly commanded. God's 
demands can emerge mysteriously and inconsistently. 
action: his characterization and 
focalization 
The silence of character is certainly one way through which 
the polysemiotic signals can be captured in biblical 
narratives; one will undoubtedly see this predominantly in 
Abraham's Performance in Gen. 22, but there are also some 
other narratological devices. The shifts of one point of 
view or voice to another necessarily yields multilayered 
effects. The narrator may focalize a character; so does the 
character himself. Each expresses their own experience of 
an event, that also describes their presuppositions. The 
narrator's report on character's action may be proleptic, 
anticipating the future events of which the present looks 
as a preparation. The birth of Isaac as a fulfillment of 
God's promise has been explicitly or implicitly anticipated 
by the narrator while reporting Abraham's journey. Abraham, 
on the other hand, may not be aware of the narrator's 
reports and acts pragmatically, according to his "limited" 
understanding. There probably is a discrepancy between what 
is seen by Abraham and what is conceived by the narrator. 
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Our argument, however, does not lead to a judgment as to 
which one of those voices should be accepted and which one 
should not. Each voice will be heard and seen dialogically 
with another. 
Genesis 12 
The name of Abram (becomes Abraham af ter being ordained as 
the father of many nations, ch. 17: 5) is mentioned for the 
first time along with the other sons of Terah (11: 26). 
Abram is the tenth descendant of Noah. The announcement of 
Abram as Noah's descendant has related Abram's story to the 
previous history. But, here, we cannot see the reason why 
Abram becomes the main focus in the following narrative or 
why he is chosen by God. However, he is the only one who 
then receives a divine command to move from his original 
place into the promised land (12: 1-3). The command is "go 
(Iek-loka) from your country (mearesekha) and from your 
kinship (umimmoladetekha) and from your father's house 
(umibet 'abhikha) to the land that I will show you ( 'el- 
ha'ares 'as'er 'ar'ekha)" (v. 1). This command is heard when 
Abram is in Haran, the place where he and his father stay 
in their journey to the land of Canaan from Ur (11: 31) and 
after the death of his father (11: 32). Without regarding 
this command, the journey of Abram from Haran itself, 
starting in 12: 5, would have been a continuation of the 
previous journey (11: 31) and obviously without Terah being 
in it since he has already died. The command has 
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transformed the worldly Pilgrimage of Abram's clan into a 
religious pilgrimage initiated by God's calling. 
Nonetheless, we still can see the reflection of the two 
I'motivatedly separate" Pilgrimages as the narration goes 
on. The religious motive of Abram's journey does not 
completely eclipse the mundane one. In spite of God's 
command and some of its reconfirmation throughout Abraham 
narrative, Abram's journey is more like an unending 
journey, full of danger, rather than a divinely-guarded 
journey to a promise land. 
The two differentiated angles which perceive Abram's 
journey will soon be apparent in response to God's command. 
The narrator reports Abram's response to God's command in 
two ways: 
1. So Abram went, as the Lord had told him; 
and Lot went with him. (v. 4). 
2. And Abram took Sarai his wife, and Lot his 
brother's son, and all their possessions 
which they had gathered, and the persons 
that they had gotten in Haran; and they set 
forth to go to the land of Canaan. (v. 5). 
NO-1 is a briefer report where Abram is portrayed in his 
instant obedience to God. This report assumes that Abram 
follows every detail of the content of the command. Judging 
f rom this report alone, we undoubtedly would agree with 
some commentators that "Abraham obeys blindly and without 
objection" God's command. 34 But, in the second report, the 
narrator with "the camera" directed straight at Abram's 
34The sentence is von Rad's. Gerhard von Rad, Genesis: A 
Caumntary, 1961, p. 156. 
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actions discloses a quite different view. Abram prepares 
his journey in an orderly manner as if he does not want to 
leave anything he has when he moves. As a response to God's 
command, Abram's actions look asymmetric. The command wants 
Abram to go alone but Abram brings the whole family with 
him. 35 Does Abram hear God's command? or is this for Abram 
his own journey (as well as a fulfilment of God's command)? 
surely, after his father's death, Abram, now the head of 
the family, has the obligation to keep the family. To 
follow literally God's command, namely, to abandon his 
family, would be unwise?! 
The second report is not just a further detail of the first 
one as some commentators have argued. 36 It unveils a 
different phenomenon, Abram's depiction is, here, closer to 
the reality of a pilgrimage that is ready to move to 
another Place. The first report is more likely to be the 
narrator's own judgment of Abram's obedience, who cares 
more about Abram's piety. Abram instantly departs from home 
alone, in accordance with God's command. Lot is even 
depicted as the one who follows Abram (wayelek 'ito lot: 
and Lot walks with Abram) and not that he is brought by 
Abraham as in the second report. 
35 Af ter Terah died, the rest of Abram's f amily are those who go 
with him. 
36See for exanple Claus Westermann. who first of all thinks that 
vv. 4b-5 are an insertion by P, the redactor (works later than J, the 
original writer). He says, "vv. 4b-5 give the inpression of filling out 
rather than repeating, and the sentence inTrediately preceding it is 
identical with the same, or almost the same, sentence in J, which can 
therefore be left out". Claus Westennann, Genesis 12-36: A Cbmnentar7, 
C. 1985, p. 153. 
107 
Since the text bears two different perspectives, we should 
not automatically take them as meaningless contradictory 
statements that remain to be so unless one is regarded as 
more reliable and can be taken into account than the other. 
instead, the many voices may well express a dialogical 
comprehension which can originate from an authorial 
contemplation. As argued by Bakhtin, 
When there is a deliberate (conscious) 
multiplicity of styles, there are always 
dialogic relations among the styles. One 
cannot understand these interrelations 
purely linguistically (or even 
mechanically) ... It is important to 
understand the total sense of this dialogue 
of styles from the author's standpoint (not 
as an image, but as a function). 37 
obviously, Bakhtin's argument would invalidate, on the one 
hand, source criticism or documentary hypothesis which 
normally points at the different writers, distributors, 
redactors as the cause of the multiplicity of coverage and, 
on the other hand, any understanding that basically seeks 
for a closure, an obvious explanation of such differing 
phenomena. For Bakhtin the multiplicity is not a problem - 
so that unless it is overcome the interpretation cannot 
succeed- but a deliberate attempt of the author to 
objectify his reflection upon reality that inevitably is 
many-sided since the reality itself is basically 
unstructured, multi -dimensional, keeps changing, not always 
comprehensible as such. The Bible itself, in spite of being 
claimed as authoritative or expressing merely a single 
37 Bakhtin, "The Problem, " p. 112. 
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ideology, still demonstrates the inevitability of plurality 
in its- attempt to comprehend the reality. Thus, we should 
not be tempted to reduce the plurality into a single 
explanation for the sake of clarity or the singleness of 
the ideology. We, the readers, especially the modern ones, 
live with an awareness of a complex and incomplete reality 
in which the affects, like it or not, influence our 
reading. By raising this matter to the level of realisation 
we may hope that our reading of the Bible can be more 
exhaustive, taking into account as many full-blown aspects 
as possible that are even neglected or deliberately 
suppressed by the author(s). 38 
We will identify the phenomenon of the first report as a 
"direct definition/description" of the character from the 
narrator. 39 Rimmon-Kenan says, "Definition is akin to 
generalization and conceptualization. It is also both 
explicit and supra-temporal. Consequently, its dominance in 
a given text is liable to produce a rational, authoritative 
and static impression. 1140 If this theory is true for other 
fictional narratives, it is- only partially true for 
biblical narratives in which the narrator's direct 
definition of the character does not always demand to be 
accepted as static impression. When the narrator describes 
39 What I have in mind here is the sort of readings that post- 
modernism could offer. They are feminist readings, deconstructionism, 
readings produced by the liberation theology movenent, etc. 
391n this case, the narrator merely offers his contemplative 
report (conclusion) rather than unfolding the situation of the 
character as s/he is or the character in her/his own action or 
utterances. 
4ORhumn-Kenan, Narrative, p. 60. 
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the character as in the first report, it should not be 
taken as the only conceptualization of what happens. It is 
true that the narrator's direct definition is an attempt to 
make a generalization about the character but as happened 
in our reading, the narrator will also let the character be 
characterized differently in the discourse (the second 
report above). It- does not mean that the narrator has, 
therefore, betrayed its own judgment but the truth is that 
the discourse may reflect many voices and the voice of the 
narrator forms one of them. 
As Sternberg emphasises, "As a record of f act, to be sure, 
the Bible maintains a spatiotemporal (as well as thematic) 
continuity between the textual and the extratextual world 
denied to fictional writing. 1141 The biblical characters are 
at a certain degree depicted as if they are live human 
beings that live in the real or, with regard to the text, 
extratextual world. of course the realistic characters can 
exist only hypothetically or as an impression projected by 
the Bible. The characters as told in the story could 
possibly have never existed. The characters live merely in 
the narrative world (after all, they are fictional). In 
such a world, they are granted an opportunity, limited 
though, to manifest their own experiences through their 
actions, reactions, thoughts, emotions, speeches, external 
appearances that are reported in the narrative. 
The narrator's perception and the character's own 
41 Sternberg, Poetics, p. 159. 
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manifestation of his experience may probably be different. 
The discrepancy should not be denied because it functions 
to enrich our readings. The Bible does not only reveal one 
way of looking an event, that proves the complexity of its 
world. Abram may be as blindly obedient as described by v. 4 
but he is also a sociable man who wants to be with his 
family wherever he goes as v. 5 illustrates. His view of 
property is also practical, in that he brings all of his 
possessions that he might need in his journey. Surely Abram 
does not seem to hold a belief that he is a superhuman- as 
some would imagine because in their opinion he will always 
be protected by the deity- that he should not be worried by 
anything. Surprisingly, though, his alert act that should 
have been much more obvious dissapears from the Akedah. He 
is not' anxious nor horrified in sacrificing his own son. 
This is strange. He protects Ishmael against Sarah's hatred 
(ch. 21) but he does nothing to protect Isaac who is not 
only in danger of being expelled but killed. After all, it 
is God himself who commands the sacrifice whereas Abraham's 
obedience to God is notorious- any action of Abraham is 
practically based on God's order. It is exactly at the 
point of obeying God's command that the alert Abraham 
becomes susceptible. His obedience to God seems to estrange 
him from his own son to the point that he is able to kill 
him with no hesitation. 
We cannot precisely infer what does Abram actually think 
when he brings Sarai, his barren wife along. 42 At any rate, 
42Gen. 11: 30 reveals specifically the barremess of Sarai 
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we know that Abram may sense the fact that Sarai's 
infertility makes the promise of being a great nation (v. 2) 
absurd. surprisingly, though, Abram does not seem to be 
bewildered. on the other side, Lot is with him. While Abram 
has no son of his own, Lot, his nephew could undoubtedly 
represent the position of Abram's descendant. If Abram 
keeps in his mind the promise of a great nation, then he 
may perceive its reason in the presence of Lot who remains 
with him. He might have regarded Lot (or somebody else in 
his group) as his descendant through whom the promise of a 
great nation will be realised. 43 At any rate, Abram may not 
necessarily hope that Sarai will be the mother of his own 
child. 
Does Abram really love Sarai so that he could not 
relinguish her for the sake of God's command? If we think 
so, we might be disillusioned by the next event where Abram 
is deliberately disguising Sarai as his sister in-order to 
escape from a lethal danger he senses in advance (12: 10- 
20). The scene of a husband using his wife as a shield to 
protect himself would, to many of us, be morally shocking. 
It could be more perplexing that it happens, under urgent 
circumstance, just after Abram receives God's promise that 
his journey is going to be a blessed journey. - Instead of 
getting the divine blessing Abram must sacrifice his own 
43 The promise of descendants should have been given more 
appropriately to Sarai rather than Abram who seem to have no 
difficulty in getting children by himself (Ishmel) or by adoption 
(Lot, Eliezer of Damascus: Gen. 15: 2). Isaiah 51: 2 reveals the 
apotheosis of Sarah as the mother of Israel. Abraham is father of many 
it (nations) but Sarah is the one "who bore you (Israel) . 
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wife. The story begins with a famine that urges Abram and 
his family to take refuge in Egypt. There Abram must face 
another trouble, the Egyptians would kill him if they found 
him as Sarai's husband. So, Abram asks Sarai to cover up 
their relationship as a brother and sister. 
Say you are my sister, that (10ma'an) it may 
go well with me (yiyýabh-li) because of you 
(bha'abhurekh), and that my life may be 
spared on your account. (v. 13) 
There are two reasons used by Abram in persuading Sarai: 
"that it may go well with me because of you" and "that my 
life may be spared on your account". The first reason has a 
close relationship with the main cause of their coming to 
Egypt, that is, to search for food. The emergence of the 
proceeding danger (that the Egyptians might kill Abram) 
that haunts Abram a great deal does not-, however, 'eclipse 
the primary motive of being in Egypt. So that whatever they 
do to avoid the present danger must also be a way-out of 
the hunger. If Sarai masquerades as Abram's sister they 
could hope for the Egyptians, having seen Sarai's beauty, 
to be interested in exchanging some food and properties for 
her. It does work. v. 16: "And for her (Sarai) sake 
(ba'abhurahh) he (Pharaoh) dealt well with Abram (le'abhram 
hepibh)". This report obviously corresponds to the first 
reason of Abram's request as well as to the second one. As 
commented on by Westermann: "The first sentence, 'But with 
Abram, all went well because of her (his own translation of 
v. 16a)', is to be understood in the context of the 
beginning of the narrative: the escape from the famine and 
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the new threat of death. " Westermann furthermore infers 
that "the ruse appears to have succeeded; both live and all 
is well with them; but the marriage and the family are 
destroyed". 44 Abram and Sarai may suffer throughout the 
deception, a suffering that has to be seen as the 
consequence of the command to go out from the original 
country. However, we hardly have any evidence that Abram's 
marriage is destroyed- that the couple no longer live in 
harmony. After the event Sarai resumes as Abram's wife and 
they apparently live as they used to be before the event. 
Westermann's judgment seems to be plausible only to our 
modern sense in which such a use of one's own wife should 
be strongly condemned. In the meantime, Abram and Sarai 
themselves do not seem to be bothered by it. 
The narrative would not, however, have continued with Sarai 
being permanently Pharaoh's wife. The narrative discloses 
the affliction of Pharaoh (v. 17) who then grudgingly gives 
Sarai back to Abram (vv. 18,19). The strong reaction of 
Pharaoh toward Abram indicates that Pharaoh himself does 
not think that he deserves the affliction. Surprisingly, 
Abram does not want to respond against Pharaoh's anger, his 
silence inevitably makes it appear as if he accepts all the 
blame Pharaoh accuses him of. Pharaoh, finally, expels 
Abram from his country as a culprit. (v. 20). After all, does 
Abram really feel guilty over the trick he played on 
Pharaoh? We have no clear answer to this question. If we 
see his complete silence in front of Pharaoh, we might 
44Westennam, Genesis, p. 165. 
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think that he accepts the blame. But, judging from the very 
beginning of the event, we can say that Abram being in 
double danger could have thought that the trick is the only 
way to survive. He arranges the trick just to escape from 
the predicament. And if in the end he keeps silent in front 
of the angry Pharaoh it is because he does not see any 
point in having a quarrel when he has gained everything he 
wants from Pharaoh. In contrast to Abram's practical 
thinking, the narrator makes a judgment which is subtly 
implied by the report of Pharaoh's affliction. The narrator 
who operates outside the represented world (instead of, 
inside the represented world, that is, the world of the 
characters) could not justify the fact that Pharaoh takes 
Sarai as his wife. As a result, if, on the one hand, 
Pharaoh is revealed as being afflicted by Yahweh, on the 
other hand, Abram is cursed and expelled by Pharaoh. Both, 
Pharaoh and Abram are, in the narrator's point of view, to 
be badly rewarded because of the misplacement of Sarai. 
However, the "punishment" of Abram, if the unsympathetic 
reaction of Pharaoh can be thought as such, cannot be as 
crude as Pharaoh's affliction. Abram is different from 
Pharaoh. 45 Abram bears a religious duty from God and, as 
far as 12: 4 is concerned, he is also a pious man. In 
comparing the punishment that the two men have to accept, 
we can see the assumption of the narrator that because of 
the speciality of Abram, he cannot be equated to others. 
45Elsewhere in biblical, narratives, Pharaoh is identified as a 
foreign oppressor of Israel (Exodus). His harsh treatment of Abram way 
be an allusion to this later history of Abram's descendants. However, 
the present context shows that Pharaoh is angry because of he is caused 
suffering by Abram's trick. 
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Even if he is found guilty he must not be condemned like 
other people. 
Genesis 13 
in ch. 13 we find another discrepancy between the narrator's 
point of view and Abram's. The story is about Lot's 
departure f rom Abram's group. In the eyes of Abram, the 
separation is to avoid a clash within the family. "Then 
Abram said to Lot, "Let there be no strife (meribhah) 
between you and me, between your herdsmen and my herdsmen; 
for we are kinsmen"'(v. 8). This is actually a practical way 
of solving a family problem. About the place, Abram does 
not seem to really care. He will be glad to let Lot choose 
the place first and he will take the opposite direction 
accordingly. However, in the narrator's report the matter 
looks more complicated than Abram might have thought. The 
report about Lot is obviously an undermining of Lot 
himself. The narrator makes a contrast of Lot's place as 
seen by Lot at that time and as seen after the destruction 
of the place. 
And Lot lifted up his eyes, and saw that the 
Jordan valley was well watered everywhere 
like the garden of the Lord, like the land 
of Egypt, in the direction of Zo'ar; this 
was before the Lord destroyed Sodom and 
Gomor'rah. (v. 10). 
The sentence after (; ) besides giving time indication also 
anticipates Gen. 19 that reveals the dreadfulness of the 
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place that contradicts Lot's perception at that time. The 
narrator's comment on the place renders Lot as an 
unreliable informant with respect to what he sees of Sodom 
and Gomorrah. The same case happens when Lot has decided to 
live in Sodom. The narrator's words "the men of Sodom were 
wicked, great sinners against the Lord" (v. 13) would be 
enough to completely debunk Lot's consideration. Although 
this information from the narrator may refer to the 
destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah (ch. 19) later on, we 
certainly do not see any reason why Lot should avoid living 
in that splendid place (10a) for the sake of the not-yet- 
visible danger. However, by combining the two contrasting 
phenomena, the narrator apparently wants to convey its 
ideological message that a judgment based on the outward 
appearance may be tricky. This message becomes more 
apparent with the divine promise of land and descendants to 
Abram just after Lot's departure. (vv. 14-17). Lot has chosen 
his land because of the beauty of the place. Abram, on the 
other hand, has Yahweh as the giver of his land (though 
still in a form of a promise), he does not choose the land 
by and for himself. Abram, therefore, should depend on 
Yahweh for the land, the status of the land as promise 
increases the sense of the dependence. 
Genesis 15 
The report of Abram as a Pious believer seems to reach its 
peak in ch. 15: 6 where the narrator states conclusively "and 
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he (Abram) believed (he'emin) in Yahweh (baYahweh) and he 
(probably Abram) reckoned it to him (probably Yahweh) as 
righteousness (wayyahOA`bheha lo sedaqah). " 46 Ironically, 
the context of this statement is a debate between Abram and 
Yahweh which is coloured by Abram's protestation. The 
problem is that Abram is doubtful of having a son from his 
own blood as implied by previous divine promises. 
Therefore, he wants to realistically adopt one of his aides 
to be his heir. Yahweh, however, wants it otherwise, 
Abram's descendant must be Abram's flesh and blood. After 
hearing Yahweh's declaration, we hear the statement of the 
narrator. The conclusion, however, cannot just hide the 
fact that Abram has been aggressively arguing against 
Yahweh. He even still reserves a doubt over Yahweh's 
promise of land (vv. 7, B). So, what has made Abram's opinion 
vary from God's? Having viewed the whole argument we may 
say that their disagreements more likely come from 
different ways of thinking. While God always looksto the 
future, that is, the fulfilment of the promises themselves, 
Abram is a realistic man, he always bases his arguments on 
what he can see at the time as it is. If God asserts that 
Abram will have his own descendant that is still invisible. 
on the other hand, Abram, seeing that he remains childless, 
wants to adopt another child as his heir. Abram's thought 
46Westermann calls this phrase "a theological reflection! ' which 
camot have originated from Abram. He says "there is no trace in the 
verse of anything which goes back to the patriarchal period". 
Westermann, Genesis, p. 222. Westermann, therefore, realises that there 
is sm-behow a gap between the original knowledge of Abram and the writer 
who -uses his own conclusion in order to inTose on the readers a 
religious effect of Abram's performance. For us,, the gap can also be 
seen as a discrepancy between the narrator's own generalisation and 
Abram's performance similar to the previous dialogue with Yahweh. 
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may threaten to break up his promissory dependence on God. 
The adoption of Eliezer would end the promise of descendant 
which otherwise has yet to be fulfilled. Once Eliezer 
is 
admitted as Abram's heir, Abram will no more have to wait 
for the fulfilment of the promise of descendant. However, 
Abram's intention does not gain favour in God's eyes. Thus, 
Abram has to remain loyal to the promise, cancelling the 
visible presence - (Eliezer) for the sake of the invisible 
future (Isaac). 
Genesis 16 
Abram's pragmatic way of life is attested again when he 
accepts Sarai's suggestion that he should marry Hagar in 
order to have a son. 47 Where Gen. 15: 2,3 writes Abram's 
reaction to the problem of childlessness- his senior 
servant is absolutely eligible to be his heir- this chapter 
deals with Sarai's attempt to overcome the problem which 
seems to be much more distressing in her eyes. Sarai's 
frustration expressed in a strong language "the Lord has 
47Von Rad, like same other ccmnentators, considers the plan to 
give a personal n-aid given to a wanan when she gets married to a 
husband in order to have a child is a widespread legal custom at 
Abram's time. And yet, von Rad sees a probability that the narrator 
subtly condemns its application to this particular event, "the story of 
Hagar (so he calls ch. 16) shows us to same extent ...... a fainthearted faith that cannot leave things with God and believes it necessary to 
help things along. All persons of the drama appear in a bad 
light .... the reader understands that a child so conceived in defiance 
or in little faith cannot be the heir of promise. " Von Rad, GL-nesis, 
pp. 186,191. Von Rad's conclusion seeffs to be directed to strongly 
reject the existence of Ishmael as Abram's sm. Although this prejudice 
would be proved too strong in the narrative, we would agree if the 
narrative somewhat ends up with showing "a failure" of Sarai's plan as 
unveiled in the beginning of the story. 
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prevented me from bearing children 'asarani Yahweh 
inilledeth)" (v. 2) may not be found in Abram. Sarai seems to 
be very disappointed by her barrenness which in her own 
judgment is the only cause of the childlessness. Unlike 
Sarai, Abram does not seem to reckon the childlessness as 
an urgent problem, however, he is depicted as in utter 
agreement with Sarai's suggestion to take Hagar as wife. It 
is said, "And Abram hearkened to the voice of Sarai 
(wayyiffma' abhram loqol s*aray)" (v. 2). The sentence clearly 
indicates Abram's consent to Sarai's will that is done 
without any reservation. The narrative seems to emphasize 
that the plan to take Hagar as Abram's wife is engineered 
by Sarai alone, Abram just follows what has been decided by 
Sarai. It is made obvious in the succeeding summary: 
Sarai, Abram's wife, took Hagar the 
Egyptian, her maid, and gave her to Abram 
her husband as a wife. And he went in to 
Hagar, and she conceived... (vv. 3,4). 
If Sarai is the initiator of Hagar's marriage, she is also 
the one who causes Hagar to flee (vv. 5-7). After being 
pregnant Hagar looks down on her mistress. Sarai, on the 
other hand, may think that Hagar's contempt is a defiant 
gesture that in the future Hagar may not hand the child 
over to her in a way she expected before. Sarai pleads for 
Abram's judgment on Hagar's contempt. Besides the fact that 
he is Hagar's husband now, Abram willfully confirms Sarai's 
power over Hagar that results in the expulsion. The 
narrative is about Sarai's desperate attempt to have a 
child, but in the end it is Abram who owns the child: "And 
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Hagar bore Abram a son" (v. 15). After the expulsion, 
Hagar's son is no longer Sarai's son as planned though he 
is still Abram's. 
Genesis 17 
The transformation of Abram's name into Abraham which means 
"a father of multitude (nations)" (ch. 17: 5) is undoubtedly 
important as far as the promise of descendants is 
concerned. The promise of descendants itself is not for the 
first time heard in this occasion (see also 12: 2,13: 16, 
15: 5) and indeed it is not given for the last time either 
(see 22: 17a). Ironically, besides the promise of multi- 
descendants Abraham only has one son, that is, Ishmael. 
But, one son is apparently enough for Abraham to think of 
the possibility of having many more descendants (apparently 
through Ishmael) so that he remains attentively silent 
while listening to the divine utterances (vv. 4-14). Only 
when Elohim declares Sarah (Sarai's new name) as the mother 
to-be of his son (v-16), Abraham cannot help laughing 
(v. 17). In his old age, as is Sarah, Abraham does not 
believe that a child can be born to them. With a similar 
motive as in ch. 15: 2,3 Abraham contemptuously enough asks 
whether Ishmael is the son through whom Elohim wants to 
establish his covenant with the generations after Abraham. 
up to this moment, we still see Abraham disagreeing with 
God concerning his actual heir. Abraham tends to consider 
what are the facts. For him, Ishmael is the hope f or the 
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continuation of his clan. He seems to always interpret the 
divine promise of descendants in the light of the existence 
of some "children" that he has already had (cf. ch. 15: 2,3). 
Genesis 18,19 
In the next story (ch. 18) we discern a unique 
characterization of Abraham in his relation to God. Here 
Abraham is depicted as a character that can express his own 
will in front of the divinity. 
Af ter knowing that Yahweh is going to destroy Sodom and 
Gomorrah, Abraham wants to make sure that Lot and his 
family can be saved from the destruction (vv. 22-31). The 
text actually does not mention Lot's name but from a 
previous event we have gathered that Lot and his family 
live in Sodom (ch. 13: 12). In ch. 13 despite the beauty that 
makes Lot prefer to live there, we have also heard about 
the potential danger of the place. So, there is no doubt 
that Abraham, here, tries to have Lot and his family 
protected from the catastrophe. In his argument, Abraham 
tries to convince Yahweh that there are some righteous 
people (Lot and his family) however small a minority they 
are in the place. Based on this fact, Abraham appeals to 
Yahweh, 
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Far be it f rom thee to do such thing, to 
sla the righteous (sadiq) with the wicked 
(raia ý) , so that the 
. righteous f are as the 
wicked! Far be it from thee! Shall not the 
Judge of all the earth do right? (hasophet 
kal-ha'ares lo' ya'aseh mis"pat) (v. 25). 
The phrase "far be it from thee" which is addressed to 
Yahweh twice indicates the seriousness of Abraham in 
preventing the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah. As 
has"ophet kal-ha'arep, Yahweh should not punish the just 
with the wicked, he should be able to distinguish between 
the pious and the impious. since they are not the same. 
Abraham's argument eventually appears as effective. In the 
end Yahweh concedes, "For the sake of ten I will not 
destroy it" (v. 32). 48 
But, does Yahweh really bring about his deal with Abraham? 
As a matter of fact, Sodom and Gomorrah are destroyed 
(ch. 19). Although Lot and his two daughters are saved, in 
contrast to the agreement made by Yahweh with Abraham, the 
place is destroyed. When he wakes up early in the morning 
to see whether Yahweh keeps his deal, Abraham should have 
been disappointed because "he looked down toward Sodom and 
Gomorrah and toward all the land of the valley, and beheld, 
and lo, the smoke of the land went up like the smoke of a 
furnace. " (v. 28). We are not told what Abraham's comment on 
it was but we can imagine it from seeing how the place 
looked in Abraham's eyes. The analogy of "a furnace" to 
refer Sodom and Gomorrah demonstrates how dreadful the 
48 The number might have described the number of Lot and his familY. 
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place was for Abraham. Abraham might have been in despair 
imagining the fate of Lot and his family. For him, Yahweh 
has failed to keep his deal. 49 
Ironically, the narrator makes a conclusion of the event by 
saying "So it was that, when God destroyed the cities of 
the valley, ý God remembered Abraham (wavvizkor 'elohim 'et- 
abhraham) ... 11 (v. 29). It is virtually 
impossible for 
Abraham to think that God has remembered him by virtue of 
his agreement not to destroy the cities (18: 32). So, the 
context of the narrator's conclusion should be searched for 
not in Abraham and Yahweh's dialogue (18: 22-32), instead in 
Yahweh's inner voice (18: 19). We read in v. 19 Yahweh's 
intention to keep his promises to Abraham which also 
include the promise for multiplying Abraham's descendants. 
When the narrator declares that "God remembered Abraham", 
it introduces the story of Lot and his two daughters who 
survived the catastrophe and begot children incestuously 
(19: 30-38). In other words, the narrator wants to make a 
49 The destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah emerges, as a symbol of 
the doom of sinners, many times in the Bible. In the second temple 
period, the people of Jerusalem (sinners) were accused as Sodom: 
Isa. 1: 9-10,3: 9; Ez. 16: 46; Jer. 23: 14. The destruction of Sodom and 
Gomorrah in Genesis might have originated in the contemplation of the 
people, particularly those who engaged themselves in didactism, in the 
second temple period who grieved for the spiritual deterioration of 
Jerusalem. Thus, Sodom and Gcmorrah represents sin in general, the 
wickedness of the people. So it does in the New Testament, Rev. 11: 8 
like the prophetic texts, depicts Jerusalem, where Christ was crucified 
by its people, as Sodom. However, if the prophetic texts may bear the 
context of the sin of Jerusalem and the book of Revelation indicates 
Jerusalem as the place of Crucifixion, Gen. 18 & 19 give no clear 
context of what the sin of the people was (cf. 18: 20,21 that only 
mentions "their sin is very grave"). A similar story can be found in 
judges 19 in that the hospitality of an expatriate to his guests 
provokes an anger of the local people who then act maliciously. The 
lack of the reason of the malicious act itself makes it look 
disproportionate- why suddenly people brutally attack a foreigner? 
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link between the survival of Lot and his family and God's 
promise to Abraham. Lot survives because God remembered 
(his promises to) Abraham. But, Abraham, having seen Sodom 
and Gomorrah burning like hell, scarcely thinks in the same 
way as the narrator. Abraham does not even see the survival 
of Lot and his daughters. While in the eyes of the narrator 
God remembers Abraham, in the eyes of Abraham God has 
failed to implement his deal. 
Genesis 20 
Genesis ch. 20 discloses a scene similar to ch. 12, that is, 
Sarah's disguise as Abraham's sister in a foreign land. 50 
Unlike in ch. 12, the reason for disguising Sarah cannot be 
found instantly in the beginning, before Abraham and Sarah 
entering the foreign land. The motive of moving to Gerar 
has also nothing to do with a famine as in Pharaoh's land 
before, instead, it is a part of Abraham's pilgrimage. The 
sojourn suddenly evokes the departure from Haran 
(ch. 12: 5ff. ). But, certainly the whole of Abraham's journey 
is a wandering. He has never been established permanently 
in one particular place. In one of his sojourns, however, 
he goes to Gerar where he reveals himself as Sarah's 
brother. Why must Abraham say that he is Sarah's brother? 
There is no apparent circumstance which forces Abraham to 
play such a trick. Rather than unveiling Abraham's motive 
50 But the two stories actual ly have quite dif f erent contexts and 
outcames so that to treat thern as the sanne with respect to their 
structure would only reduce their values. 
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at this early stage, the story continues with disclosing 
Abimelech's nightmare (vv. 3-7). It is a peculiar nightmare 
because Abimelech can defend himself against Elohim's 
unexpected accusation. In the debate between Elohim and 
Abimelech, it is, finally, agreed that Abimelech is an 
innocent man (vv. 4,5,6). However, - he has to restore Sarah 
as Abraham's wife under a deadly threat by Elohim (v. 7). 
Having been agitated by God, Abimelech shows his 
discontentment against Abraham (VV. 9,10). At this point, 
Abraham is urged to explain the motive of his pretence. 
I did it because I thought, There is no fear 
of God ( 'en-yirath 'elohim) at all in this 
place, and they will kill me (waharaguni) 
because of my wife (al-debhar 'Afti). 
Besides she is indeed my sister, the 
daughter of my father but not the daughter 
of my mother; and she became my wif e. And 
when God caused me to wander (wayehi ka'aser 
hith*u 'othi 'elohim) from my father's house 
(inibeth 'abhi), i said to her, 'This is the 
kindness you must do me: at every place to 
which we come, say of me, He is my 
brother. '(vv. 11-13). 
It is not clear what Abraham means by "there is no fear of 
God". It seems that in this kind of place people have no 
respect for the husbands whose wives they want to possess, 
they could even kill the husbands. Abraham seems to bear 
this kind of thought in mind and assumes that the people of 
Gerar are like that. To avoid being trapped in such the 
situation he must disguise his relationship with Sarah as 
brother and sister. It seems that the habit is quite 
widespread among the nations into whose land Abraham makes 
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a sojourn so that he has decided "at every place to which 
we come, say of me, He is my brother". We can imagine how 
often Abraham and Sarah should live under the disguise if 
they must do it at every place, it would be even too much 
for them bearing in mind they -are a permanent wanderers. 
This condition has made the pilgrimage an almost impossible 
task. No wonder we hear Abraham's disappointment at the 
pilgrimage, he and his family have got to accomplish, and 
he somehow blames God who prompted him to wander: "God 
caused me to wander from my father's house". The use of the 
form Hithphael for the word ta'ah: to wander, clearly 
indicates that God is the primary cause of the distressing 
wander in Abraham's eyes. In other words Abraham puts the 
responsibility of the disguise also indirectly on God's 
shoulders as the source of all the conditions he must to go 
through. 
Nonetheless, the relationship between Abraham and Sarah as 
brother and sister should not entirely be called a 
disguise. Sarah is actually Abraham's sister as well as his 
wife (the truth of this incestuous relationship might also 
go deeper as to hint at the barrenness of Sarah as 
Abraham's wife). Abraham explains to Pharaoh, "She is indeed 
my sister, the daughter of my father but not the daughter 
of my mother". In fact this explanation would create a tone 
which is in contrast to Elohim's rebuke in Abimelech's 
dream (v. 13). Elohim does not give Abimelech any other 
opportunity but to accept Sarah as Abraham's wife. Seeing 
how serious is Elohim's rebuke we cannot think that Elohim 
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would accept Abraham's explanation that he is in fact 
Sarah's brother which in turn would only decrease the 
seriousness of his rebuke. As a result, we can hear two 
kind of voices regarding Abraham and Sarah's relationship 
through Abimelech's ears. Elohim's utterance represents the 
voice of the accuser (vv. 3,7) with a strong tone and 
Abraham's explanation is more like the voice of the accused 
(vv-. 11,12,13) with a "begging tone". Abraham is not 
accusing Abimelech of doing anything wrong to him, he seems 
to be ignorant or indifferent to the content of Elohim's 
rebuke. For him, Abimelech does not have to feel guilty 
about taking over Sarah. Abraham realises that the same 
occurrence may happen elsewhere since he must always 
describe himself as Sarah's brother for his own safety. As 
a response to Abraham's explanation, Abimelech is urged to 
substitute his anger with friendly treatment. He, finally, 
grants Abraham some possessions and lets Abraham stay in 
his country (vv. 14,15). Abimelech's friendly treatment of 
Abraham must be seen only in the context of Abraham's 
confession and as a result of it and not because of his 
fear of the divinity. It can furthermore be proved by the 
fact that Abimelech, after hearing Abraham, prefers to call 
Abraham Sarah's brother regardless of Elohim's rebuke. "To 
Sarah he- (Abimelech) said, 'Behold, I have given your 
brother a thousand pieces of silver... . "(v. 16) (this can 
also be taken as Abimelech's justification of his marriage 
with Sarah). 
The last two verses of ch-20 report the healing of 
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Abimelech, his wife and female slaves so that "they bore 
children". Interestingly, Abimelech's wife is indicated in 
singular form: 'iSto. The close interrelationship between 
the content of these two verses and the beginning of ch. 21, 
that is, the pregnancy of Sarah and the birth of Isaac, may 
lead us to think that the Abimelech's wife is actually 
Sarah herself. Thus, the last event in Abimelech's house 
results in the healing of Sarah's barrenness which is a 
prerequisite for her subsequent pregnancy. But, if in this 
event, it is implied that Sarah is Abimelech's wife and in 
the later event, Yahweh originates Sarah's pregnancy, the 
role of Abraham in any way still remains obscure. Who 
therefore is Isaac's father? Is he Abraham (21: 2,3)? or 
Abimelech? Or Yahweh (if it is possible at all)? This 
obscurity creates a tension that seems to underlie 
Abraham's opposition against Ishmael's expulsion, his real 
son (cf. 16: 4) as well as Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac! 
The subsequent friendship relationship of Abraham and 
Abimelech is told in Gen. 21: 21-24 in which they are agreed 
to make a covenant for living in peace together until their 
next generations. in the pretext of Abimelech's coming it 
is heard that the presence of Elohim in Abraham's life can 
always create a danger to other people. 
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At that time Abimelech and Pichol the 
commander of his army said to Abraham, "God 
is with you in all that you do ('elohim 
'immkha bekhol aser- atah oseh); now 
theref ore swear (hiffabh %ah) to me here by 
God that you will not deal falsely 'im- 
tiSqor) with me or with my offspring or with 
my posterity, but as I have dealt loyally 
(kahesedh) with you, you will deal with me 
and with the land where you have sojourned" 
(ch. 21: 22,23). 
Abimelech needs to be sure that Abraham is not going to 
harm him and his family just because he knows that Elohim 
is always with Abraham. The context of Abimelech's request 
would be appropriately found in the previous story of ch. 20 
in which Abimelech has experienced a dreadful meeting with 
Elohim who accuses him of abducting Sarah. In the end of 
his ghostly appearance in Abimelech's nightmare, Elohim 
says, "if you do not restore her,, know that you shall 
surely die (da' ki-moth tamuth 'atah), you, and all that 
are yours" (ch. 20: 7). As a matter of fact, Abimelech has 
already restored Sarah (20: 14). The thing which seems to 
please God who, upon Abraham's prayer, heals Abimelech 
(20: 15). After all, he may remain unsure of the danger that 
may arise when Elohim is with Abraham. 
Genesis 21 
Abraham's characterization in the event of the birth of 
Isaac in ch. 21 is interesting because unlike Sarah, he 
surprisingly does not express any sign that he is happy. In 
the narrator's report, Abraham is seen in a normal activity 
of maintaining the tradition of welcoming a new born child. 
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-Abraham called the name of his son who was 
born to him, whom Sarah bore him, Isaac 
(v. 3). 
-Abraham circumcised his son Isaac when he 
was eight days old (v. 4). 
-Abraham made a great f east on the day that 
Isaac was weaned (v. 8). 
We undoubtedly perceive a link between Abraham's present 
actions and his past experiences especially in his relation 
with God. In this light, the birth of Isaac is considered 
to be a fulfilment of the divine promise. 51 But, apart from 
the fulfilment of the promise which is reported in a rather 
formal way by virtue of Abraham's actions, we hardly know 
that Abraham receives Isaac in a peculiar way as one might 
hope for the promised son. In contrast to him, Sarah 
celebrates the birth of Isaac as a delightful miracle, "And 
Sarah said, 'God has made laughter (ý; ehoq) for me; every one 
who hears will laugh over me'(yishaq-1i)" (v. 6). When 
Abraham is reported silent, Sarah exposes her feeling, 
pronouncing the wonder she is experiencing. The euphoria, 
on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the over- 
protection given to the child have completed the 
characterization of Sarah as a mother of a miraculous 
child. Sarah wants Isaac to be the only son of Abraham 
unrivalled by Ishmael (VV. 9,10). 52 But "the thing was very 
51The name of the son corresponds to the caw=d in ch. 17: 16: 
... whom you are to call Isaac". If Isaac is in f act born to Sarah, it 
correlates with ch. 17: 21: "wham Sarah will bear you! '. Isaac is 
furthermore circumcised in his eighth day, it accords to the camnand in 
IL7: 12: "He that is eight days old among you shall be circumcised". 
52Gal. 4: 22-31 vakes a differentiation between Ishmel as "the 
son of the slave (who) was bom according to the f lesh" and Isaac as 
11the son of the free woman through pra-nise"(v. 23). It is used in an 
apologetic rhetoric to envhasize the freedom from law (Torah) of Paul's 
followers as Isaac's descendants. when it ccn)es to the matter of 
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displeasing to Abraham on account of his son" (v. 11). This 
turns out to be the only report of, Abraham's inner feeling 
in the ýwhole chapter. While we do not know his feeling 
concerning Isaac, we certainly know that he cannot just let 
Ishmael depart from his house, at least, not until Elohim 
comes to convince him with a promise to make Ishmael a 
nation (v. 12,13). 
The narrative would barely give way to the character f or 
performing his own feelings, thoughts, judgments if they in 
the end simply disconcert the main theme. Abraham will 
never permanently oppose the expulsion of Ishmael. His deed 
has got to comply with the intention to specify the promise 
of descendant in the existence of Isaac and to elevate 
Isaac's status accordingly. By the birth of Isaac, the 
promise of descendants which has been declared several 
times to Abraham, since he departed from Haran (ch. 12), is, 
now, realised. This outcome is apparently approved by the 
narrator. The approval can be found in the comment on 
Sarah's pregnancy, "The Lord visited Sarah as he had said, 
and the Lord did to Sarah as he had promised. And Sarah 
conceived" (v. 1,2). Sarah's pregnancy, in the narrator's 
Jerusalem- a popular notion in Judaism eaployed by Paul, Hagar is 
identified with the earthly city "for she is in slavery with her 
children", on the other hand, "Jerusalem above (Sarah) is free, she is 
our mother. "(v. 25,26). The portrayals my delineate a tradition, used 
in Judaism as well as in Christianity, that venerates Sarah as an 
infertile wanan (v. 27: "Rejoice, 0 barren one that dost not bear... " a 
quotation from Isa. 54: 1) Yet has many children, she is seen as the 
Mther of Israel in old Testament texts (e. g. Isa. 51: 1,2) or the mother 
of Paul's followers in Galatians. These ideological uses of the story 
about Hagar and Sarah seem not to be bothered by the f act that in 
Genesis, Sarah merely wants first of all to protect the future of her 
beloved son, her only son, rather than deliberately creating an 
animsity against Hagar. (cf. westennam, Genesis, p. 339). 
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eyes, is a phenomenon created by God in accordance with his 
promises (ch. 17,18). Apparently for this reason God backs 
up the expulsion of Ishmael, however displeasing it is for 
Abraham. Abraham's reaction to Ishmael's expulsion would 
sound unconventional with respect to the story's aim. 
Abraham's eccentric reaction may well be used only as a 
means to introduce the emergence of God and his 
confirmation of Isaac's special status ("through Isaac 
shall your descendants be named"). Nonetheless, Abraham can 
be rebellious over the plan of -rejecting Ishmael for the 
sake of Isaac. God. may successfully convince Abraham about 
Isaac's special status and Ishmael's future fate as a 
nation but how far Abraham understands it remains 
enigmatic, as enigmatic as his understanding of the whole 
promises of God and maybe of God himself. 
Abraham's compliance in expelling Ishmael is done in 
silence which makes us wonder as to whether he does it 
wholeheartedly. In general, Abraham's actions are almost 
always an (silent) implementation of God's will (probably 
with an exception of ch. 14 in which he acts independently) 
but most of his verbal expressions seem to be defiant of 
God's will: 15: 2,3; 17: 17; 18: 23-33; 20: 13; 21: 12. The 
supposed discrepancy between Abraham's verbal expressions 
and actions creates a-puzzlement that may lead us to think 
that some of Abraham's obedience to God is possibly 
unenthusiastic as in this event or, conversely, is over 
enthusiastic (more than God intends him to do) as in 
Genesis 22. 
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The status of Ishmael and Isaac in Abraham's eyes becomes 
an interesting background to our reading of the Akedah. 
Both of Abraham's sons must experience a mortal danger 
which in Ishmael's case is indirectly caused by God through 
his support of Sarah's demand; in Isaac's case it is 
directly demanded by God. Were Ishmael not to be expelled 
from Abraham's house, he would never have been in mortal 
danger in the wilderness of Beersheba. Abraham might have 
anticipated the possibility of such a danger that he was 
unhappy to let Ishmael go. In other words, Abraham does not 
want to have Ishmael living in danger away from him. We 
would very much expect Abraham to show the same anxiety 
when God asks him to sacrifice Isaac. Perhaps even more, 
recalling that Isaac is the promised son. But, as a matter 
of fact, we do not find any indication that Abraham is 
dismayed by God's command, not even that he makes God 
convince him of the task such as happened in Ishmael's 
expulsion. Abraham appears very confident in preparing as 
well as in executing the sacrifice of Isaac. One may 
therefore suppose that there is a gap in the relationship 
that Abraham sees between himself and Isaac. A gap that has 
apparently existed since Isaac's birth, namely, Abraham's 
reluctance to accept Isaac as his own son rather than the 
one that is given by Yahweh through Sarah. 53 
53For the possibility of reading Gen. 21,22 in the light of 
conspiratorial opposition between Yahweh/Sarah and Abraham/Hagar 
concerning Ish-nael's expulsion and Isaac's sacrifice, see Chapter IV. 2. 
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The multilayeredness of Abraham's silence in the Akedah. 54 
The Akedah can be reckoned as a distinctive story among 
Abraham's narratives with regard to the seriousness of the 
content, that is, a human sacrifice demanded by God 
himself. However, the way the narration is carried out does 
not seem to reflect the acuteness of the problem. Instead 
of giving a clear explication of the unusual sacrifice, the 
narrator tends to minimize its report. What does appear to 
the readers is God's command which is eventually followed 
by the counter-command that has no motives. other than that 
Abraham's dumb actions (with some minor exceptions) form 
his response to God's demands. The main focus of the Akedah 
is apparently on Abraham's action. From the preparation of 
the sacrificial journey until the execution, every bit of 
Abraham's action is monitored. The only and main problem is 
Abraham's silence which dominates almost all aspects of his 
appearance with one or two exceptions when he speaks 
briefly to other characters. There is virtually nothing we 
can know about him in his silence. 
The question is: should we fill the gap in knowledge of 
Abraham's concealed mind? and if the answer is yes, then, 
how do we do it? or should we simply look at the story in 
its economical style and derive our reading from it? 
54 Al though the nul ti 1 ayeredness of the character is rmch more 
the concept of literary critics, same historic critics like von Rad in 
their caments on the Akedah also adrdt that "there are Tmny levels of 
nr_aning, and whoever thinks he has discovered virgin soil mst discover 
at once that there are many more layers below that. " Von Rad, Genesis, 
P. 238. 
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Biblical scholars even, those who work on a literary basis, 
have been disagreeing over this point. Meir Sternberg for 
example argues that the point of the story does not depend 
on the activity of bringing into the surface Abraham's 
state of mind, "the focus of interest lies in Abraham's 
supreme obedience regardless of any possible thought. His 
state of mind thus becomes of secondary importance. An 
insight into it would doubtless enrich the drama, and the 
reader concerned with realizing the text's potentialities 
in full will cast about for clues; but this will at best 
round things out. The point will be made and taken even 
with this gap left open. "55 For Sternberg, unlike in 
another biblical narrative (for example, the story of David 
and Bathsheba) the gap shown by the Akedah should only be 
left as it is, the readers' concern should merely be 
Abraham's obedience. This is not because the gap itself is 
considered too small and therefore ignorable but quite the 
opposite. The gap in the Akedah is so obvious that 
Sternberg arrives at the thought that the gap is a 
systematic gap, i. e., the omission of the supposedly 
peripheral information in order to gain a complete focus on 
the reported phenomenon. As a result the unexposed 
information would selectively be regarded as less essential 
than the exposed one. Sternberg says, "the Binding of Isaac 
resorts to systematic omission in order to establish (and 
impress on the reader) a hierarchy of importance. 1156 But, 
is the obedience of Abraham the only point in the Akedah ? 
55Stemberg, Poetics, p. 192. 
56Stemberg, Poetics, p. 192. 
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it is true that in the end the deity pronounces his 
blessing for a reason related to Abraham's obedience (v. 18: 
VV aser sama'sta beqoli: since you have heard/obeyed my 
voice) but Abraham's deeds are too equivocal to be 
identified as a mere obedience to the deity. The 
characterization of Abraham in the Akedah (and also in the 
other occasions in the saga) makes us think of what kind of 
obedience Abraham has showed? Does it f it with , God's 
conclusive judgment that Abraham is a fearina-God man 
(v. 12)? So, there are still some problems which make the 
point that Abraham's obedience is not at once acceptable as 
it is. The silence of Abraham would still attract some 
differing interpretations. Sternberg's argument that seems 
to specifically point at the general, overarching, coherent 
meaning of the story has to be balanced with a close 
reading that looks into every detail . of the story, the 
spoken as well as the unspoken one. 
Eric Auerbach, who compares the characters of Homeric poems 
and the Bible, claims that "the personages speak in the 
Bible story too; but their speech does not serve, as does 
in Homer, to manifest, to externalize thoughts - on the 
contrary, it serves to indicate thoughts which remain 
unexpressed". 57 The biblical story which Auerbach has in 
mind is the Akedah. He thinks that some statements and 
dialogues of God, Abraham and Isaac are impenetrable with 
regard to their actual motives. The voices are heard but do 
rjot bring us anywhere in understanding the inner thought, 
57 Auerbach, Mirresis, P. ii. 
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feeling or judgment of the characters. One could hardly 
argue against Auerbach's opinion particularly in the 
awareness that the Akedah is told in an economical way. The 
narrator works selectively with words. He has no interest 
in disclosing the whole reality but only some events which 
for him are important. As a result we are Jeft with many 
gaps, ambiguities concerning the motives of each actions. 
only by filling these gaps can we hope to arrive at the 
depths of the characters' lives. 
For Auerbach, the process of filling the gap in the Akedah 
amounts to inquiring into the whole life of the characters 
from surrounding, stories. The reason for doing this is, that 
"although they (the characters) are nearly always caught up 
in an event engaging all the faculties, they are not so 
entirely immersed in its presence that they do not remain 
continually conscious of what has happened to them earlier 
and elsewhere". 58 There is a close link between several 
stories about the characters that what is veiled here can 
be unveiled in another event. The link between those 
stories lies, according to Auerbach, in the consciousness 
of the character in question. So, we can see in Auerbach's 
argument that the character is psychologically depicted 
just like an ordinary human being that his/her acts are 
influenced by the abstract state of consciousness. And that 
the consciousness also includes the previous history or 
experiences. Exactly in recalling his previous history can 
Abraham possibly be described as being in a state of 
59 Auerbach, Hirresis, P. 12. 
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conflict. "Abraham's actions are explained not only by what 
is happening to him at the moment, nor yet only by his 
character.... but by his previous history; he remembers, he 
is constantly conscious of, what God has promised him and 
what God has already accomplished for him- his soul is torn 
between desperate rebellion and hopeful expectation; his 
silent obedience is multilayered, has background", says 
Auerbach. 59 Abraham's silence is not caused by his firm 
determination to obey God's command but conversely it is 
caused by his conflicting mind. 
Auerbach's exposition of the complexity (or the depth as he 
might call it) of biblical humanity may sound familiar to 
our modern ears. But we hardly see Abraham in such a 
conflicting state described by Auerbach, not even at the 
peak of the sacrifice. Instead of being doubtful when he is 
about to kill Isaac, Abraham looks very determined. The 
narrator's report of this critical moment clearly indicates 
the seriousness of Abraham. Genesis 22: 10: "Then Abraham 
put forth his hand, and took the knife to slay his son". 
All is done by Abraham without delay. Seeing this, Gros 
Louis considers Auerbach's exposition of Abraham's inner 
thought as paratextual. He argues, "there is nothing in the 
text (Genesis 22) to support his (Auerbach) assertion that 
the morning for Abraham was 'bitter11.60 Furthermore he 
says, "I find no textual evidence that Abraham, at any 
59Auerbach, 1-finx-sis, p. 12. 
6OKemeth R. R. Gros Louis, "Abraham: II in Literary 
Interpretations of Biblical Narratives, vol. II, ed. K. R. R. Gros Louis 
and Jams S. Ackerman, 1982, p. 73. 
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moment, considers 'desperate rebellion' - the dialectic 
Auerbach imposes on Abraham's soul seems to me solely a 
twentieth-century interpretation. 1161 In his opinion, 
Abraham, right from the beginning merely displays an 
unwavering obedience, he brings about the sacrifice without 
doubt. Gros Louis even perceives that "There is no suspense 
in the episode, but rather an enormous sense of relief, a 
slowing of the pulses. "62 This is obviously contradictory 
to Auerbach's argument. If Auerbach describes Abraham as a 
hesitating man who must think several times before taking 
the risk to sacrifice his own son, Gros Louis argues that 
Abraham agrees instantly to God's command. 
The difference between Auerbach's and Gros Louis' reading 
does not primarily originate from the degree of their 
loyalty to the text itself as Gros Louis has implicitly 
claimed. Like Auerbach, Gros Louis also needs to inspect 
other narratives to collect some elements that are useful 
for his reading of the Akedah. He calls those narratives 
"the narrative context" of the Akedah. By the narrative 
context he means all stories concerning Abraham and 
isaac. 63 The Akedah is, for Gros Louis, the summary of the 
whole Abraham's story. In the Akedah the whole point of 
Abraham's life is recapitulated. He explains: 
6IGros Louis, ibid., p. 73. 
62 Gros Louis, ibid. , p. 81. 63Gros Louis, ibid., p. 74. 
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Genesis 22 is not the climatic moment of the 
Abraham legend, but rather its summary. The 
narrative does not need to echo further the 
events of Abraham's life; it needs now to 
recall the values that have made that life 
meaningful and affecting, to remind us of 
Abraham's understanding of the significant 
connotations in the context of this 
narrative world; of possession, 
fruitfulness, and beauty. 64 
Abraham, having been prepared by his previous experiences 
is ready to obey God's command, he does not reckon the 
recent command as unusual. If there is something unusual in 
this event, it does not come from God's command and its 
implementation by Abraham as Auerbach says but because 
Abraham would regard this moment as a chance to test God's 
righteousness. Gros Louis says, "There can be nothing 
bitter about the early morning when Abraham saddles his ass 
(against Auerbach). on the contrary, he must be tense and 
anxious, provided as he is with an unusual opportunity to 
confirm the justness and righteousness of his Lord, to find 
out, on a starkly realistic level, if the Lord's covenant 
with him concerning Isaac's descendants is true or not. 1165 
Nevertheless, we do not have any textual evidence which 
says that Abraham is testing God, on the contrary what we 
have in the text is "God tested Abraham"(v. 1). So, Gros 
Louis himself cannot avoid imposing upon the text his own 
interpretation although in a different way from Auerbach's 
kind of psychological exposition. Gros Louis has apparently 
given a religious meaning to Abraham's action in the Akedah 
in a way that Abraham wants to confirm the righteousness of 
64Gros Louis, ibid., pp. 81,82. 
65Gros Louis, ibid., p. 80. 
141 
God by trying to sacrifice the promised son. But, to say 
that Abraham is testing God seems to have belittled the 
horror projected by Abraham's actions. Abraham does not 
seem to expect the emergence of God to cancel his sacrifice 
provided that it is a test. The text only tells us that 
Abraham is at one time asked to sacrifice his son and he 
does .... In other words, the sacrifice is not a means 
for 
Abraham but an end in itself. 
If, on the one hand, Gros Louis' argument that Abraham's 
appearance shows his whole-heartedness in sacrificing Isaac 
seems plausible; on the other hand, we accept his further 
argument that Abraham is actually testing God, as his own 
ideological projection. 66 We will find that Abraham has 
another reason for not being doubtful. The reason or more 
precisely reasons are, to follow Auerbach, multilayered. 
The multilayeredness is not necessarily in connection with 
Abraham's conflicting mind, Abraham's silence may conceal 
some multilayered motives that the readers should 
reconstruct although by no means fixing their certainty. 
Genesis 22 
in the text itself, soon after God gives his command, we 
are told of how Abraham is to sacrifice Isaac. The first 
part of v. 3 demonstrates Abraham's preparation of his 
journey. Normally like somebody who wants to take a long 
66 It should be admitted, however, that the influence of readers' 
own ideology in the process of reading is unavoidable. 
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journey, Abraham departs early in the morning. The time 
indication may also allude to some other understanding. The 
morning time gives us a clue that God's command is 
delivered in the night time, that is, the night before 
Abraham's preparation. It will fit the usual time of divine 
appearances. The darkness of the night itself can, in the 
biblical narrative, symbolize a kind of mystery. And 
apparently for this reason that God's appearance, which is 
often surrounded by mystery both in form and content, tends 
to take place in the night. The command to sacrifice Isaac 
obviously demonstrates the mystery of God's will. We never 
know why God wants such a (vicious) sacrifice. However, 
once the focus is directed on the implementation of the 
sacrifice by Abraham, the impression of darkness and 
mystery of God changes. It changes into an ordinary scene 
of human daylight -business, full of consciousness. Abraham 
becomes a fully aware individual in his task to sacrifice 
his own son. 
Abraham seems to have exactly calculated all his deeds to 
make the sacrifice effective. When he and the others have 
arrived at the nearest area of the sacrificial site, he 
splits his group into two, he leaves the two young men and 
his ass behind while he himself and Isaac continue on to 
consummate the sacrifice (v. 4,5,6). Here, we are reminded 
of Abraham's, preparation before the departure. He prepares 
two things, the journey: "(Abraham) saddled his ass, and 
took two of his young men with him" (v. 3) and the 
sacrif ice: "he (Abraham) cut the wood for the burnt 
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offering" (v. 3). Isaac is unspecifically mentioned between 
those groups so that he can be part of the journey 
(together with the two young men) or the sacrifice (a 
complement to the wood). In v. 5 Abraham apparently thinks 
he has finished his journey so that he does not need his 
companions and the ass anymore. The sacrificial place can 
be reached easily from where they stand at the moment. His 
message to his companions that he and Isaac will go up and 
worship sounds relevant to the situation. The wood that is 
brought from home can be seen as an indicator that Abraham 
is going to worship. If, however, Isaac still goes with 
him, while the others have been left behind, it is because 
Abraham apparently needs his help to bring the wood for the 
burnt offering which otherwise he may not be able to do it 
himself (v. 6). We can also see that Abraham calls Isaac 
hanna'ar (that young man), the same term used for his two 
companions which implies their status as Abraham's physical 
aides. So that the presence of Isaac in Abraham's 
subsequent journey is needed, at least in the eyes of the 
young men, to carry the wood for Abraham. But, does Abraham 
forget that his intention is actually to sacrifice Isaac 
which is not common worship as his companions might have 
understood ? We simply do not know what exactly Abraham 
thinks at that time when he tells the young men that he is 
going to worship (v. 5). He seemingly wants to convince 
everybody that there is nothing unusual in the worship. 
Abraham's answer to Isaac's question about the lamb for a 
burnt offering is essentially in the same line of argument 
0 
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as his message to the two young men. Isaac's question, 
"where is the lamb for a burnt offering? " (v. 7) effectively 
threatens to break up Abraham's concealment. Isaac, like 
the two young men, - would have primarily accepted that this 
is a worshipful journey, but for this reason they, of 
course, would need a lamb which has not appeared yet even 
when the sacrificial site is right next to them. Isaac 
needs to show his bewilderment which in turn urges Abraham 
either to make up another concealment or to tell the truth. 
in such a situation Abraham's answer is once again evasive. 
Instead of saying "You are the lamb for the burnt 
offering", Abraham says, "God will provide himself the lamb 
for a burnt offering" (v. 8). There is no indication that 
Abraham tells Isaac directly' that he is the sacrificial 
lamb. The phrase gives us an impression that Abraham is a 
pious believer who completely lives under God's providence. 
In fact, if that is true, it is the first time we find 
Abraham expressing such piousness. His other appearances as 
a believer can only be encountered in the narrator's 
conceptual ization rather than in his own utterance. Having 
faced some discrepancy between the narrator's and Abraham's 
own expression, we cannot be certain that the phrase would 
mean that Abraham simply believes that God will really 
provide himself the lamb. Abraham might have employed it as 
a tactic so that Isaac would stay with him until the last 
minute of the sacrifice. It-could be reached provided that 
Isaac believes that the lamb in question would be there 
somewhere on the sacrificial site. Abraham, as we have also 
been informed on several other occasions, is, however, 
145 
clever enough to persuade people to do what he wants them 
to do. 
If in the next moment Isaac has apparently agreed to comply 
with his father's intention to make him a sacrifice 
(v. 9,10).. we may imagine that the blank between the time 
after the brief'dialogue (v. 8) and building the altar (v. 9) 
is the time when Abraham must use all of his ability to 
convince Isaac about the (unusual) sacrifice. There might 
have been some disagreements since the matter would be 
shocking for Isaac bearing in mind he has so innocently 
trusted his father's words that it is going to be a normal, 
i. e., animal sacrifice. But, the matter is possibly too 
disturbing to be included in the (sacred) text. Should 
Abraham, the Patriarch, blatantly overpower his own son's 
contradictory choice? The narrator's ideology might have 
made impossible such a depiction of the Patriarch. It could 
also be that the main purpose of the narrator, as Meir 
Sternberg has argued, is merely ýto show Abraham's supreme 
obedience and not at all to introduce Abraham's abusive 
action in subjugating Isaac's freedom. 67 Do either 
ideological constraint or literary confinement simply 
result in a silence over what has actually happened or 
should have logically happened? It is the readers, however, 
who should accept the lack of knowledge of how Abraham 
induced Isaac, as an invitation to become involved in 
experiencing such a tormenting moment. The gap created by 
ideological concern should be responded to by the readers 
67 For Sternberg's comment on the Akedah, see his Poetics, p. 192. 
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who, in their interpretative task, cannot simply harvest 
the meanings from the text but also have to engage in a 
dialogical encounter with it. 
In such a relationship with the text, a different argument 
from what the narrator has consistently tried to establish 
may be proposed. Abraham, as we have seen so f ar, is not 
just an obedient person who never considers the cost and 
benefit of his action like a normal human being. If he 
wants to obey God's- extraordinary command such as the 
command to go out from his father's house it is because he 
can see a chance for a better life which is attested very 
soon through the event in Pharaoh's land (ch. 12). 60 
Conversely, when he thinks that God's utterance is 
illogical he will make a rigorous defence against it 
(chs. 15,17, etc. ). In other words, under any circumstances, 
Abraham knows what he has and he has not to do f or his own 
sake particularly and sometimes for the sake of his family 
as well. This is how Abraham appears in the stories. The 
narrator could not prevent the readers from reviving the 
whole memory of Abraham (cunning, selfish but tactful and 
worldly). It attracts our imagination to capture the time 
when Abraham has to entangle himself in a debate with 
Isaac, while it is ready to continue the story in which 
Isaac has seemingly already agreed with the realisation of 
68Westermann says, "It is the normal and natural thing that 
Abraham should go as God cam-anded him (against the ccmTentators who 
laud Abraham's obedience); he would be putting himself at risk were he 
not to go". This explanation indicates how pragmatic Abraham's faith 
is. Westermann, Genesis, p. 152. 
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the sacrifice. 69 
Artistically the narrator also creates a contrasting effect 
between Abraham's and Isaac's performances during the 
execution. While Isaac is only waiting hopelessly for the 
sacrifice, Abraham calmly prepares the sacrificial altar, 
puts the wood on it and finally binds Isaac and places him 
on the altar (v. 9). Isaac remains speechless inýhis total 
surrendering act, watching Abraham take the deadly knife to 
slay him. On the other hand, Abraham is portrayed just like 
a cold-blooded killer. There is no hesitation in him. Not 
even the narrator speaks about God, in this particular 
moment, in order to remind us that the sacrifice is 
demanded by God. 70 The sacrifice seems to be a killing 
conducted by Abraham. Is Abraham's sacrifice motivated 
purely by a religious duty ? or, does Abraham possess 
another motive, at least as a second motive apart from the 
religious one (if there is any) ? The revealed phenomenon 
of vv. 9,10 would again and again project an image of pure 
infanticide that represents the opposite side of a 
religious performance. 71 
69Viewing from Iser's understanding, this gap is to be 
considered as a fundan-ental means by which the cawmmication between 
text and its reader takes place. 
70Fran the departure until Abraham and Isaac arrive at the 
sacrificial site, God's nanne is again and again resounded (v. 3: "went to 
the place of which God had told him! ', v. 8: "God will provide himself the 
larrb", v. 9: "they cam to the place of which God had told hire') but it 
suddenly fades away when Abraham is about to kill Isaac, when a divine 
confirmation of the sacrifice is =stly needed. 
710ne may only look at Reiribrandt's painting: "Abraham's 
Sacrifice" to realise the dreadful marent of the sacrifice. In it, the 
hands play a dominant role in the ccffpositional logic of the scene. 
Abraham is depicted as he is holding Isaacs head back (cf. Lev. 1: 4, 
4: 24) with his clawlike hand that covers the whole of Isaac's face to 
expose the throat. In contrast, Isaac, lying down hopelessly on the 
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It would seem a big leap to suggest that Abraham is seduced 
by some kind of jealousy that urges him to kill Isaac. But, 
surely the idea of a murder enacted by a close relative is 
not at all alien to biblical narratives. Cain murders Abel 
his only brother (Genesis 4). Esau hates Jacob and plans to 
kill him when his father has died (Genesis 27). Joseph's 
brothers arrange his death when they are away from their 
father's house (Genesis 37). Human jealousy is certainly 
the most prominent motive of these occurrences although it 
cannot be separated from a religious factor as well. 72 Such 
a human factor might as - well underlie the sacrifice of 
Isaac. Abraham might have used this chance to take revenge 
for Ishmael's expulsion for which he was dismayed. or that 
the presence of Isaac is, in Abraham's eyes, the harbinger 
of his death which he tries to reject by the killing. 
However, it is not our aim to hold one motive while 
rejecting the others. We only accept that Abraham's silence 
may conceal many possibilities. 
After all, the ultimate effect of reading the Akedah does 
not depend on the rationalization of Abraham's conduct as 
much as experiencing an unspeakable moment when a father 
is convincingly exposing his own son to death. A moment 
ground even without his hands being shown (Isaac's hands are presumably 
bound at the back). The angel grips Abraham's hand to let the knife 
drop. C. Brown, Jan Kelch & Pieter van Thiel, Renbrandt: the Master & 
, ffjs 
Workshop, Paintings, 1991, p. 183. 
72Religious rwtive cannot entirely disappear from biblical 
narrative but one rray notice that human beings in the Bible are not at 
all sirple-hearted in their relation with each other. They gradually 
develop their ambition to dominate another, frcm the =re irTulsive one 
. such as 
Cain's to a wre sophisticated one shown by David. 
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that would undermine any reason. It may only be compared 
with the time when Sarai/h was asked to sell herself in 
order to save her husband (Genesis 12,20) that would 
disturb our conscience. It is a moment that is ethically 
absurd. 
one thing must also be said. Although silence occupies 
virtually the whole appearance of Abraham in the Akedah 
which has attracted a great deal of comment, it should not 
be a single focus in reading the Akedah. As a matter of 
fact, Abraham does speak in the Akedah, he replies to 
Elohim's calling, he gives a message to the two young men, 
and he speaks to Isaac too. His utterances, however, are no 
more than an obliqueness that serve to blanket the truth. 
Thisý completes the image of Abraham as ,a cunning, 
calculated, indifferent man in his relationship with the 
others. If anything is different, it must be his utterances 
directed to God that reflect a mere docility. Abraham, to 
God, is a submissive person but he can be deceitful and 
patronising to his fellow human beings. The recognition of 
Abraham must contain those oppositional characters. 
Nevertheless, it seems inappropriate to judge Abraham's 
deeds on the basis of moral standards and put blame on him 
because of the deception. Abraham is hardly a figure who 
acknowledges moral responsibilities or, prioritises moral 
consideration in his deeds. He would not interpret the 
sacrifice of Isaac as inhumane; that in order to do so he 
had to go across the boundary of common sense. His 
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considerations are, in short, all too predictable. 
After all, Abraham is not the initiator' of the sacrifice. 
The involvement of God as the initiator of the sacrifice is 
undoubtedly the case. 73 We are at once reminded of 
Abimelech's anxiety that the presence of Elohim in 
Abraham's life can invoke a danger for other people 
(ch. 21: 22,23), a danger of which Abimelech himself has 
earlier almost been the victim of (ch. 20). It is not clear 
how the danger should be understood except by the 
anticipation of its impact. To prevent the danger, however, 
Abimelech asks Abraham to swear (, Xabha') that he will never 
harm his family (ch. 21: 23). In the Akedah, the divine 
blessing which basically is a promise to protect the 
welfare of Abraham's descendants in the aftermath of the 
sacrifice of Isaac is opened by an oath (Svabha') of Yahweh 
(ch. 22: 15). There could be a link between the two events by 
way of allusion. The same kind of danger anticipated by 
Abimelech is also threatening Isaac and the oath of Abraham 
to let Abimelech's family live in peace correlates to the 
oath of Yahweh to let Abraham's descendants live peacefully 
(yet, by dominating others). Thus, the presence of Abraham 
turns out to be a mortal danger for both Abimelech and 
Isaac just because Elohim is with him. Abraham's history 
is, however, surrounded by a similar danger that has 
threatened his sons, his wives, even himself (cf. his 
complaint in ch. 21) and all happened not because of the 
73The role played by God in the Akedah and in Abraham's life 
will be studied later on in conjunction with the characterization of 
God. 
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absence but, on the contrary, the presence of God. 
The silence of Abraham: its meaning for Abraham and for the 
narrator 
The Akedah consists of two kind of silences, that is, the 
silence of Abraham and the silence of the narrator. What we 
mean by the silence of the narrator is the refusal of the 
narrator to penetrate Abraham's mind. There is always a 
possibility for the biblical narrator to make a report 
based on somebody's invisible thoughts, feelings or 
judgment as well as on the invisible acts of the 
character. 74 But in the Akedah the narrator prefers to 
report Abraham only outwardly. 75 In response to it, we may 
think that the narrator does not want to reveal Abraham's 
inner thought because it cannot be tolerated with regard to 
the ideology it is based on. Suppose we accept Sternberg's 
argument that the narrator is only interested in showing 
Abraham's supreme obedience. Then its silence towards 
Abraham's inner thought can be interpreted as an attempt to 
delete any disturbing images which would debunk Abraham's 
supreme obedience. The narrator deliberately conceals 
Abraham's inner thought in order to avoid unintended self- 
contradictory phenomena in the discourse. While the motive 
of the concealment of the narrator can be quite as simple 
as that, we certainly have to face a multilayered meaning 
of Abraham's silence in his own view. The silence of 
74 See for example Genesis 3: 22,15: 6,18: 17-19. 
75 With the exception of vv. 4& 13 where he uses Abraham's vision to see the sacrificial place and the ram. Nonetheless, he does not take 
any opportunity to unveil Abraham's inner thought. 
152 
Abraham brings with it the variety of desire that is 
humanly possible in worldly life. 
Thus the work of the narrator represents one world, the 
world where God's promise is fulfilled and where the 
Patriarchs show their supreme obedience; while Abraham 
represents another world, a literally dangerous world, 
compelling man to be cunning, hardheaded, indifferent in 
order to survive either temporarily or permanently. In such 
an inconsistent world, Abraham is challenged, not to 
surrender his life merely into God's hand but to expand his 
own power in order to gain a confidence that he is able to 
prolong his life as well as his name. 
The silence of Abraham does not necessarily mean that he is 
rendered dumb by a paradoxical understanding of God as 
Auerbach has argued, but it also does not have to be 
understood as a sign of his steadfast obedience as Gros 
Louis said. Abraham is silent because he is certain that 
Isaac's life must now be ended by way of a sacrifice. The 
idea may not'come originally from him but he certainly does 
not have any, objection to it. His utterances both to the 
two young men and to Isaac have a single aim, that is, to 
disguise his real intention so that he may prevent any 
disobedience from the others. We cannot simply say that 
Abraham is lying. It is analogous to the events in Eqypt 
and Gerar. 76 There is an element of worship in the 
76In those places Abraham disguises Sarah as his sister but 
eventually he admits that Sarah is actually his sister as well as his 
wife. Based on this fact, Abimelech the king of Gerar dismisses his 
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sacrifice that may be used as Abraham's reason for the 
young men. And Isaac would be suitably thought of as the 
jamb to be provided so that Abraham may use that reason, 
the actual-meaning of which he himself understands,, - to keep 
Isaac following him. 
obviously, the narrator refrains himself from overtly 
stating Abraham's attempt to persuade Isaac to come to the 
sacrificial altar. Abraham's action, at this particular 
moment, even if it were only outwardly, is to be censored. 
Nonetheless, the readers may use their imagination to seize 
the most dreadful moment in the relationship between 
Abraham and Isaac. The author(s) who dares to unveil as 
much as the Akedah has already told, would certainly grant 
the readers a chance, even somewhat deliberately encourage 
the readers, to involve themselves in penetrating the 
moment that he for some reason tends to leave out of his 
record. 77 
There'is no doubt that the involvement of the readers, one 
way or another, would contribute to the story some 
understanding that the story may never bear. 78 Such a role 
enjoyed by the readers is necessary in maintaining a 
previous assuTption that Abraham is a liar. 
77We surely accept Auerbach's argunent that a text like the 
Akedah calls for interpretation. Auerbach, 1-firmsis, p. 11. And von Rad 
i. s also right in saying "a story like this (the Akedah) is basically 
open to interpretation and to whatever thoughts the reader is inspired. 
The narrator does not intend to hinder him, he is reporting an event, 
not giving doctrine. " Von Rad, Genesis, p. 238. 
78This situation can be explained as such: while the text 
provides a gap, the readers fill the gap. The filling is fundamentally 
beyond the control of the text although not necessarily atextual. 
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dialogical relationship between the readers and the text. 
And from this the story-meanings can hope to be generated. 
In the text itself, the gaps create a possibility for the 
readers to enter the story world. The world in which 
Abraham is perceived as a dreadful parent whose determined 
ambition is to kill his child. It would, of course, 
undermine, or at least, create a paradoxical perspective to 
another image of Abraham usually projected by the narrator, 
that is, Abraham as a pious and religious man. 
Even if Sternberg is right that the narrator only wants to 
project Abraham's supreme obedience while leaving other 
elements out, we still have to remember that Abraham's 
understanding of obedience may well be different from the 
narrator'S. 79 Abraham, as we have recognised from the whole 
discourse, would not do anything when he was not certain 
that he would benefit. We only need to look back to the 
expulsion of Ishmael in which Abraham only wants to 
implement Sarah's demand after he gets an assurance from 
God that Ishmael will be made a nation (of course it is 
Abraham's nation as well, for they are his descendants). If 
Abraham wants "to obey" God's command to sacrifice Isaac, 
it may well be that he sees advantages in doing it apart 
from Just blindly following God's demand. But then, the 
79The difference indicates the general inclination of biblical 
rjarratives to allude to a tension, even a contradiction, between the 
fact that sameone is elected (by God) and his/her day-to-day behaviour. 
Alter sees this aspect in his analysis of David's story, he says, "one 
of the rost probing general perceptions of the biblical writers is that 
there is often a tension, sametimes perhaps even an absolute 
contradiction, between election and moral character. " Alter, The Art, 
p. 117. 
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sacrifice could be a conspicuous killing of which the image 
of v. 10 is the reminiscence. Were this to be the case, the 
command of God would no longer be the issue. It would lose 
its authority and be substituted with Abraham's own motive. 
The issue would be so sensitive that the narrator needs to 
smuggle in that possibility primarily under the title "God 
tests Abraham" and subsequently by omitting Abraham and 
Isaac's further discussion (supposedly between v. 8 and 
9). 80 By so doing the narrator can retain the sense that 
the sacrifice is always under God's command. Nevertheless, 
the narrator's assumption does not entirely eclipse the 
possibility of reading Abraham as a self-determining 
character who may act according to his own will. 
The text can, in the end, be seen as a mixture of differing 
perspectives. Unlike the narratqr, Abraham perceives the 
sacrifice as a golden opportunity to consummate his 
infanticidal desire. The narrator, on the other hand, 
places the sacrifice of Isaac within the context of a test. 
in the narrator's perspective, Abraham has to show his 
strict obedience to God's will while pushing aside his own 
desire. 
The presence of God with his 'command may provide a reason 
for Abraham to execute Isaac in his own will and for the 
narrator to show the obedience of Abraham. The command is a 
rneans by which the two purposes can be achieved. After all, 
OOThe narrator would ideologically reckon an independent will of 
Abraham which is not coexistent with God's will as intolerable. 
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God himself does not lack his own will. His command may be 
used in different directions by others but, he also wants 
the sacrifice to be delivered in his own way and will. In 
the next discussion (Chapter IIIA) we will see that while 
there is no obvious motive behind God's command, it will 
remain certain that the sacrifice per se is seriously 
intended to be consummated. 
for Sarah and Isaac 
It is not far-fetched if the life of Abraham is perceived 
as a series of uses and abuses of the people surrounding 
Abraham and perhaps of Abraham himself too. In other words, 
it reflects a mechanism of victimization. Each of the 
occurrences in the stories about Abraham tells us of a 
danger that, as well as mortally threatening Abraham and 
his family, also puts the divine promises of land and 
descendants in jeopardy. In that situation what we may 
identify as an attempt to seek a problem solving by 
victimizing another appears as a model among the leading 
characters. Here comes what seems to be the use and abuse 
of the people. Moral consideration becomes absurd. The weak 
characters gain no defence against the use by the stronger 
ones. The feminists' eyes notice abuses towards women, they 
say the stories ostentatiously champion the superiority of 
rnan and debunk the ability of woman. 
First, the divinity victimizes Abraham. He promises Abraham 
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a vast land and many descendants. But, never in his life 
does Abraham enjoy living in a wide land, the only land he 
owned is his graveyard that he bought with his own money 
(ch. 21,25). Of his descendants, before his death Abraham 
had Ishmael from Hagar, Isaac from Sarah and another six 
children from Keturah (25: 2), they are all eight people, 
far away from being analogous to the dust of the earth 
(13: 16) or the stars in heaven (15: 5). When one day 
Abraham's great-great-great-grand children were many (the 
Israelite nation), one wonders that the divine promise is 
not actually given to Abraham but through Abraham. 
The victimization does not solely involve Abraham. The 
evidence even becomes clearer when it comes to the people 
surrounding Abraham. What happened with Sarah and Isaac is 
a good example. Genesis 22: 1-19 obviously tells about the 
sacrifice of Isaac. But, the text reflects nothing 
significant about Isaac's response to the sacrifice. 
Anxiety, fear, feeling of horror that one, being bound on 
the sacrificial altar, would have suffered from, are simply 
erased from the text. Sarah's case is worse since her 
existence is utterly forgotten in the story. Not a word is 
mentioned about her. Being the mother of the sacrificed 
son, Sarah's heart would have been more torn apart than 
Abraham's. Let alone, she is the one who loves Isaac most 
(see Genesis 21). 'Nonetheless, her feelings have been 
forgotten. She never even had an opportunity to express her 
comment on the Akedah. Soon after the sacrifice, the text 
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declares her (mysterious) death. 83L Logic would, however, 
guide us to think that Sarah knew of the sacrifice of his 
son by her husband and, therefore, suffered from it before 
she died. 
Sarah 
The feminist biblical critic Phyllis Trible has written, 
with regard to Genesis 22, the so-called "a movement into 
unknown territory" that is "the sacrifice of Sarah". 82 An 
interpretation 'which, in terms of traditional biblical 
criticism, should be regarded as unconventional, therefore, 
"yields surprise, elicits puzzlement, and builds suspense" 
as the title itself may tell us. Trible designates her 
interpretation as an "innovation", unrecognizable in the 
history of interpretation as well as in the text itself. 83 
It is an attempt to create balancing points of view between 
the (modern, female) readers and the author's. The readers 
who have been aware of the acuteness of woman's problems 
and the author(s) whose works reflect virtually a 
devaluation of woman. "An authorls. intentionality and a 
reader's response have thus yielded competing views" 
remarks Trible in her *epilogue. 84 
Unlike Abraham's, the pronouncement of Sarah's death does not 
indicate that she died peacefully (23: 2, cf. 25: 8). Did not Sarah die, 
as sm-e rabbinic cam-entator says, because she was greatly troubled by 
the sacrifice of Isaac? 
82Phyllis Trible, "Genesis 22: The Sacrifice of Sarah" in Not in, 
geaven: Coherence and Cmplexity in Biblical Narrative, eds. 
p, osenblatt, J. P. and Sitterson, Jr., J. C., 1991, pp. 170-91. 
83 The anission of Sarah f rcm Genesis 22 is seen as an atteapt by 
the (ral e) author (s) to suppress the value of wcmn's existence. 
84Trible, op. cit., p. 191. 
159 
Sarah should have been the focus in Gen. 22, argues Trible. 
She deserves to represent the parental position in the 
Akedah instead of Abraham. Because, as Genesis 21 
demonstrates, she is the one who actually loves Isaac while 
Abraham himself never expresses his love for Isaac. 
Moreover, as seen by R. P. Carroll, "the disappearing of 
Ishmael in the text of 22.2 -'take your son, your'only son 
Isaac, whom you love... '- is curious in the context of the 
stories of Abraham in Genesis and seems to steal a line 
more appropriate to Sarah than to Abraham. "85 Isaac is not 
the only son of Abraham sin'c-e through Hagar he also has 
Ishmael. On the other hand, Isaac is the only son of Sarah. 
The divine words, therefore, would have been more 
appropriately addressed to Sarah. The story introduces 
Isaac as the only son of Abraham while speaking nothing of 
Sarah. Trible claims, "by structure, use of particles, and 
repetition, the narrator has relentlessly secured meaning. 
Abraham fears God, worships God, obeys God. "86 By so doing, 
the author(s) has sacrificed Sarah. Sarah is victimized for 
the sake of enhancing the figure of Abraham as a devoted 
believer. As a matter of fact, the whole story about 
Abraham tends to show him as a steadfast believer while 
Sarah is protrayed as less admirable than that. 
Sarah in the previous events of Abraham's stories has 
85R. P. Carrol 1, "The Disca-nbobulations of Tim and the 
I)iversities of Text: Notes on the Rezeptionsgeschichte of the Bible" in 
Text and Pretext: Essays in Honour of Robert Davidson, ed. R. P. Carroll, 
jSOT SS 138,1992, p. 75. 
86Trible, "Sarah, " p. 181. 
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always been characterized as a marginalized woman. A barren 
wife is her first identification in the book of Genesis: 
"Now Sarai was barren; she had no child. " (11: 30). While, 
Hilcah, Nahor's wife has no such mention that make us think 
that Sarai is an abnormal wife. Something is wrong with 
Sarai, Abram's wife. Nonetheless, we hear no complaint or 
an effort to heal the infertility (cf. Rebekah, Gen. 25: 21). 
The case seems to be closed or concealed. It can only be 
felt as a background of-any occurrences that involve Sarah. 
But, as a result, it may seem that Sarah is hardly regarded 
as an honourable wife by Abraham. In the land of Pharaoh 
and later on, in Gerar, Sarah is to degrade her dignity as 
a good woman. She sells herself to protect Abraham. One may 
wonder, had Sarah not been barren, would Abraham have used 
her in a way he does now? Infertility amounts to Sarah 
being used and abused all the time. But, the text is silent 
about her suffering. 
once, Sarah is exposed as a woman with power in her hand 
(Genesis 16,21), her image is remote from a person who can 
use her power wisely. Instead, she is depicted as a 
selfish and cruel woman. Hagar and her son are the victims 
of Sarah's cruelty. This derogatory feature of Sarah, once 
revealed, never ends up with a refinement. Hagar may come 
back to join Abraham and Sarah as commanded by the deity 
(ch. 16) but Sarah would never give her a peaceful life any 
more. 87 Her abhorrence of Hagar and Ishmael was persistent 
87Hagar will never appear again until the birth of Isaac 
(Genesis 21) when she has to suffer another intimidation from Sarah 
through Abraham. It proves that since the first expulsion, Hagar has 
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until she died. The last thing the text can tell us about 
the Sarah and Hagar relationship is that Sarah urged 
Abraham to expel Hagar and Ishmael (ch. 21). When Sarah 
died, she did not die in "a good old age" (cf. Abraham, 
Gen. 25: 8). one may think that it is because she still 
cannot get away from her enmity towards Hagar and Ishmael. 
The Akedah, moreover, would have obsessed her as Hagar and 
Ishmael's revenge when she herself could not be present and 
be supportive to Isaac. The Akedah was a nightmare for 
Sarah who died just after it and perhaps because of it 
too. 88 
In Genesis 21, after the birth of Isaac, Sarah's demand for 
the expulsion of Hagar and Ishmael is not without a logical 
reason. She accepted Isaac as a special son who is given in 
her old age when she even could not have expected to give 
breast feeding to a baby any more (21: 7). Undoubtedly, she 
really loved Isaac and wanted him to enjoy an exclusive 
right as Abraham's heir. one could easily notice that this 
is not the case with Abraham. As Trible comments, "unlike 
the bond between Sarah and Isaac, no unique tie exists here 
between Abraham and Isaac. "89 There is a contrasting 
appearance between Sarah and Abraham in their relation with 
Isaac. When Sarah, during the birth of Isaac, was in a 
state of euphoria, Abraham merely did what usually a father 
received no kind treatment f ran Sarah any imore than before their 
relationship was broken (Genesis 16). 
88A Jewish legend describes the death of Sarah as caused by a 
grieving after she is told that Isaac is sacrificed by Abraham. See 
L. Ginzberg, The Legends of the Jews, vol. j, c-1909, p. 278. 89Trible, "Sarah, " p. 187. 
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does in a tradition of welcoming a new-born baby. Abraham 
does not seem to regard Isaac as a special son. Sarah was 
the only one who not only uttered Isaac's name and 
predicated it with "my son" (21: 10) but also echoed the 
name (in Hebrew -yishaq means "he laughs") in her sayings: 
"God has made laughter, for me; every one who hears will 
iaugh over meý" (21: 6). But, the happiness soon becomes a 
worry, a worry that Ishmael, another son of Abraham, would 
one day be Isaac's rival in inheriting Abraham's name and 
welfare. It eventually results in the expulsion of Ishmael 
and his mother. However, Sarah is not alone in trying to 
protect Isaac's right by way of casting out Ishmael, 
although the idea is at once rejected by Abraham. God 
clearly convinced Abraham that Sarah's idea was justified 
(21: 12,13), we may see that the narrator is also in support 
of Sarah. ý 
The narrator's intention is important to be highlighted 
here, since it does not simply tell of the occurrence but 
also reflects the maintenance and implementing of Sarah's 
demand, of course, in his own way. The demand of Sarah was 
for Ishmael to be expelled. The narrator's intention is 
probably to write out Ishmael. 90 The evidence is that, not 
once Ishmael's name is mentioned in the text. Ishmael's 
identification ranges from the more specific one, "his 
(Abraham's) son" (21: 4,5), "the son of Hagar the Egyptian" 
(21: 9), to the more general one, "the child" (21: 14,15,16) 
90The same ideological inclination to identify Ishmel not by 
his own narre can be found in the New Testament texts (Paul's letters). 
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and "the lad" (21: 17,19,20) but never is he identified by 
his own name. And if we take the notion that name is 
essential for Israelite understanding of being, that name 
indicates the existence of the person, then the removal of 
Ishmael's name from the discourse would manifest nothing 
but his annihilation. If we read the text without some 
prejudice such as "Ishmael is not the promised son, so why 
should we care about him or his name? our main concern is 
Isaac, the promised son" (both Christians and Jews would be 
in favour of this prejudice but certainly not Muslims), we 
would be bewildered by the narrator's decision not to use 
Ishmael's name directly. obviously, the story will end up 
with Ishmael being separated from Isaac and Abraham and the 
removal of Ishmael's name in this case would simply 
complete the ideological deletion of Ishmael from the 
history of Abraham's descendants. If this is true as the 
intention of the narrator then Sarah's demand is clearly 
incorporated for endorsement. Thus, on the narrative level 
we have Sarah's demand for Ishmael's expulsion; in the 
discourse we acknowledge the narrator's bias of writing out 
Ishmael's name. After all, we may distinguish Sarah's 
demand which originated from her genuine love of Isaac from 
that of the narrator's sophisticated attempt to disregard 
Ishmael which may be because Ishmael is not the promised 
son or that his mother is a foreigner. However, it is 
easier for us to prove from the expulsion of Ishmael the 
cruelty of Sarah. In the foreground, she alone apparently 
holds responsibility for the expulsion and its ensuing 
effects. Nonetheless, after realising the effect of the 
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narrator's work we may come to the conclusion that Sarah is 
not the only one who would be satisfied by the expulsion of 
Ishmael from Abraham's house. Even the narrator upholds the 
expulsion. Both Sarah and the narrator "erase" Ishmael. 
To say that Sarah is left with the unfortunate image of 
cruel mistress and selfish step-mother, simply because she 
is a woman, would hardly be acceptable. This view which is 
commonly held by feminist critics and seemingly shown by 
Trible has no obvious evidence in the story. The` appearance 
of man only-in the Akedah brings about violence. Abraham, 
without Sarah's presence in defending Isaac, is unalterable 
in his determination to kill his own son. Abraham, as a 
man, would never show any sign of despair in facing the 
death of Isaac (cf. Hagar: 21: 16) or of remorse at having 
killed his son. The divine intervention interrupts the 
sacrifice not because of the crying of the mother (21: 17) 
but because of the father's rigidity: "you have not 
withheld your son" (22: 12). Without the intervention, the 
child would have been killed. This is obviously a serious 
threat to the benign image of Abraham as an obedient man 
that is supposedly inculcated by the narrator, and, seen by 
the feminist as the only figuration of the text that needs 
to be combatted. 91 In the Akedah, Abraham does not seem to 
be a loving father but, rather, a killer of his own son. 
Trible seems to overlook the dialectical appearance of 
Abraham, for her the author only wants to produce a fine 
91 Tribl e, "Sarah, " p. 181. 
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figure of Abraham while suppressing disreputable images. On 
the other hand, more importantly, Trible also misses 
Sarah's "double faces". Her view of Sarah in the story 
sounds too pessimistic that she needs to counter by her own 
interpretation. In fact, in the text, despite the exposure 
of Sarah's cruelty, her attitude is endorsed by God and in 
the plane of discourse, entertained by the narrator. 92 
Ishmael has, however, to be separated from Abraham's 
family. Thus, Sarah is not only depicted as a disgraceful 
woman but also as a woman whose decision is vindicated. 
The affection of Sarah for Isaac is, however, notorious. 
Abraham himself does not seem to be able to emulate Sarah's 
love for Isaac. What is notorious of Abraham, on the other 
hand, is his unyielding obedience to God. Unlike Abraham, 
Sarah once clashed with the divinity over her skepticism 
(Gen. 18: 9-15). on the contrary, almost every move made by 
Abraham is an implementation of God's command. These might 
be the reason why Abraham alone is to accept the 
sacrificial command while Sarah does not appear at all in 
the event. In the background, we may perceive that the 
greatness of Sarah's love for Isaac might have hindered the 
sacrifice. This, at the same time, may create an ambiguity 
in the understanding of nissah. A test like this should 
have been directed to the one whose love of the son might 
probably defeat his love of God. What is the use of the 
test if the tested person has already shown his steadfast 
921n a tradition that is reflected in Isa. 51: 1,2, Sarah is 
adored as Israel's mother and in Paul's letters, she is admitted as christians' mother (e. g. Gal. 4). 
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loyalty to God? The dynamics of oscillation between 
oppositional wills that can be hoped from a nissah does not 
appear in the Akedah (cf. the murmur of the people of Israel 
in Exod. 15: 22-25). This makes nissah a rather inappropriate 
title of the events. Yet, without the rendering of nissah, 
the sacrifice of Isaac could be seen as anything but a 
proof of Abraham's faith in God that overcomes even his 
bond with his own son. Nissah has put the Akedah in a 
different prespective, what should have been a blind 
obedience is manipulated into a more dynamic obedience in 
which Abraham's subservience to God is not merely accepted 
without a struggle that emerges from his love for Isaac. 93 
However, nissah would seem to be more vivid had Sarah 
appeared as the subject instead of Abraham. 
Isaac 
our present study is primarily a response to the omission 
of Isaac since the cancellation of the sacrifice (22: 11) 
right to the end of the Akedah. This leads to an evocation 
of the characterization of Isaac in the whole story of 
Isaac and Abraham. 
There hardly is any doubt of the pitiful figure of Isaac in 
the Genesis narratives besides his being the promised son. 
93The rendering of nissah in Gen. 22 nay be seen as equivalent to 
the rendering of a Job-like discussion between God and the prince 
14astema in the book of Jubilees (ch. XVII: 15ff) that ends up with the 
prince Mastema urging God to test Abraham. Both are an ideological 
exposition on the Akedah. 
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In his childhood (ch. 21), he apparently needs protection 
from his mother against supposedly his rival brother. 94 
After the expulsion of Ishmael, however, a more serious 
threat- comes into Isaac's life. It does not come from 
anyone but his own father. Is there any rivalry motive 
behind the sacrifice of Isaac by Abraham? 
A study by Carol Delaney titled The Legacy of Abraham has 
been directed to show the exercise of the distinctive power 
of Abraham as a father over Isaac's life and death that 
allows the sacrifice to happen. 95 Delaney says, "Abraham, in 
taking Isaac without consulting Sarah, executed the 
prerogative of father-right. "96 The father-right is 
primarily understood as a claim of the father to the 
child's mother that because of him the child may exist. 
"The child is fashioned solely by the impregnating 
principle provided by the father while the woman supplies 
nothing of her essential being to the child. She serves 
merely as the soil. in which the seed is planted, her value 
becomes derivative. "97 The father, therefore, sees himself 
as the one who is able to engender life. In the next state, 
#'if the life engendering ability is male then it is 
94 Interestingly, Gal. 4: 29 alludes to the persecution of Isaac by 
Ishmael that may indicate a tradition on which it is based. The 
allusion corresponds to a Jewish legend about quarrels between Isaac 
and Ishmael over the rights of the first-born. "Ishmael, who had been 
accustaned f rcm his youth to use the bow and arrow, was in the habit of 
airrdng his missiles in the direction of Isaac, saying at the same time 
that he was but jesting". In the end, it is Sarah who def ends Isaac and 
his right to inherit all that Abraham has. Ginzberg, Legends, pp. 263-4. 95Carol Delaney, "The Legacy of Abraham! ' in Anti-Covenant: 
Counter-Reading Wdnran's Lives in the Hebrew Bible, ed. Mieke Bal, 1989, 
-pp. 27-41. 
96Delaney, ibid., p. 37. 
97Delaney, ibid., p. 35. 
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transferred from father to son. The son also possesses this 
ability and therefore as he matures he becomes a potential 
threat to the father's authority. "98 This kind of threat 
felt by the father, that underlies infanticides in the 
Greek stories, is, according to Delaney, possibly the 
rationale behind the Akedah, the sacrifice of son. Abraham 
may have anticipated, the rivalry of Isaac to him, for which 
the sacrifice is a precautionary act, over the father- 
right. 
However, the sacrifice of Isaac comes for the first time as 
a divine command. Since the narrative presentation of God 
reflects his maleness, God is inevitably involved in the 
web of male actions in terms of defending the father-right 
(after all, Sarah has Isaac because God {Yahweh) visits 
her, Gen. 21: 1,2), the right to be seen as the author of 
life and death. In the Akedah, it is, after all, God who, 
by the sacrifice, tries to defend his "prerogative of 
father-right"; that is to say, the story effectively shows 
the undeniable power of God over man's life and death. 
Thus, Delaney, "the story functions to establish the 
authority of God the Father. The authority becomes 
omnipresent but invisible. This, more than anything, 
legitimates the patriarchal way of life. "99 So, there is a 
close link between God who demands the sacrifice and 
Abraham, the executor, in that both of them ultimately 
reflect a fatherly desire to curb the freedom of Isaac, the 
I 
98Delaney, ibid., p. 37. 
99Delaney, ibid., p. 39. 
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biological as well as symbolical son, even if it leads to 
the death of the son. 
But, not every male in the Genesis stories would reflect 
such an absolute power. If there is any man in whom the 
existence of the power is highly doubtful, he must be 
Isaac. 100 Isaac 'is hardly the figure that may exercise his 
father-right over and against his wife and his children. It 
is, of course, unusual since as Abraham's heir Isaac should 
have shared his father-right as well as the way the right 
is to be implemented. It seems that Isaac has never learned 
f rom his father, he has never known how to be a tough man 
like his father. It may give us another sign that the 
relationship between Abraham and Isaac is not so harmonious 
and that, Isaac prefers to conduct his life in his own way 
which is in contrast to his father's. 
The performance of Isaac as a weak man also breaks with a 
common mythological theme of a redeemed son who becomes a 
superhuman. 101 Delaney perceives the departure of Isaac's 
story from the theme of a special son in that, "if one were 
attempting to make exact correlations between the Greek and 
Hebrew stories Isaac, rather than Abraham, would be 
equivalent with Zeus, for he, like Zeus, was the child 
redeemed by the substitute. Yet Isaac, the child of 
10 0 In addition to that we may also include Lot. 
101The Christian interpretation that typologically relates Isaac 
with the figure of Jesus as another sacrificed son who becomes God 
after a resurrection should, however, be rethought with regard to the 
realisation that Isaac's performance, after being redeemed in the 
Akedah, does not encourage any notion of superhumanness. 
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promise, is strangely not a very prominent figure in the 
Bible. This fact has given rise to speculation that Isaac 
was sacrificed, and that the substitution rite was a late 
modification. "102 After the event as told in the Akedah 
Isaac disappears for some time. We could only hear other 
characters (Abraham and his senior servant) speak about him 
(Genesis 24). Isaac merely lives in the mind of those 
characters. Isaac himself is not involved in this plan nor 
is his will heard at all. He simply is erased from the plan 
that would, ironically, establish his own future. The 
prerogative right of the father persistently sounds its 
echo. 
In contrast to the account of Hagar's attempt to find 
Ishmael a wife that only occupies half a verse (21: 21b), 
the account of Abraham's plan to marry Isaac with his 
brother's descendant takes 67 verses (Genesis 24). The 
story, besides its lenghty appearance, is also told 
dramatically. 103 only that one cannot help wondering, again 
and again, of the disappearance of Isaac from a story whose 
characters are merely concerned about him, doing business 
just for him. 104 AS the story goes on, we may virtually not 
remember Isaac any more. our attentions are firmly attached 
to the effort of Abraham's envoy to bring Rebekah back to 
102Delaney, "The Legacy, " p. 35. 
103Not least the literary critic M. Sternberg is delighted to use 
this supposedly rich of resources narrative as a basis of his account 
of biblical literariness. Sternberg, Poetics, pp. 131ff. 
104The irony could also be seen in that the cannentators of this 
story do not even consider that it is necessary to indicate Isaac in 
their chosen title or topic and it is virtually so with the content. 
The canmon title applied to this story is "The Wooing of Rebekah". See 
Sternberg, Poetics, p. 131. 
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his master's place. Just before the end, we suddenly and 
enigmatically find Isaac in a field in the evening 
(vv. 62,63). He is said to have come from Beerlahairoi, the 
same place where Hagar, in her run from Sarai, saw the 
deity who urged her to go back to her mistress (16: 14). The 
place may indicate that Isaac himself has been an the run 
(from his father), just like Hagar, away from some 
harassment, that brings our mind back to the horror of the 
Akedah. To meditate (SUah), in the field, in the evening 
are words that simply picture a melancholy situation that 
may probably inhabit Isaac's mind too at that time. The 
darkness of Isaac's mind will eventually be disclosed as 
when his love for Rebekah grows well, "Isaac was comforted 
after his mother's death" (v. 67). Hitherto, Isaac is a sad 
man. The death of Sarah is not an easy experience for Isaac 
to come to terms with. But, the narrator, up to the meeting 
between Isaac and Rebekah, has never unveiled the great 
loss that Isaac has undergone because of his mother's 
death. The narrator even does not tell us that Isaac was at 
his mother's funeral (23: 19). How deeply sad Isaac is, not 
only that he has lost his beloved mother but also that he 
was not able to bury his dead mother. The Akedah has 
separated Isaac from Abraham (the reunion between Isaac and 
Abraham after the Akedah happens only at the burial of 
Abraham, 25: 9) but more than that, it has also removed 
Isaac from his beloved mother forever (not even the dead 
body of Sarah, could Isaac see). 
Meanwhile, in contrast to Isaac's melancholic life, Abraham 
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is told to live with another wife and their 6 children 
(25: 1-6). 105 The text does not indicate that Abraham took 
Keturah to comfort himself after the death of Sarah. Unlike 
Isaac, Abraham does not seem to suffer a great deal because 
of Sarah's death., Let alone if he, now, can have another 
wife and children. 
Following Isaac's marriage with Rebekah and the death of 
Abraham, since when Isaac receives the divine blessing 
(25: 11), hardship is still enveloping Isaac's life. The 
text shows contrasting lives of Ishmael and Isaac (25: 12- 
34). While Ishmael begets 12 children, the "twelve princes" 
with their clans and lands (vv. 12-16), Isaac still has to 
beg God for healing for his barren wife (v. 21). And, when 
Isaac can eventually have children, the twins Esau and 
Jacob, his children bring him nothing to his favour but 
more trouble, a fraternal rivalry. The trouble can be 
anticipated even when the children are still in their 
mother's womb. "The children struggled together 
(yithroftfu) within her" (25: 22). And, when they are 
teenagers, Jacob has cheated Esau, his older brother, to 
exchange a meal for his birth-right (vv. 27-34). It is a 
harbinger of a yet greater tragedy that also brings in the 
motive of deception (Genesis 27). Another misfortune comes 
from Esau's, Isaac's beloved son, supposed misdemeanour. 
fie, to whom Isaac might have planned to bequeath his 
patrimony, along with his Hittite wife have embittered 
IOSThere is also a possibility that besides Keturah, his wife 
(Vgs"ýh)(25: 1), Abraham has same more concubines (pilage, s`lm) whose 
. sons are granted gifts 
by Abraham (25: 6). 
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Isaac and Rebekah (26: 35). 
At the age of 100 or so, Isaac rapidly becomes an unfit 
man. 106 His eye-sight is deteriorating until he cannot see 
any more (27: 1). It really influences him to the point that 
he seems to lose his appetite for life. He feels that his 
day has come to an end. As a matter of fact, Isaac has 
underestimated his day (v. 1). He will have 80 years more to 
live after this event. 107 However, he is anxious about his 
death and arranges a special blessing for Esau. The 
disabled eye-sight will soon plunge him into the, 
presumably, biggest blunder he has ever made in his life. 
Isaac, is deceived by Rebekah, his wife, and Jacob to give 
the blessing he intended for Esau to Jacob in a ruthless 
trick. Tragedy seems to be affixed to every movement taken 
by Isaac. Before this, his father, and now, his wife and 
his son, all indifferently use Isaac for their own 
benefits. What is left for Isaac is tragedy. Doubtful is 
Isaac when he hears Jacob's voice in Esau's disguise. The 
hesitation is indicated at least 5 times: (1) v. 20: "how is 
it that you have found it (the game) so quickly, my son? " 
(2) v. 21: "come near, that I may feel you, my son', to know 
whether you are really my son Esau or not. " (3) as in 
isaac's inner voice, v. 22: "the voice is Jacob's voice, but 
the hands are the hands of Esau". (4) v. 24: "are you really 
10 6 To caapare with Abraham who, in his 100 plus stage, is still 
able to beget 6 children (Genesis 25). 
10 7 Isaac is 60 years old when he begets Esau and Jacob (25: 26). 
Esau is 40 years old when he is said to have brought bitterness to his 
parents' lives, that is, not long before Isaac suranons him to hunt game 
in order to get the blessing (ch. 27). At this time, Isaac's age is 100 
or a little bit more. And Isaac died at 180 years (35: 28). 
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my son Esau? (5) finally, not being convinced by the 
previous inquiries, Isaac smells Jacob/Esau, v. 27: "and he 
smelled the smell of his garments, and blessed him. " The 
more Isaac is doubtful the more shocked he is when he finds 
that the blessed son is Jacob instead of Esau. The doubts 
accumulate a greater power for the emotional explosion that 
is triggered off when the truth is unveiled. It is said 
that "Isaac trembled violently" (v. 33). It is enough to 
describe how badly affected Isaac is by the deception. If 
there is any experience that makes Isaac tremble more 
violently than this, it would have been the Akedah. But, if 
the text says only a little bit about Isaac's reaction to 
the deception of Jacob, it does not even say anything about 
Isaac's reaction during his father's attempt to sacrifice 
him. Poor Isaac, his suffering never deserves special 
attention. It is often eclipsed by the shadow of Abraham's 
majesty. 
But, one should never forget that Abraham's majesty owes 
itself to Isaac's sorrow. The effect of Abraham's grandeur 
upon Isaac's weakness is noticeable in the whole story of 
Abraham and Isaac but it is the more so in the Akedah in 
particular. The Akedah symbolizes the unbalanced 
relationship between Abraham and Isaac. The authority and 
power belong only to the father while the son lives under 
the father's shadow. Without the implication of this 
condition, Isaac would have never serenely relinquished his 
life in his father's hands. In other words, the weakness of 
Isaac is indispensable for the Akedah's narrative 
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structure. The powerful Abraham, therefore, would gain 
freedom to express his own will with regard to the divine 
command. It is entirely up to Abraham, rather than Isaac, 
whether he will sacrifice Isaac according to God's order. 
Had Isaac been a powerful man, he might have challenged the 
sacrifice and therefore, undermined Abraham's intention in 
every possible way. In, fact, Isaac is in no way a powerful 
character, not in the Akedah nor in the other stories. A 
contemplation of , the characterization of Isaac reveals a 
disenfranchised figure. A blessed life is maybe not Isaac's 
fortune but it practically is Abraham's as well as Jacob's, 
Isaac's son (though not the beloved one). 
Genesis 26 tells a story that has a similar motive to that 
of Abraham when he has just departed on his wandering 
journey and faced by a famine that urges him to take refuge 
in Pharaoh's land (Genesis 12). The land of Gerar and the 
figure of Abimelech echo another wife-sister story in 
Abraham's saga (Genesis 20). The immediate difference can 
be seen in the characterization of Abraham and Isaac. 
Abraham was a canny man who did not only beg for food from 
pharaoh but, through his trick, he was able to get as much 
as he could of various properties from Pharaoh regardless 
of the unpleasant reaction of the local people. While Isaac 
rnay come to Gerar just to follow his father's path before 
in the time of famine. Only Isaac cannot go to Pharaoh's 
land because of the divine prohibition (26: 2). There is no 
clear reason as to why Isaac is not allowed to go down to 
Egypt in order to seek a temporary shelter from the famine. 
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Nonetheless, we may recall that the relation between 
Abraham and Pharaoh bef ore was not as good. as that between 
Abraham and Abimelech. Thus, it is not safe for "the weak 
Isaac" to go and find a help from a man that has been 
exasperated by his father. Meanwhile, Abimelech had been a 
friend and a business colleague of Abraham (Abraham's 
possessions even grew well in Abimelech's land) as well as 
an ex-husband of Sarah, Isaac's mother (ch. 21). 1.08 Isaac, 
therefore, may benefit from his parents' good relationship 
with Abimelech. It proves once again that Isaac can only 
live under the shadow of his parents. The kindness that 
he, now, obtains from Abimelech is virtually an expansion of 
what his parents had formerly cultivated. In Abimelech, 
Isaac has found a figure he can depend on. Unlike Abraham, 
Isaac lives for a long time before his disguise as 
Rebekah's brother is disclosed. We may imagine how 
torturing life is for Isaac who always has to conceal his 
true relationship with Rebekah in front of the public. The 
rnotive of the disclosure of Isaac's disguise is also 
different from that of Abraham. It is Isaac's careless or 
irresistible act that opens the way to the disclosure and 
not a divine revelation (26: 8). Having so long ceased to be 
husband and wife, Isaac cannot restrain himself from 
expressing his love for Rebekah any more. After the 
disclosure, we never hear Isaac create an alibi as it 
happened with Abraham (20: 11-13). on the other hand, his 
reasoning sounds naive, "because I thought, lest I die 
1080f Abraham and Abinielech's harmonious relationship, see the 
discussion of it in the characterization of Abraham, Genesis 20, 
pp. 124f f- 
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because of her. "(26: 9). The humble Isaac has only one 
simple reason for his disguise, that is, afraid of death. 
He is not diplomatic, cunning, tactful like his father. He 
reveals straightforwardly why he pretends to, be Rebekah's 
brother (cf. Abraham's lengthy argument in ch. 20). 
The impact of Isaac's inferiority in the Akedah 
The contrast between Abraham and Isaac produces, in the 
Akedah particularly, a repugnant atmosphere in which a 
father exercises his absolute power to sacrifice his 
defenceless son. The Akedah clearly reflects the imbalance 
of power between Abraham and Isaac. And as for God, the 
focus of his attention seems to be on Abraham's indifferent 
act rather than Isaac's pitiful manner. God wants to cancel 
the sacrifice, not because he feels pity for Isaac but, 
after seeing and being attracted by Abraham's violent act 
(cf. Ishmael's case: 21: 17). 
The curse that Isaac unintentionally gives to Esau 
(27: 39,40) may symbolize his own hard life (against his 
father rather than brother). 109 Sometimes Isaac tries to 
escape from the hardship but he is barely successful. 11.0 
Tragic is Isaac's fate, the same as when he is on top of 
1-090ne may say that the blessing proclaimed in the end of the 
Akedah is =re appropriate for Abraham's descendants (including Isaac) 
because of its futuristic sense. However, to say that Isaac's life 
inViies the realisation of the blessing is hardly likely. 
I 10 Isaac's exclusive love for Esau rmy indicate his longing for 
a strong figure like Esau, the hunter, the man of field himelf, which 
he cannot find in hirmelf. 
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the sacrificial altar, bound hopelessly. In fact, the 
awareness of the tragedy is accute in the text which 
has 
chosen to keep silent about Isaac's destiny, when Abraham 
went back home (22: 19). Was Isaac left in the sacrificial 
site? or was he dead? the text does not tell us. It remains 
mysterious as if it wants to remind us of the tragedy of 
Isaac that cannot just be enveloped by the exaltation of 
Abraham's obedience. 
Isaac's tragedy is a symbol of the tragedy of a child who 
has to succumb to the violent desire of the father. It may 
become real for us, modern readers, when we realise, as 
R. P. Carroll does, "the problems of child abus ein 
society". 111 The Akedah can be seen as an example of child 
abuse cases in our society nowadays. Meanwhile, in the 
history of religious interpretation of the Akedah, we 
cannot hide the fact that thousands of ardent Jews have 
committed themselves to a mass suicide in the time of the 
Crusades as an enactment of the Akedah. 112 Tragedy is 
apparently a real problem both for the readers of the 
Akedah and the text itself. If the text, for the sake of 
exposing Abraham's obedience, has tried to subordinate the 
tragedy, it can never do it successfully. Tragedy would 
always emerge one way or another. It begs a special 
attention, like Isaac from under Abraham's shadow. But once 
attention is given, the text begins to deconstruct itself, 
III Carroll, "Discarbobulations, " p. 76. 
112 See S. Spiegel, The Last Trial: Cn the Legends and Lore of the 
Cxm=d to Abraham to offer Isaac as a Sacrifice: The Akedah, 1967, for 
irLstance, pp. 17-27. 
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the narrator's voice becomes less reliable. The obedience 
of Abraham, as persistently argued by the narrator, no 
longer deserves sympathy. Isaac's sorrow now shifts to the 
centre of recognition and threatens all the adorations of 
Abraham. An impartial highlight on Isaac's sorrow might 
balance the narrator's special focus on Abraham's 
obedience; thus, we arrive at a point where, to follow 
Phyllis Trible, no interpretation, including the narrator's 
own interpretation, should become an idol. 
III,. 4. The-portrayal of God 
As a character, God undoubtedly plays an important role in 
biblical narrative with regard to his involvement in almost 
every activity. But, the impact of the presentation of God 
cannot automatically entail a general speculation about who 
or what he is. God judges, acts, reacts responsively with 
the other characters in ways that make his appearance 
relative. As it is an interaction between God and other 
story characters that lays the foundation for the story 
event, it is very unlikely therefore that readers should 
understand the divinity exclusively, separate from context. 
Thus, we may say that a speculative task of bringing out a 
clear-cut description of divinity from biblical story is 
not in any way easy, if possible at all. The difficulty is 
not primarily caused by a text that would prevent readers 
from inventing such an arbitrary interpretation. Rather 
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than preventing, the text would invite the readers' 
participation in producing meaning. But, it is always a 
great doubt whether a reading should or could lead towards 
finding a closure of a simpler conclusion. Should naturally 
multi -dimensional images of biblical narrative be reduced 
to a certain conception by virtue of logic? The answer to 
this apparently lies a great deal in the purpose of reading 
that the readers set as well as their ethic of reading. 113 
However, it must be said that there would be a great loss 
when a text such as the Akedah, particularly with regard to 
the presentation of God, has, in the end, to relinquish its 
polysemiatic nature for the sake of a closure. Biblical 
narrative such as the Akedah, although it may express 
certain theological or ideological notions, has basically a 
different nature of discourse in that it would likely deny 
any conclusive reading. There is not an univocal image of 
God in the Akedah. 
The ambiguity of the will of God 
God is basically portrayed as an inconsistent character in 
the Akedah. He pronounces two contradictory commands to 
Abraham. Each commands conveys a definite message that 
Abraham could not be doubtful of its intention. The initial 
command demands the sacrifice of Isaac who, in God's 
knowledge, is the only and beloved son of Abraham. The 
113The Bible has been used in various ways to support certain 
conceptions particularly in connection with theology. It inevitably 
results in a reduction of the values of biblical text itself to fit 
with the concept in question. 
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attributes indicate how precious Isaac is in Abraham's 
life 
in the eyes of God. Ironically, the story reveals that the 
more precious Isaac is, the more dangerous his life 
becomes. An infant sacrifice should be reckoned as an 
unusual activity, it is the more so when demanded by God 
himself. God who, in the Genesis narratives particularly, 
is recognised as the maker of life, specifically, the life 
of Isaac through his promise and fulfilment, allows himself 
to be seen as a destructor of life. 
If God ever commands Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, he really 
wants to see the actual result. The consummation of the 
sacrifice is all he wants to prove in the end. Indeed, 
eventually the sacrifice is interrupted by another 
divine 
appearance. But, it should not automatically bring us to an 
understanding that God has never meant the sacrifice, as 
the narrator might lead us into such a thinking (by giving 
an impression that the sacrifice is in fact only a test). 
The gesture of the cancellation could never be traced in 
the initial command, which means that God is absolutely 
certain about the content of the command. The counter- 
command, which takes place af ter some time in the story, 
could only be understood as a substituting command. God may 
have changed his mind af ter having some, unrevealed though, 
considerations, seeing what Abraham is doing is too 
unbearable a horror that he never imagined before. It is of 
course only a possibility. The problem is that we would 
never know for certain why God suddenly changes his mind 
and interrupts the sacrifice. It is enigmatic. Mystery is 
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actually also an inseparable part of the first command. We 
are never informed about God's motive in demanding Isaac's 
sacrifice. So, nothing could apparently be found about the 
reason behind God's will in this story. However, the impact 
of the will is in any sense sure... Isaac is to die. 
The death of or the deadly threat to Abraham's descendant 
itself is actually not a new reality that just happened to 
Isaac. It is a common phenomenon that can be found 
throughout Abraham's life concerning some people who have 
been reckoned as his descendants. Just before Isaac, we 
find Ishmael, another son of Abraham, almost loses his life 
through thirst (21: 15,16). Ishmael is commanded to go away 
from Abraham's house as a result of the birth of Isaac and 
Sarah's will of making her own son enjoy an exclusive right 
in his father house. The participation of God in the 
expulsion of Ishmael is obvious (21: 12). God convinces 
Abraham of Ishmael's fate in the future, "I will make a 
nation of the son of the slave woman also, because he is 
your offspring" (v. 13), that in a way makes Abraham agree 
to give his consent to the expulsion. However, what 
immediately happened after the pronouncement of Ishmael's 
fate is not its fulfilment but, to the contrary, the story 
reveals a lethal danger of Ishmael. "Let me not look upon 
the death of the child ( 'al-'er'eh bemoth hayyaledh)" says 
Hagar in response to her son's hopeless condition (v. 16). 
Should a dead son be a nation as promised by God ? 
The question sounds its audible echo in the Akedah, as we 
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realise that the threat of the death of Isaac, the promised 
son in whom Abraham's name will be bore (21: 12), in the 
narrative moves gradually to reach a point of certainty. 
Both occurrences of Ishmael and Isaac, have created an 
ironic effect. It is not only because they are the special 
people who bring a divine promise of being, in the future, 
a big nation (Ishmael) and the bearer of Abraham's name 
(Isaac) and now have to encounter a danger that may 
jeopardise any possibility of their future lives but also, 
the fact that they are Abraham's sons itself seems 
inevitably to always engage them in mortal danger. Abraham, 
in other words, has apparently again and again to face the 
fact that he is intended to be childless. Consequently, 
anyone thought to be Abraham's son cannot live away from 
the bad luck that threatens to eradicate their lives. 
From the very beginning of his life as recorded in the book 
of Genesis (beginning from ch. 12), Abraham has gone through 
a paradoxical life derived from his- relationship with God. 
lie walks away from his original country with a divine 
promise of land and descendant. The promise of descendants 
promptly looks absurd since Sarai, Abram's wife, is barren. 
Abram may, however, entertain himself aqainst that 
absurdity by thinking that Lot, his only nephew, has a 
right to be reckoned as his son because he himself does not 
have one. 
Lot, as well as Abraham, subsequently develops himself as a 
prosperous man. This fact alone seems to match with the 
184 
implication of the divine promise. Lot, besides flocks, 
herds and tents (13: 5), also gains a land (13: 11) that 
turns out to be the promised land as well (13: 14,15). 114 
But, Lot's life does not perpetually demonstrate a blessed 
life. He and the other inhabitants of the land have to live 
under an oppression of Chedorlaomer king of Elam and some 
other foreign kings for twelve years (14: 1-4). And, in 
spite of their rebellion, they must, later on, undergo a 
worse condition than before. They, along with their 
belongings, are to be taken away to the place of the enemy 
(14: 11,12). Having been freed from it, Lot has to enter 
another disastrous experience. The land where he and his 
family live, is to be wiped out under divine judgment 
(ch-19). The place is to be destroyed because of the wicked 
(undefined) behaviour of the people of the land that can no 
longer be tolerated by God. Lot and his family are 
apparently not involved in the people's misconduct. 
Nonetheless, they too are to be affected by the divine 
punishment. Lot will, 'eventually, survive the disaster 
together with his two daughters. But, by this time his 
family is not intact anymore, his wife and his sons in-law 
failed to follow Lot's way and were to be destroyed. 
The plagues that have been experienced by Lot and his 
family are not likely to have reasons in Lot's sin or such. 
They are not given as a punishment, at any rate, we do not 
see the logic of punishment over guilt in the narrative. 
114The land shown by Yahweh to Abraham obviously includes Lot's 
land. 
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But,, as we may more appropriately place them, it is a 
common phenomenon that as Abraham's descendant Lot and his 
family have to suffer from one plague after another. God, 
transparent in the background of the narrative event or 
appearing in the foreground as the actual actor, seems not 
to be able to keep his calamitous hands off the life of 
Abraham's descendant. Indeed, as in the case of Sodom and 
Gomorrah, God is the one who delivers Lot out of the 
disaster. But, it is precisely the paradoxical existence of 
the God of Abraham that he acts as Abraham's saviour as 
well as the source of the lethal danger that Abraham and 
his family have to encounter time after time. 
If Lot has been saved from the plague against Sodom and 
Gomorrah, Ishmael has also, by divine intervention, been 
released from a lack of water that almost killed him 
(21: 19). The Akedah as another story of a tragedyýin the 
life of Abraham's son is ended by showing the deliverance 
of Isaac from- the sacrifice. This time, similar to 
Ishmael's case that also reveals divine intervention, God 
in the form of the messenger of Yahweh comes to save 
Isaac's life. God has released Isaac particularly from 
Abraham's hand and, more importantly, from the consequence 
of his own command. The divine intervention that has 
cancelled the sacrifice effectively represents the opposite 
will expressed by the initial command. It has countermanded 
the command to sacrifice Isaac. 
We cannot know the reason why God contradicts his own 
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command, from his own testimony. The text itself includes 
an utterance of the messenger of Yahweh to Abraham in the 
time of intervention that he wants Abraham to refrain from 
killing Isaac, "for now I know that you fear God, seeing 
you have not withheld your son, your only son, from me. " 
(v. 12). The implication of these words is for the first 
command to be consummated rather than to be cancelled. The 
cancellation itself indicated by the previous words: "Do 
not lay your hand on the lad or do anything to him" does 
not gain any clear basis. It is here that the narratorial 
framework, that has put the story as a test story, seems to 
be functional. It has explained the reason for the 
cancellation as well as the command to sacrifice itself, 
that they are all made merely to be a test for Abraham. 
They are no more - important than the response of Abraham 
that will determine the result of the test. But then it is 
the work of the narrator, more like a rationalisation of 
the ambiguity of God's will, which should not be understood 
as the only possible explanation of the event. 115 The 
contradictory will of God itself remains surrounded by 
mystery. 
We may also think that the different designations of the 
deity (haelohim and mal'ak Yahweh) are produced to 
describe the sense of contradiction related with the two 
commands. In A. R. Johnson's notion, they are expressing 
115 See Phyllis Trible, "Sarah, " pp. 170-191. Trible describes a 
possibility of building upon the same story another understanding that 
is a rival to the narratorial understanding. Her reading is based on 
Sarah's/ferdnist perspective. 
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differing aspects of Israel's God. He says, "God is thought 
of in terms similar to those Of man as possessing an 
indefinable extension of the Personality which enables Him 
to exercise a mysterious influence upon mankind. In its 
creative aspect this appears as 'blessing'; in its 
destructive aspect it makes itself felt as a 'curselly. 116 
What Johnson actually sees in the performances of the 
biblical God is an oscillation in terms of quantity as 
between the singular (in our text indicated by mal'ak 
Yahweh) and the plural (for instance, 'elohim) and in terms 
of quality as between the destructive and the constructive 
aspects of divine actions. This polarity, according to 
Johnson, must not be seen as a problem that seeks a logical 
solution. The motion between those differing aspects does 
not originate in a lack of knowledge or mistakes but in a 
specific conception, however incoherent the outlook of the 
conception may seem. Johnson calls the attempts to look for 
the source of the polarity on the basis of historical and 
literary (in the older sense of biblical literary approach, 
for instance, the study commenced by H. Gunkel) assumptions: 
"the misleading effect of trying to impose upon the Hebrew 
scriptures what one thinks is a more 'logical' 
coherence"117 The background of the oscillation of the 
divine images is more likely to be found in a henotheistic 
understanding of the kingdom of gods with one of them 
(Yahweh) being the chief. As Johnson says, "there seems to 
be no gainsaying the fact that one time in Israel (as 
116 A. R. Johnson, The One and the Many in the Israeli te concepti on 
of God, 1961. p. 16. 
117 Johnson , ibid. , p. 31. 
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indeed in the Jewish colony at Elephantine so late as the 
fifth century B. C. ) Yahweh was worshipped as a member, 
albeit the chief member, of a Pantheon. "118 The many faces 
or manners of God(s) represent, therefore, the idea of the 
pack of gods who govern the world with many ways and wills. 
Johnson's description of the biblical God in terms of "the 
one and the Many" seems to be af actor of our reading of 
the oppositional- wills of God. We are faced by the 
inexplicable position of God in the light of the sacrifice 
of Isaac. Does God prefer the first command or the second 
one? We could never fathom it. The two commands should be 
regarded as reflecting different wills but at the same 
time, they are to be seen as bearing the same authority or, 
as Johnson will argue, they come from the same God. 
The contrasting wishes of God, however, might have 
bewildered Abraham, the obedient man. 119 Abraham who 
actually obeys the first command of God in executing his 
own son, will only be portrayed as disobedient with regard 
to the second command. And when he takes the command not to 
kill Isaac into account, he has turned down his own 
obedience to the initial command. Certainly obedience is a 
confusing term for this absurd situation as it might 
probably be for Abraham. In confusion, Abraham may look 
ridiculous. He is, to some extent, the victim of God's 
play. It seems to be, as it were, a parody about the life 
"$Johnson, ibid., p. 22. 
119Here we are re-ninded of Kierkegaard's paradoxical faith of 
Abraham. As a matter of fact, it is God whose will is paradoxical, 
Abraham, on the other hand, only straight-forwardly iuplements God's 
will, he my not even think about it?! 
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of an obedient man. And it is God who would have been 
entertained by the seriousness of Abraham in obeying his 
contradictory commands. 
Nonetheless, it may not be the case if, as we have seen in 
our earlier discussion about Abraham's characterization, as 
a matter of fact, Abraham might possibly not just follow 
God's will in sacrificing Isaac. He may have agreed to 
sacrifice Isaac but for another reason that God himself 
would have never been aware of . 120 Thus we have the 
sacrifice of Isaac intended and acted by different parties 
with also different reasons. 
When we look at the command of Isaac's sacrifice and its 
impact in the entire narrative, we might realise that God 
may probably be serious in his demand. He really wants the 
sacrifice of Abraham's son. It is, therefore, not just a 
test. We are at once reminded of Abimelech's fear in the 
previous episode (21: 22-34) that God, particularly 
"Elohim", when present with Abraham may cause a mortal 
danger for others. The danger could, for Abimelech come 
without any clear reason. It is just something that can be 
prevented by binding Abraham, in advance, with an oath of 
not dealing falsely with him and his family (v. 23). The 
mysterious danger anticipated by Abimelech may well 
120We have already considered same possibilities that may make 
Abraham agree to sacrifice Isaac. Among them are: the existence of 
Isaac may be seen by Abraham as a harbinger of his own death which he 
tries to deny by the sacrifice, or else, the expulsion of Ishmael my 
provoke Abraham to take revenge on behalf of Hagar which opportunity he 
finds by the sacrifice. 
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describe the danger that Isaac encounters during the 
accomplishment of the sacrifice. As the will of God, the 
sacrifice would remain enigmatic, no one could penetrate 
God's mind to find out the motive of the sacrifice. Even 
the narrator prefers to remain silent about it. But, of 
course, he does it only to allow the readers to concentrate 
on the plot he has suggested that the sacrifice is a divine 
test for Abraham. It might certainly be a test for Abraham 
but what about its impact on Isaac? Should Isaac too, whose 
life has been tragically put in jeopardy, perceive it as a 
divine test for his father and deny all the horror? We 
would think that even if Isaac accepted it as a religious 
task that his father -ought to realise, he could not, 
however, go away from the sacrificial site without being 
haunted by the possibility that God may create a terror for 
his own people for an unknown reason. It is not 
inappropriate if God is known as "the terror of Isaac 
(phahad yishaq)" (Gen. 31: 42). 
Isaac's experience in the Akedah is reminiscent of the 
experience of Lot, Ishmael and probably Abraham as well in 
their relationship with God. We have seen how Abraham 
expressed his complaint about the trouble he had been 
experiencing during the journey commanded by God 
(20: 12,13). And also his protest that he had not been 
granted a child, as promised, even when he had already 
sensed the end of his life (15: 2). Thus, Abraham may not 
always perceive the presence of God as something on which 
he can happily depend for the sake of the realisation of 
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the promise. In the process of general development of 
Abraham's family God may apparently act more of a hindrance 
rather than a help. If in the case of Lot and Ishmael , God 
has indirectly put them into a life crisis, in Isaac's case 
God is the actual initiator of the sacrifice of Isaac's 
life. Here, it becomes much more obvious that God has the 
potency for obstructing the continuation of Abraham's 
family. 
The Akedah well witnesses to the contradictory aspects of 
God since it unveils, on the one hand, a death demanded by 
God and, on the other hand, a divine blessing that implies 
a continuation of human life in the case of Abraham's 
clan. 121 The ambiguity will remain mysterious because of the 
lack of clear motivations as well as coherent purposes of 
God's actions. 122 The discourse about the paradoxical God 
does not apparently demand a closure that would unravel the 
paradox. One may doubt even if it needs to be clarified 
rather than realised as it is. It invites any readerly 
experience to live in such a world, as Abraham and his 
family do, the world of protection, guidance, blessing as 
well as destruction, loss and curse. 
12 1 Some ccgnnentators tend to consider the divine blessing at the 
end of the story as having superseded God's initial sacrificial demand 
and, therefore, the horror can somewhat be overlooked. As against this 
kind of cannentary, we ought to say that the story chronology does not 
necessarily express the importance of the occurrence. The horror 
created by the sacrificial com-nand is an essential experience in the 
process of reading that should never be abandoned as the readers reach 
the point where God appears to pronounce his blessing. 
122We should distinguish the pragmatic actions of the divinity 
from the purposeful guidance of the narrator. The disclosure of God's 
actions in the story my convey narratorial intention as well as 
expressing God's own will. 
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The characterization of God: God as the One and the 
Many. 123 
What we have seen is God as participant in a narrative 
event that also involves Abraham and- Isaac. Indeed, God may 
be seen as having a quality that separates him from human 
beings. For instance, the acceptance of his command and 
countermand by Abraham implies some presupposition of God's 
authority over human beings. However, such a quality is 
merely applicable to support the role borne by God in the 
narrative. So, the difference of God from human beings 
should be accepted no more than the fact that each 
character within the story should reflect various roles. In 
this regard, God is to be considered an independent 
character with a distinctive role as Abraham and Isaac 
have. 
Dale Patrick, who has studied the characterization of God 
in the Old Testament narrative, has shown that the 
appearances of God in the story cannot be f rozen into a 
theological proposition without losing so much of its 
dynamic as revealed in the story. 124 God is no more than a 
story character for Dale Patrick. And he considers two ways 
by which God as a character is represented in biblical 
literature. First is by evocation of presence, that is, 
"the representation of a persona in such a way that the 
audience entertains his or her existence as a living 
being ... the author must allow the audience to enter into 
12 3 The term "the one and the Many" is used by A. R. Johnson. 124Dale Patrick, The Rendering of God in the Old Testament. 
Overtures to Biblical Theology; 10,1981. 
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the thinking and feeling of the persona and to enact the 
persona's experience of himself and his world 
imaginatively. 11125 In this notion, the strongest emphasis 
is on the involvement of the audience or the readers, by 
their imagination, in pondering the thought and feeling of 
the character. It is seen by Patrick that the sharing of 
understanding of the character's world is made possible by 
the way the biblical author works. In other words, the 
biblical author-, through his works, wanted to communicate 
or establish a communication with the readers on the basis 
of the experience of the characters he wrote. Concluding 
from what Patrick has said especially about the audiences' 
imagination, the text does not actually come with some 
certainty regarding the characters, including God. It is 
the imagination of the readers which, after all, would 
decide how the construction of the characters should be 
read. But we should not understand such a construction as 
something other than that is made for the sake of reading 
(for instance, theological constructions). Thus, - it is 
highly dependent upon the narrative context or the events 
in the narrative that are temporal as well as 
interchangeable. 
Nonetheless, one would eventually notice that Patrick's 
reading has also the purpose of Positing a special image of 
God based on interconnection and consistency of the 
characterization of God that he argues is presented by 
biblical text. Yet it is thought to be different from 
125Patrick, ibid., p. 15. 
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theological constructions against which he attempts to 
produce an alternative. 126 Apparently for this purpose, 
he 
describes the second representation of character in 
biblical narrative, which he calls delineation of identity, 
as a representation of a -character with 
"definite personal 
traits, coherently related to each other and consistently 
manifested in speech and deeds ... a specific 
individual with 
a unique history, a set of beliefs and values, a 
disposition, manner, moral character with strengths and 
weaknesses, a physical identity and a social location. The 
composite of attributes belonging to the persona must, 
in 
addition, be synthesized into an identity that 
impresses 
itself on an audience as unique and interconnected. "12 7 We 
would not argue against Patrick that character 
performances should not lack plausibility. But, Patrick 
has 
apparently gone too far by allowing the character to be 
considered as a fixed identity bearer. A story character 
should be distinguished from a real person who would firmly 
maintain a certain identity that is unarguably necessary 
for human relationship. 120 A character like the biblical 
126The editors of the "Overtures" series in their foreword 
clearly express the concern of the series, "Our problern (the problem of 
the people whose ideology is expressed by the series) is to find a mode 
of articulation which avoids, on the one hand, supernaturalism that is 
frozen and violates the vitality of the text, and on the other hand, 
historicizing that is preoccupied with facticity and is therefore 
, jnable to mke any meaningful interpretative claim which has continuing 
authority. It is to this difficult matter that Dr. Patrick addresses 
himelf; ... He will neither let the text be a fixed absolute nor will he 
relativize the text away frcrn its faithful referent. " 
12 7 Patrick, The Rendering, p. 15. 
128Even in the case of real people, an identity should never be 
accepted as a static thing that would never change. We would all agree 
that, especially in our n-odern time, along with the fast changing life, 
there mmt be, at least sa-ne, elemnts of our lives that have been 
affected and nrdified by the outside world. In this respect, we can 
scarcely asyvm an unchanged identity. 
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God could be more unpredictable than a real person. 129 A 
Isaac of course the command to sacrifice case in point is 
itself that one would never know its motive and purpose 
except that it has to be as such. 130 Being ignorant of this 
fact, it is not surprising if Patrick, concerning the 
divinity, furthermore says, "for the believer, getting to 
know Yahweh is getting to know one's world in its totality. 
This is the one to whom we have entrusted our lives and 
from whom we seek guidance and encouragement. For the 
majority of us who read the Bible, this religious purpose 
is undoubtedly, primary. 11131 In contrast to Patrick's, our 
reading of God yields a knowledge that there is no sense of 
totality that we can grasp from the presentation of God. 
God may act beyond the boundary of consistency. The sense 
of identity that one may perceive in God is again and again 
to be challenged by its very oppositional image. Human 
beings who should live before God may, like Abraham, 
realise that instead of certainty, they have to face a life 
full of risk and danger of uncertainty. It is a life of 
pilgrimage that Abraham and his family should undergo and 
129AS Johnson has put it: "... Yahweh, though undoubtedly 
pictured in the form of a man, was nevertheless thought of as a Being 
of a different substance from the latter .... His control, differs from 
n1ankind as being of a more rarefied substance 'like fire'-in short, 
. ruakh 
or 'Spirit', a term which is reserved in the case of man (at 
least in the early period) to describe the more vigorous nunifestations 
of life on his part, especially such as might be attributed to the 
influence of the Godhead. " (my ermhases). Johnson, one and Many, 
pp. 14,15. 
130When his inner thought is disclosed, God my also feel sorry 
f or what he has done, he may real ise that he has done sm-ething wrong 
(Genesis 6: 6). It shows that God in the ongoing events my probably 
,, am 
to a radical change of view as well as identity (the following 
verse unveils a very different image of God in his relation with huTan 
being, he totally rejects the value of hunan being by blotting them out 
from reality). 
131Patrick, The Rendering, p. 45. 
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it is a God of pilgrimage that we could recognise from the 
story of the God of Abraham. The God of a wanderer seems to 
be a wandering God as well. 
The other thing that makes biblical God-language (Patrick's 
term) deny a closure is because it intermingles with other 
languages of other characters. The God-language must be 
understood as being in a dialogic relationship with other 
languages in the Bible. As Bakhtin says, "any two 
utterances, if juxtaposed on a semantic plane (not as 
things and not as linguistic examples), end up in a 
dialogic relationship. "132 The typical quality of this 
relationship is that it cannot be reduced "to the purely 
logical (even if dialectical) nor to the purely linguistic 
(compositional -syntactic). They are possible only between 
complete utterances of various speaking subjects ... 11133 
God-language is, therefore, highly -pragmatical, hardly 
universal. 
111.5. The dominant voice of the narrator but not the only -"voice#' 
The narrator of biblical narratives 
F, very narrative assumes the presence of a narrator that is 
"the agent which utters the linguistic signs whi ch 
constitute the text. "1.34 Since the narrator deals only with 
13 2 Bakhtin, "The Probl em, " p. 117. 
13 3 Bakhtin, "The Probl em, " p. 117. 
134Bal, Narratology, p. 120. 
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the linguistic signs of the text, it can and should be 
considered as a different body from that of the 
author/writer. The author of the Akedah, as commonly 
recognized in source criticism, is E (Elohist). 135 This 
person or group of people lived at a certain time and 
presumably wrote the Akedah. But, they are not at the same 
time the narrator of the Akedah. "An author may embody in a 
work ideas, beliefs, emotions other than or even quite 
opposed to those he has in real life; he may also embody 
different ideas, beliefs and emotions in different 
works. "136 The concern of our study is, however, the 
presentation of the discourse: how the discourse expresses 
its ideology through the narrator and what is it? 
"The narrator speaks with the authority of omniscience, " 
claims Sternberg. 137 The evidences which endorse the 
omniscience of the biblical narrator are given by Sternberg 
as follow: 
For one thing, the narrator has f ree access 
to the minds ("hearts") of his dramatis 
personae, not excluding God himself ("the 
Lord repented that he had made man on the 
earth and it grieved him to his heart. And 
the Lord said, I will blot out man" [Gen 
6: 6-71). For another, he enjoys free 
movement in time (among narrative past, 
present, and future) and in space (enabling 
him to follow secret conversations, shuttle 
between simultaneous happenings or between 
heaven and earth). These two establish an 
unlimited range of information to draw upon 
or, from the reader's side, a supernatural 
principle of coherence and intelligibility. 
For the narrative provides us with an 
assortment of plot-stuff that would normally 
13SIt is generally agreed that vv. 15-18 reflect i's style that 
was adopted by E later on. 
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be inaccessible. 138 
In this status the narrator places itself "above" or 
superior to the story it narrates. It may be compared with 
a kind of report that uses bird-eye angle of vision which 
provides a wider view. The omniscient narrator not only 
assumes a superior level to the story it narrates but it 
claims for a disentanglement from the story, neutrality 
with regard to the events and characters in the story it 
narrates. Rimmon-Kenan says, "it is precisely their (the 
narrators') absence from the story and their higher 
narratorial authority in relation to it that confers on 
such narrators the quality which has often been called 
vomniscience'. 11139 In relation with the readers, the 
omniscient narrator is to be regarded as the most reliable 
. source 
of knowledge. This would enable the narrator to 
manipulate the readers for the sake of the achievement of 
the story purpose. 
sternberg, furthermore, argues that the narratorial model 
taken by biblical narrative can be linked with a conception 
of God and the world. In comparison with other ancient 
literatures, the biblical God has an immeasurable knowledge 
while "the demigod Gilgamesh, all-seing and all-knowing, 
embarks on a quest for immortality". 140 The omniscient 
narrator in its freedom to weave in and out of minds, to be 
136Rimnon-Kenan, Narrative, P. 87. 
137Stemberg, Poetics, p. 85. 
130Stemberg, Poetics, p. 84. 
139Rimmon-Kenan, Narrative, p. 95. 
140Stemberg, Poetics, p. 89. 
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in several places at the same time depicts the omniscience 
of God himself. "The biblical narrator and God are not only 
analogues, nor does God's informational privilege only look 
far more impressive than the narrator's derivative or 
second-order authority. The very choice to devise an 
omniscient narrator serves the purpose of staging and 
glorifying an omniscient God. 111.41 The omniscient narrator 
is a technique that was presumably intentionally chosen to 
manifest the ideological awareness of an almighty God. 
sternberg's argument seems problematic. There hardly is any 
conspicuous link that can be seen between God and the 
narrator who practically live in separate worlds. We ought 
to, first of all, assume that God lives, in fact, as a 
(fictional) character in biblical narrative. He exists in 
the narrative world, takes part in the activities of other 
story characters and is bound within the network of 
relationships with them. On the other hand, the narrator 
works from outside and is absent from the story it 
narrates. Consequently, the narrator can claim that it is 
able to read God's covert mind that is inconspicuous for 
the story characters (eg. Gen. 18: 17-19) but never God read 
the narrator's mind. By its devices, including revealing or 
effacing God's judgments at the intended time, the narrator 
may lead the readers into thinking of God's superiority 
over human beings. God may unquestionably be seen as 
omnipotent in the narrative. But, the narrator cannot be 
like God or it does not seem overtly to play God as 
l4lStemberg, Poetics, p. 89. 
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Sternberg has argued. It cannot demonstrate its authority 
to the readers just like God presumably does to human 
beings in biblical narratives. Being omniscient does not 
necessarily make the narrator assume a divine-like role. 
such a prerogative of the narrator scarcely gains a place 
in the polysemiotic nature of biblical narrative. 
omniscience is, after all, a narratological term that is 
used to identify the characteristics of an extradiegetic 
(superior to the story) and, at the same time, 
heterodiegetic (outside the story) narrator. The term 
itself is, as Rimmon-Kenan rightly thinks, "perhaps an 
exaggerated term". 142 
The omniscient narrator is still a narrator which at some 
level may become unreliable that is when its utterances 
turn out to be unconvincing or even contradictory. 14 3 
Rimmon-Kenan detects "one of the potential sources of 
unreliability is the colouring of the narrator's account by 
a questionable value-scheme. A narrator's moral values are 
considered questionable if they do not tally with those of 
the implied author of the given work. "144 She, furthermore, 
explains: 
Various factors in the text may indicate a 
gap between the norms of the implied author 
and those of the narrator: when the facts 
contradict the narrator's views, the latter 
142Rinmn-Kenan, Narrative, p. 95. 
143 Sternberg would hardly agree to this claim. 
144In proposing a notion that distinguishs the implied author 
frcm the narrator Rimmon-Kenan quotes Chatman who argues: "unlike the 
narrator, the implied author can tell us nothing. He, or better, it 
has no voice, no direct mans of cornnunicating. It instructs us 
silently, through the design of the whole, with all the voices, by all 
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is judged to be unreliable (but how does one 
establish the 'real facts' behind the 
narrator's back? ); when the outcome of the 
action proves the narrator wrong, a doubt is 
retrospectively cast over his reliability in 
reporting earlier events; when the views of 
other characters consistently clash with the 
narrator's, suspicion may arise, in the 
reader's mind; and when the narrator's 
language contains internal contradictions, 
double-edged images, and the like, it may 
have a boomerang effect, undermining the 
reliability of its user. 145 
Nonetheless, it is not always easy to pin down the 
unreliability of the narrator particularly in the text that 
offers manifold meanings. "Many texts make it difficult to 
decide whether the narrator is reliable or unreliable, and 
if unreliable-to what extent. Some texts-which may be 
called ambiguous narratives- make such a decision 
impossible, putting the reader in a position of constant 
oscillation between mutually exclusive alternatives. 
"14 6 
The alternatives are perhaps formed by the narrator's 
reports of an event from various' points of view or by 
characters' thoughts different from the narrator's point of 
view. Here, instead of judging the differing views on the 
basis of their reliability, each of them can be accepted as 
representing one way of looking things among many other 
ways. 
A biblical narrative such as the Akedah is one of the texts 
that Puts the readers in a position of constant oscillation 
between mutually exclusive alternatives. It is a text in 
the rreans it has chosen to let us learn. " Seymour Chatman, Story and 
Discourse, 1978, p. 87. 
145Rimnon-Kenan, Narrative, P. 101. 
146Rim-non-Kenan, Narrative, p. 103. 
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which what is said by 
the only, alternative, 
narrator which remains 
be taken as another 
obviously equally imp, 
story. 
the narrator should be heard not as 
because what is not said by the 
as a possible "fact", could probably 
perception of the event and is 
: )rtant for the understanding of the 
The voice of the Akedah's narrator 
our first and most important encounter with the Akedah's 
narrator is through this declaration: 
Af ter these things God tested Abraham, and 
said to him, "Abraham! " And he said, "Here 
am I. " (waythi 'ahar hadobharim ha'elleh 
weha'elohim nissah "eth-'abhraham wayyo'mer 
relayw 'abhraham wayyo'mer hinneni) 
(Gen. 22: 1). 
According to the narrator, the following episode is a 
divine test of Abraham. It becomes clear that, as 
Westermann rightly explains, the word nissah describes "the 
testing by God as a subsequent interpretation of an event, 
not the event itself. " The interpreter is the narrator who 
"was responsible for the title (i. e. nissah) intended the 
event to serve as a model : the suf f ering of a person is 
presented as a testing by God. "147 A suffering of people 
that is understood as a divine test is quite a common theme 
in the narratives concerning the Exodus: Ex. 15: 25,16: 4; 
Deut. 8: 2ff. The hardship undergone by Israel in the 
147Westennarm, Genesis, p. 356. 
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wilderness in the journey out of Egypt is reflected as a 
testing by God, to prove the loyalty of the people. It is 
this kind of reflection that may well be presupposed by the 
Akedah. The demand to sacrifice Isaac is seen as a test in 
which Abraham is to show his obedience. With regard to this 
event, the faith of the succeeding generations is hoped to 
be strengthened by recalling Abraham's obedience. The focus 
of the narrative, therefore, is on Abraham's obedience. 
But, as von Rad says, "for Abraham the command that was 
directed to him was deadly serious ... For Abraham, God's 
command is completely incomprehensible: the child, given by 
God after long delay, the only link that can lead to the 
promised greatness of Abraham's seed (ch. 15.4f. ) is to be 
given back to God in sacrifice ... Because the entire 
previous, suspense-filled Yahwistic story of Isaac's birth 
(chs. 12.1ff.; 16.1ff.; 18.1ff. ) precedes our narrative 
(through the final reaction of the sources), God's demand 
becomes even more monstrous. 11148 The way Abraham would have 
perceived the command that is different from the narrator's 
point of view makes the story a combination of "twofold 
viewpoint" (von Rad's term). Looking from the narrator's 
viewpoint it is a divine test addressed to Abraham, but 
from Abraham's perspective it is merely a sacrifice. 
There are probably two achievements intended by the 
narrative in stating God to be the source of the 
sacrificial command. Firstly, as stated by R. Davidson, 
"lest there be any doubt that it is God's doing, the word 
14 8 Von Rad, Genesis, P. 234. 
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God occurs in the emphatic position at the beginning of 
the 
sentence, as if to say 'It was God who ... 
111.1.49 This 
statement may assume that the sacrifice 
does not originate 
with Abraham who, as a human being, might have expressed 
his own desire. Since it is a divine command, there should 
not be any doubt about its truth. 150 In the meantime von 
Rad notes the second effect of such an attribution, "the 
story concerns a temptation given by God, a 
demand which 
God-did not intend to take seriously. " (my emphasis)151 The 
logic of von Rad's argument can possibly be traced in the 
direction taken by the narrator which to von Rad is 
unlikely to describe God as really demanding a 
human 
sacrifice. Scholars (historical critics) tend 
to 
distinguish the present form of the narrative from the 
supposedly older element that can, however, still 
be 
perceived in the present form. In the older form, 
the 
divine sacrificial demand had not yet borne any other 
Inotives than itself. As Nahum Sarna says, 
"we cannot evade 
the fact that the core of the narrative actually seems to 
assume the possibility that God could demand human 
sacrifice". 152 However, it is generally agreed that in the 
present form the narrative possesses a didactic motive that 
149R. Davidson, Genesis 12-50,1979, p. 95. 
150The effphasis made by Davidson, and before him von Rad, on God 
as the subject of the den-and of the sacrifice may be directed to 
confront, as well as pointing out the unusual Hebrew syntax of v. 1, the 
rational argument (such as made by Kant) that denies the legitimacy of 
the sacrifice as a divine cannand. For Kant's cammts, see D. Pailin, 
"A Hermeneutical Problem Before Kierkegaard" in R. L. Perkin, ed., 
yjarkegaard's Fear and Trembling: Critical Appraisals, 1981, p. 32. 
15IVon Rad, Genesis, p. 239. Just like watching a horror film in 
the cinem while reTaTbering that it is not real, the meaning of the 
word test seems to diminish the horror of the sacrifice. 
152Nahu, n Sarna, Understanding Genesis, 1970, p. 157. 
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by seeing that: "God tests Abraham through his demand of 
the sacrifice of Isaac and Abraham shows his obedience" one 
may learn how to live in obedience to God. Looking at this 
"testing-obedience" motive in particular, von Rad comes to 
a conclusion that several other stories besides the Akedah 
also contain the same motive. 153 "The report about God's 
promise and conduct of Abraham from Mesopotamia 
(chs. 12. lff. 9,15.1ff. ) contained a temptation motif. The 
outbreak of famine must also be understood as a 
test ..... the visit of the three heavenly beings was a test 
for Abraham... 111.54 In von Rad's view, therefore, the life 
of Abraham amounts to a series of tests where the Patriarch 
has to show his faithfulness to God. 
If this is true, one must, however, make an exception of 
Gen. 22, asývon Rad himself eventually admits, "what is here 
new, however, is the-programmatic appearance of the idea of 
testing in the very verse of the story as well as its 
destructive harshness. "155 While von Rad can only infer the 
temptation motive from the presentation of other Abraham's 
stories, Gen. 22 obviously discloses the word nissah, at the 
very beginning of the discourse. Such a rendering may 
indicate nothing but an attempt to guard the understanding 
of the story in accordance with the testing pattern. And if 
we accept the scholars' interpretation of test as something 
that is not intended to' be real, only to prove Abraham's 
153Ten-ptation is von Rad's term that refers to "a pedagogical 
test which God permits men to endure in order to probe their f aith and 
faithfulness". Von Rad, Genesis, p. 239. 
15 4 Von Rad, Genesis, p. 239. 
15 5 Von Rad, Genesis, p. 239. 
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obedience, then we should bear this in mind from the very 
beginning and throughout the story. Nonetheless, von Rad 
also mentions that the Akedah is notorious for its 
destructive harshness. It in itself is contradictory of the 
supposed meaning of test. The sacrifice of Isaac can be 
real. This destructive element cannot, after all, only be 
subordinated for the sake of the testing-obedience motive. 
The distinction usually made by historical critics between 
the older (the true sacrifice) and the present (the 
testing-obedience) element is hardly acceptable as such 
since the narrative still projects both elements equally. 
This could bring in the problem of the subjectivity of the 
narrator besides the fact that the biblical narrator is an 
omniscient narrator that is supposed to stand in the 
neutral position. The subjectivity becomes apparent when we 
realise that its interpretation does not seem to represent 
the entire reality of the story. The concept of nissah as 
such may not fairly be understood by all characters. God 
may possibly view the event from the same point of view as 
the narrator's although it is by, no means certain. He could 
understand his demand of sacrifice as a testing for 
Abraham-156 Nevertheless, the case is far from true for 
Abraham. As we have seen through some commentaries, Abraham 
156Presumably those cannentators we mentioned above would not 
hesitate to argue that God's point of view is just the same as the 
narrator's in that they see the event as a testing for Abraham. But, 
the narrator's utterance should not be accepted automatically as 
equally reflecting God's mind. God may not understand the sacrifice as 
a testing as such but a pure demnd of Isaac's death. It should remain 
as a possibility throughout the story with regard to the ca-nPlete 
absence of any information about God's motive. 
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would never realise that the demand of sacrifice is only a 
test for him (that the actual sacrifice would not be 
happened). When he sacrifices Isaac the consideration of 
getting any reward f rom God by so doing may not come into 
his mind. That Abraham reckons the sacrifice of Isaac as an 
end in itself rather than as a means of expressing his 
obedience is obvious in the story. So, there seems to be a 
discrepancy between the narrator's utterance and the way 
the character focalizes his own circumstance. It proves 
that although nissah arises as the narrator's explanation 
of the story, it does not wholly represent what actually 
happens in the story, that is, how the characters perceive 
things from their own point of views. Despite the 
understanding that the sacrifice cannot have happened, the 
Akedah also projects the opposite view that Abraham can 
actually kill Isaac just as commanded by God. 
Another explanation of nissah is made not in relation to 
the meaning of the word but the structure of the story. 
Westermann, for instance, considers that the whole text, 
except vv. 15-18, shows one apparent objective, "at every 
stage and with every sentence the narrator has his goal in 
view: to tell a story about the testing of Abraham. " There 
are three elements of test that are seen by Westermann in 
Gen. 22: "in the first part (vv. lb-2) a task is laid on the 
one being tested; in the second (vv. 3-10) Abraham carries 
it out, but only as far as the penultimate act; in the 
third part, the structure of the test is modified in that 
the last act is taken out of Abraham's hands. The command 
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to kill the child, implied in the command to sacrifice, is 
revoked (vv. 11-12a), and Abraham is told at the same time 
that he has passed the test (v. 12b)". 157 Thus in 
Westermann's view the text does not only reveal the word 
nissah as a heading of the story but also reflects a 
testing motif in the development of its plot. The test is 
ended with Abraham being passed because he acts according 
to the divine command to kill his son. Although Isaac 
presumably escapes the actual sacrifice,. Abraham can be 
seen, especially in the light of the divine utterance 
(v. 12), to have passed the test. The goal of the narrator, 
that is, "to tell a story about the testing of Abraham", 
therefore, has reached a point of achievement.. To perceive 
the testing motif, however, one has apparently to follow 
Westermann's strategy of reading which he imposes on the 
text, without which we simply cannot see such a sequential 
development of the test. 
G. W. Coats, viewing the Akedah as a story of Abraham's 
obedience rather than a test, comes to a similar assumption 
as that of Westermann about the structure of the story that 
puts a stress on Abraham's deeds. He says, "structure 
within the unit thus emphasizes Abraham's action in 
relationship to his son as obedience to God's command. "158 
coats, however, seems to deliberately underscore the 
presence of Isaac, which makes Abraham's acts in response 
to God's command less individual. Isaac has to be taken 
157Westermann, Genesis, p. 355. 
1-58G. W. Coats, Genesis: With an Introduction to Narrative 
Literature, 1983, p. 158. 
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into account even though "the subject of the narration is 
limited to a depiction of Abraham's faith. " Coats, 
moreover, maintains that the narrative inevitably 
introduces a threat to Isaac's life besides the virtue of 
Abraham. Whenever the threat of Isaac's life is felt 
(e. g. vv. 9,10) then the projection of Abraham's obedience 
becomes eclipsed. "Just at this point in the plot a problem 
in the structure of the story appears. The foreshadowing 
device suggests that the scope of the story encompasses 
Abraham's near sacrifice of Isaac (vv. 11-14). The point of 
tension in the story is now only the threat to Isaac's 
life. Obedience to the command is no longer at issue, for 
Abraham has already demonstrated that he would obey the 
command without a moment's hesitation. "159 For Coats, the 
presence of maPak Yahweh to cancel the sacrifice is 
necessary to prevent the killing of Isaac, which becomes a 
real problem as Abraham remains loyal to the first command 
to the last minute. 160 Coats seemingly considers the 
importance of the second divine emergence as primarily to 
save Isaac's , life rather than to reward Abraham's 
obedience. Unlike Coats, Westermann would argue that the 
importance of maPak, Yahweh's appearance does not chiefly 
lie in the fact that Isaac has been saved by it but rather 
to show that Abraham has passed the test, his obedience to 
c; od is, thus, confirmed. The highlight that Coats has made 
of the threat to Isaac's life urges us to think that 
Abraham may not be the only focus of the narrative, though, 
surely the dominant one. Coats himself, rather undermining 
15 9 Coats, ibid. , p. 160. 
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his own proposition, concedes that "this point (the threat 
of Isaac) belongs to the older tradition" which was 
presumably embedded to flesh out the story of Abraham's 
obedience. 160 However, even in the present context this 
supposedly embedded story should be seen as remaining 
indispensable. At the same time as looking at Abraham's 
obedience, the threat to Isaac's life should be equally 
taken into consideration. But then, how should we take into 
account the threat to Isaac's life in connection with the 
divine command and Abraham's obedience? 
A study made by Hugh C-White reveals that the demand for 
Isaac's sacrifice is to be seen in relation to the dilemma 
of promise (of descendants) in which Abraham, through the 
test, is brought to find the resolution. 161 The dilemma is 
this: "even though theýchild is a miraculous fulfillment of 
a divine promise, as the previous narrative has made clear, 
when the object of desire contained in the promise takes on 
material form in the fulfillment, the bond of faith between 
the promisor and the promisee is superseded by the relation 
which unites the recipient with the promised object. 11162 In 
the realisation of the promise, the object of the affection 
of the recipient (Abraham) might shift from the giver 
(God), on whom the recipient was dependent before, to the 
160A general tendency of historic critics to surrrdse differing 
story elements as coming frm various time seerm to prevent thern from 
appreciating the polyserny of biblical narrative- a story with 
rnultifaceted phena-nena rather than a cm-pilation of several unrelated 
stories frcm different tiffes. 
161Hugh C. White, Narration and Discourse in the Book of Genesis, 
1991, pp. 187-203. 
162White, ibid., p. 190. 
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material fulfillment of the promise (Isaac), in whom the 
future of the recipient becomes concrete. However, the 
Patriarch is destined to a kind of promissory life which 
does not allow for such a shift really taking place. 
Abraham has to always live under God's promises. "This 
dilemma is avoided so long as the fulfillment is delayed, 
but it cannot be delayed indefinitely if the promise is to 
remain credible. 1'163 
The other solution to this dilemma is by abandoning the 
fulfillment (Isaac), so that God may be restored as the 
promisor and Abraham as the promisee. This possibility is 
alluded to in the Akedah. The presence of Isaac, according 
to White, creates for Abraham a psychological illusion: 
"that continuity into the future would be secured by 
natural succession apart from the word of promise and 
faith. "164 The death of Isaac through the sacrifice 
represents the end of the illusion that the future can be 
such humanly arranged. But if Isaac is really to die, the 
trust in divine promise prior to the existence of Isaac 
would become meaningless. More than that, the sacrifice of 
Isaac would destroy the continuation of Abraham's clan (as 
well as the innocent life of the son itself). in fact, the 
narrative introduces the intervention of maPak Yahweh at 
the last moment to cancel the sacrifice. Isaac is, 
therefore, reprieved. "The interruption of the sacrifice 
reaffirms the place of natural succession within the future 
163White, ibid., p. 190. 
164White, ibid., p. 196. 
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of promissory faith, divorced from imaginary fantasies. "165 
While the sacrifice Isaac is accepted (vv. 12,16) which 
amounts to the death of the son (symbolically), he can be 
received back by Abraham in real forms- an unnatural state 
of affairs which can only take place in narrated actions 
and not in real life (outside the text). Gen. 22 spans the 
time when the demand of the sacrifice of Isaac is revealed 
to the time when the interruption of the sacrifice is 
declared. In between, Abraham gradually arrives at a new 
realisation where, despite the existence of Isaac, God is 
still his promisor and he is the promisee, their 
relationship is determined by promise and faith. The 
contradictory phenomena of the divine demands for the 
sacrifice and the interruption can be explained as this: 
while the sacrifice has an impact in adjourning the 
continuation of Abraham's family at the level of 
imagination- Abraham is brought back to the situation where 
he should spiritually depend on God for -the future of his 
family- the interruption preserves it at the level of a 
physical, generational succession of the family. 
As a matter of fact, Isaac is not only the object of the 
divine test for -his father. He, especially through his 
question about the sacrificial animal, is actively 
experiencing the promissory life which, by the process of 
his sacrifice and the interruption, is uniquely transmitted 
to him from his father. According to White, "the function 
of this (Isaac's) question is to break open the closed 
165White, ibid., p. 196. 
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logic of this plot in progress, and expose it to a new 
reality, the lively awareness of the innocent son who will 
not go along with this plot in total, unthinking silence. " 
When Isaac has experienced his father's experience, he 
becomes mature, the time when he has to be independent from 
his father. The disappearance of Isaac from Abraham's 
journey to Beersheba is deemed by White as the indication 
that 'Isaac has reached a state of independence and 
adulthood. 166 For White, generational succession in the 
history of promise is the more important symbol that Gen. 22 
produces. "The event on the mount, though a test for 
Abraham, was equally or perhaps more important for the 
narrative as the spiritual and theological basis for the 
transition to the second generation in the history of the 
promise. 11167 
White shows us the logic that supposedly drives the 
development of the plot in Gen. 22. Nevertheless, there 
remains a. problem concerning Isaac's understanding of "the 
spiritual and theological basis" of the generational 
transition. As White himself makes it clear that Isaac's 
question (v. 7) cannot be answered without jeopardizing the 
completion of the closed plot about the test of Abraham. 
oif his question is answered the covert plot which focuses 
upon this test of Abraham's faith will be revealed, and the 
closed structure of the narrative broken open. "168 
Abraham's subsequent reply to this question (v. 8) is seen 
166White, ibid., p. 203. 
167White, ibid., p. 203 
168White, ibid., p. 194. 
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by White as an attempt to deflect the attention onto God 
while hiding the truth. Thus, Isaac's question remains 
unanswerable. Abraham does not tell him that he is actually 
the intended sacrificial victim. Abraham's evasive answer 
hampers Isaac's way in realising the command of God as well 
as Abraham's response to it. Even when his sacrifice takes 
place, Isaac, who has been uninformed, may not be aware 
that Abraham is just obeying God's command. In the end, as 
Abraham renews his awareness of God, Isaac might still 
understand nothing of his father's faith in God. In other 
words, as against White, Isaac may never recognise "the 
spiritual and theological basis" of the whole event. His 
father's knowledge, through which he is supposed to realise 
God's involvement in the sacrifice, is never obvious to 
him. 
11owever, there is no doubt that "the question of Isaac 
defamiliarizes the conspiratorial plot of God and Abraham 
against him. "169 -only that the defamiliarization is more 
likely to be felt by God and Abraham alone rather than 
Isaac whose question merely represents a logical curiosity 
about the omission in the preparation of the sacrifice. 
indeed, the innocent question from the innocent son is 
threatening enough to uncover the evasiveness of Abraham 
and at the same time, the disguised test of God of Abraham. 
in response to this threat, the narrative is silent, no 
Inore discussion about the animal victim is revealed. Isaac 
is to believe in Abraham's prediction that the animal will 
169White, ibid., p. 194. 
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be provided by God (v. 8). This prediction itself is 
actually strange enough to come from Abraham's mouth since 
he himself, in the light of previous stories, would 
doubtfully hold on it. 170 Despite Abraham's prediction, the 
question: "where is the lamb for a burnt offering? " will 
never cease to demand a genuine answer so long as Isaac is 
never told that he is the sacrificial ViCtiM. 171 The closer 
the actualization of Isaac's sacrifice the louder the echo 
of Isaac's question is. The question may probably function 
as a warning that Isaac is not an animal for a burnt 
offering and the animal for a burnt offering is not Isaac. 
The animal should have been provided by God himself (v. 8). 
In the meantime, the later sacrifice of the ram (v. 13) 
should be thought, following the text, as a substitution 
(tahath) for Isaac. The text does not seem to link it with 
Abraham's earlier prediction or the question of Isaac, it 
is disclosed rather as a subsequent improvisation from 
Abraham. Isaac is still the intended target of the 
sacrifice, consequently his question still pleads for an 
answer, that once it is given the whole masquerade of 
Abraham as well as of God would begin to unravel. Instead 
of unfolding the answer, however, the narrative ends with 
Isaac disappearing from Abraham's journey back to Beersheba 
(V. 19). 
17OAbraham is not a figure who is likely to believe more in 
n-dracle than in his own plan. He disguises Sarai as his sister, rather 
than waiting for a miracle, to escape from mortal danger in Pharaoh's 
land (ch. 12). But, he laughs at the possibility (miracle) that he and 
Sarah, as an old man and woman, could be able to have a son (ch. 17). 17 1 We my f ind an anal ogy of the echo in the hol 1 ow voices, in a 
horror film, that haunt the audiences. 
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Isaac's question added by his absence represents the 
element of "otherness", the opposite voice of the closed 
plot of the divine test of Abraham's faith. It may not only 
defamiliarize the conspiratorial plot of God and Abraham 
but is also deconstructive of it. Yes, we may read a nissah 
in which the story ends up with Abraham being rewarded by 
the divinity (vv. 12,15-18), but we are also made aware of a 
"scandal" which is signaled by the unanswered question of 
Isaac and his absence later on. The innocent question of 
"where is the lamb for a burnt offering? " always threatens 
to break up the secrecy of God's plan to test Abraham as 
well as the sacrifice itself. And the abandonment of the 
real answer may create disquieted reactions from the 
readers who cannot stand the suppression. The wonder of 
"where is Isaac? " in the end of the discourse leaves a 
dreadful trace of memory of the event- that Isaac may 
possibly have been killed! At the same time the question 
creates uneasiness about the test itself, "must a test of 
faith employ human sacrifice as its means? ". Thus, Gen. 22 
does not hide, even somewhat deliberately poses, the 
problem of the abandonment of the existence of the innocent 
son. Isaac's question remains unanswerable and even a 
knowledge of his fate is finally omitted. In this case, the 
Akedah does not offer a denouement, an end where everything 
comes out right or is explained. On the contrary, its 
phenomenon oscillates between Abraham's supreme obedience 
to God and the tragic fate of Isaac. 
ivissah, therefore, does not represent the whole phenomenon 
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in the narrative since it does not apparently refer to the 
tragedy experienced by the innocent son. or else, we should 
not understand nissah itself as indicating something that 
is not intended to be real, nissah is still open to the 
possibility that Isaac may end up being the sacrificial 
ViCtiM. 172 Reading Gen. 22 should take into account equally 
what is said by the narrator (Abraham's obedience) as well 
as what is not said by it (Isaac's real sacrifice). 173 
"What is actually said in Genesis 22 is given life, 
radiation, and impact only by what is unsaid and by the 
unsayable... "174 
172The tem nissah itself my refer "to a type of judicial 
procedure which aim at extracting evidence concerning that which is 
hidden in the interior of mn, in the hurnan heart, as opposed to visual 
procedures of investigation which collect external infornntion, " which, 
however, does not negate the inclusion of deadly mans. H. C. White, "The 
Legends of Isaac, " ZAW, 91(1979), p. 13. 
173 See Carroll, "Discarbobulations, " pp. 75,76. 
17 4 J. Fokkeln-an, "on the Mount of the Lord There is Vision7' in 
Signs and Wonders: Biblical Texts in Literary Focus, ed. J. Cheryl Exu*n, 
1999, p. 44. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE SACRIFICIAla EII&EMENTS IN THE AKEDZUl 
Violence is the heart and secret soul of the 
sacred. 
Rene Girard, Violence 
IV. 1. Human sacrifice in the Bible 
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The Akedah is one of the biblical - accounts that contain a 
divine command for human (infant) sacrifice. The other 
passages are Exodus 22: 29-30 and 13: 1-2 which declare the 
ordinances that are given by Yahweh to Israel by Moses, 
among them are the offering of the first harvest, the 
firstborn of animals and people. The setting of those 
ordinances is post-Exodus, during the wanderings in the 
desert. Yahweh gives the ordinances that are expected to be 
a response from the people to what Yahweh had done. By 
performing the ordinances, Israel acknowledge the work of 
Yahweh who had delivered them from the bondage of Egypt. As 
a matter of fact, the sacrifice of the firstborn sons is 
specifically intended as a remembrance- when another 
generation inquire the meaning of the practice- of the last 
pestilence in the night before Israel went out from Egypt 
when Yahweh slew all the firstborn in the land, both the 
firstborn of man and cattle (13: 14-16). Ironically, by 
(jiving the command to sacrifice the firstborn, Yahweh does 
riot only strike the life of Egyptian children as a coercion 
of Pharaoh to release Israel but demands the firstborn of 
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Israel, the nation that has been released, too. It is all 
too difficult to be understood if in a thanksgiving a child 
and not an animal is to be sacrificed as a symbolic act. In 
the context of chapter 13, the law is followed by the law 
of the redemption of the asses and sons (vv. 11-16). 
However, while the asses are to be redeemed by lambs it is 
not clear as to what may redeem the sons (see also 
Ex. 34: 20). The lack of clarity may indicate that there was 
no general agreement about the redemption. The redemption 
of human victims was apparently uncommon. What was common 
was the sacrifice of the firstborn itself. The practice 
which becomes more and more controversial and that leads to 
its abolition in later times. In Numbers 3: 40ff., the 
Levites are taken instead of the firstborn of the people of 
Israel. But, in this context, the offering is not to be 
understood literally that the Levites were actually 
sacrificed. This phrase is intended to indicate the 
peculiar status of the Levites themselves as the divinely 
chosen tribe among other tribes of Israel who conduct the 
religious activity of the nation. Furthermore, no detail is 
given, in the Exodus text, about the parents who will not 
redeem their children. On the other hand, if one will not 
redeem the asses, probably because he wants to retain the 
value of the asses' offering, one may simply break the 
necks of the asses. The law does not seem to suggest the 
same method is to be applied for the unredeemed sons. Since 
the laws that surround the redemption of the firstborn sons 
are not well expressed, we may suppose that they 
represented an alternative ideology (probably of the 
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Deuteronomists) to the ideology that agrees to the 
sacrifice. The demand for redeeming the firstborn sons was 
later on inserted in the text, probably in order to justify 
the substitution of the rule of sacrifice. Apart from such 
an attempt, the-command for the sacrifice of the firstborn 
itself is hardly ruled out in this text. 
The Deuteronomistic ideology that assumes infant sacrifice 
to be abominable, unauthorised by Yahweh (Lev. 18: 21,20: 2- 
5, Deut. 12: 31, I Kings 16: 29-34,11 Kings 16: 1-4,17: 31, 
21: 1-9, Jer. 7: 31) seems to give virtually no chance to a 
fair description of how Yahweh's command to sacrifice the 
firstborn is enacted by Israel. What appears is the 
practice of infant sacrifice to other gods: Baal and Holech 
as if there is not such a practice devoted to Yahweh. The 
practice is utterly condemned in Israel. There is only a 
harsh accusation of the people, who practise it. It is in 
Ahab's time that the text places the rebuilding of Jericho 
by Hiel of Bethel (I Kings 16: 34). The city is rebuilt 
"according to the word of Yahweh, which he spoke by Joshua 
the son of Nun" which in its own right seems to underline 
the legitimacy of the building project. But we remember 
that the rebuilding of this town itself has been cursed by 
Joshua (Josh. 6: 26). The curse, which is likely to come from 
a later tradition than I Kings 16, is closely linked with 
the fact that the process of rebuilding the town is stained 
by sacrifices of the first and the youngest sons of the 
builder. Hiel rebuilds Jericho at the cost of Abiram, his 
firstborn and his youngest son, Segub. It may indicate the 
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practice of foundation sacrifice which is commonly 
intended 
to bring good luck to the building project. Although Ahab 
worships Baal, it is not clear to whom Hiel offers his 
sons. Despite the enormous sacrifices by Hiel, the city 
remains to be seen as under the curse which is also bound 
up with the f igure of Ahab as a bad king. Never mind the 
actual aim of the infant sacrifices, the rebuilding of the 
city, from the Deuteronomistic point of view, is just as 
abominable as Ahab's behaviour. obviously the report of the 
rebuilding of Jericho in the context of the account about 
Ahab itself is already tendentious in terms of "nothing 
good would emerge in the reign of this wicked king". The 
sacrifice of Hiel's sons is, therefore, never depicted as 
anything but abominable. It may be that, despite the 
Deuteronomists' anti-Ahab report, Hiel did actually offer 
his sons to Yahweh, although his Yahweh was probably 
different from the Yahweh of the Deuteronomists. 1 This 
should be open as a possibility and as Bruce Vawter sees, 
"both in Israel's laws and in the words of its prophets and 
historians human sacrifice is excoriated as a heathen 
abomination, but the same sources leave us no doubt that it 
was often practised by Israelites all the same, and that it 
was something regarded by these people as compatible with 
I Concerning the polytheistic cult of Israel in the pre-exilic 
tines, Morton Smith teaches us that "to consider 'the religion of 
Israel' as a unique entity my be rnisleading .... the predaininant cult 
was that of Yahweh and he was recognized to be 'the god' of Israel, as 
opposed to the gods of the neighbouring peoples. But the cults of the 
other gods of the cam-non religion of the Near East were not neglected 
(by Israel). These other gods were worshipped not only at altars and 
high places dedicated to them but also, together with Yahweh, in the 
teaples of the mjor cities". Palestinian Parties and Politics that 
, 5haped 
the, old Testawnt, c. 1971, p. 21. 
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the worship of Yahweh". 2 
In spite of the opposition campaign by the Deuteronomists, 
Micah 6: 7 puts the sacrifice of the firstborn at the top of 
the list of the ways one should come before God. It can 
ultimately be emulated only by doing justice, loving 
kindness and walking humbly with God which are things 
understood as required by God himself (Mi. 6: 8). Infant 
sacrifice is not directly criticised or, even, ruled out 
here, except that its value is regarded as superficial, 
therefore, it cannot be better than the real deeds. At any 
rate, it indicates that human sacrifice was ever accepted 
as the way to worship God until the emergence of an 
ideology which favoured real deeds was understood as the 
highest religious expression. 
Another biblical account that indicates infant sacrifice as 
God's command is Ezekiel 20: 25,26 which mentions that God 
gave his people statutes that were not qoo and ordinances 
by which they could not have life. And God defiled them 
through their very gifts in making them offer by fire all 
their firstborn in order to horrify them. Far from having a 
resentment against human sacrifice (Deut. 12: 31), God seemed 
untroubled in employing it as a method to make his people 
horrified. It was in fact aimed, ironically though it may 
be, to lead the people to know that "I am Yahweh". Knowing 
Yahweh meant for the people that they have to face the 
horrifying experience, the death of their own children. We 
2B. Vawter, On Genesis: A new Reading, 1977, pp. 255-6. 
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do not know what was the reaction of the people against the 
command and the practice; would they be really horrified 
and bowed down in f ront of Yahweh or just run away f rom 
him? However, we may know through this statement that 
Yahweh could use this way, that was simply condemned by the 
Deuteronomists, to "approach" his people. It is apparently 
the same way that is used in the Akedah as Abraham is made 
to sacrifice his "only" and "firstborn" son by the 
divinity. On a deeper level, however, we may come to the 
awareness that in the belief in Yahweh the people are 
brought closer to him through the horrifying experience 
providing they have courage and compassion to live as such. 
In fact, it is in the light of those passages about God's 
demand for hdman sacrifice, that the Akedah is to be 
understood. It is possible that God demands human sacrifice 
and it is not inconceivable that in response, Abraham may 
indeed sacrifice Isaac since he is an obedient man. This 
can be described as an obedience to conduct a tragic life 
with no apparent hope of a comic end. The statement 
declared by the messenger of Yahweh in his second 
appearance may underscore the sacrifice. He says, "because 
you have done this, and have not withheld your son, your 
only son" (ki yaan #aXer 'asitha 'eth-hadabhar hazeh welo' 
hasakhta 'et-binekha 'eth-yehidekha) (Gen. 22: 16). Because 
Abraham sticks only to the divine command, he is justified. 
How far Abraham is horrified by the command, as Ezekiel 
might put it, and brought to know God by it, is by no means 
apparent, but surely he has undergone what we see, in 
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agreement with Ezekiel, as the most horrifying experience. 
As against the assumption that the Akedah shares similarity 
with many stories, inside or outside the Bible, about human 
sacrifice, scholars commonly take an evolutionary viewpoint 
in which human sacrifice is thought to be a primordial 
custom, primitive and barbaric, and was modified only with 
the advance of civilization. In the present form, as they 
say, the Akedah is put within the context of nissah and 
either the sacrifice is polemicized or pushed into the 
background while the substitutionary sacrifice surfaces, at 
any rate "God did not mean it". 3 However, in contrast to 
that interpretation Nahum Sarna points out, "we cannot 
evade the- fact that the core of the narrative actually 
seems to assume the possibility that God could demand human 
sacrifice. It contains no categorical divine repudiation of 
the practice as such, and the replacement of Isaac by the 
ram is not the result of a command by God, but an exercise 
of Abraham's own initiative. The situation is far more 
complicated than appears on the surface. -"4 
Still in devotion to God, although not directly commanded 
by him, Jephthah sacrifices his only daughter (judges 11). 
on the eve of a war against the Ammonites, - iephthah, then 
known as the leader of Israel, made a vow to Yahweh that 
whoever (or whatever) came forth from the doors of his 
3Such an evolutionary assumption seems problematic in itself, 
since to prove that the original f onn of the Akedah was a hunan 
sacrifice story, scholars always have to depend on the evidences from 
the biblical account. So, at any rate, scholars can perceive the huTan 
sacrifice motive in the present version. 
4N. Sama, Understanding Genesis, 1970, p. 157. 
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house to meet him when he returned victorious from the 
Ammonites, would be offered as a burnt offering. Jephthah 
referred to the would-be victim in the third person 
masculine, "I will offer himlit up as a burnt offering" 
(v. 31). Whereas the narrator, in fact, tells us that 
Jephthah has only one daughter who lives with him (v. 34), 
who, of course, could not be referred as himlit. It is not 
clear as to what is intended by Jephthah as the victim in 
his VOW. A Jewish legend has God infuriated by Jephthah's 
indefinite vow, "so Jephthah has vowed to offer unto me the 
first thing that shall meet him! If a dog were the first to 
meet him, would a dog be sacrificed to me? Now shall the 
vow of iephthah be visited on his first born, on his own 
offspring, Yea, his prayer shall be visited on his only 
daughter. But I assuredly shall deliver my people, not for 
iephthah's sake, but for the sake of the prayers of 
israel". 5 The same legend also indicates that Jephthah did 
not mean his daughter to be the sacrificial victim. It is 
only after some debates that Jephthah could have his 
daughter agreed to be sacrificed. To expect an animal to 
come out from his house to meet (to welcome, to 
congratulate? ) him would seem absurd since we would hardly 
find such a clever animal (except if he kept a trained dog 
of which we are never informed). Another possibility of the 
would-be victim is one of Jephthah's male slaves or 
prisoners. Jephthah was a tough man, he smote his enemies, 
twenty cities, "with a very great slaughter". His powerful 
performance makes us wonder if it was necessary at all for 
5Louis Ginzberg, The Legends of the Jews, vol. IV, 1954, p-43. 
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him to make the vow that only proved a serious need of 
divine assistance on the awareness of his own weakness. He 
eventually implements his vow and his victim turns out 
to 
be his only daughter, a virgin, innocený as well as 
compliant, an Isaac-like figure as in the Akedah. The 
father is most persistent in his vow, the daughter is to 
submit her life to -her father's will. The story ends with 
the sacrifice of Jephthah's daughter which in the tradition 
is remembered every year through the lamentation of the 
daughters of Israel-(v. 40). 
we may wonder if the repetitiveness of the tradition may 
one way or another result in the using of iephthah's 
daughter as a symbol that functions to strengthen the 
solidarity amongst the daughters of Israel. In other words, 
the tragic fate of iephthah's daughter is not accepted as 
'it 
is but is transformed into a state in which she becomes 
some sort of heroine for the daughters of Israel. 
Although unrecorded as such in the Bible, the sacrifice of 
Isaac is also commemorated in the tradition in which Isaac 
is first of all depicted as willingly surrendering his life 
to be his father's sacrificial victim. But, the tradition 
does not stop at this tragic point, Isaac's sacrifice is 
furthermore believed to bring about the atonement of the 
sins of his descendants. It is probably to comply with 
common sentiment: "Without the shedding of blood there is 
no atonement". 6 Even though he is not dead (unlike 
6See J. Crenshaw, "Journey into Oblivion: A Structural AnalYsis 
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iephthah's daughter), he is reckoned as if he is dead (like 
iephthah's daughter). In the mythical understanding, the 
death of the character inevitably presupposes his 
glorification. The fact that the character is dead does not 
necessarily prevent the imagination from imagining that 
death is never the end of the matter since what arises from 
it is, at least, an inspiration of heroism (moral), at 
best, a redemption of sin (spiritual). 
Greek mythology seems to take a different route from that 
of the Hebrew. It does not seem to follow the pattern of 
"good deeds will result in rewards" 'in telling about human 
sacrifices. There is a similar Greek myth to that of 
iephthah's story. Idomeneus the Cretan, being in mortal 
danger in the midst of shipwreck, makes a similar vow as 
iephthah's. However, while iephthah comes to no harm after 
sacrificing his daughter, Idomeneus' men are struck by 
plague, and he is banished from Crete. 7 In another 
instance, Iphigeneia, Agamemnon's daughter, is redeemed 
with a doe when about to be despatched at Aulis, and then 
spirited away to the Tauric Chersonese. 8 The sacrifice does 
not take place here only because of the divine will to save 
lphigeneia from it. The sacrifice is not unanimously 
approved by the deities. To compare it with Gen. 22, there 
hardly is a will to save Isaac in this episode at least not 
until the sudden interference by the mal 'ak Yahweh which, 
of Gen. 22: 1-19", Soundings, 1975(58), p. 247. 
7R. Graves and R. Patai, Hebrew Myths: The Book of Genesis, 
c. 1963, p. 177. 
8Graves, ibid., p. 177. 
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however, has no apparent background. Unlike the Greek 
story, Gen. 22 does not contain two opposing wills with 
regard to the sacrifice of Isaac (in Jubilees' version it 
presumably does). From the very beginning, it is certain 
that Isaac has to die. Plutarch also has a story of 
Maeander who promises to reward the Queen of Heaven with 
the first person who will congratulate him on the storm of 
Pessinus. This proves to be his own son Archelaus, whom he 
duly kills, but then he remorsefully drowns himself in the 
river which is now named after him. 9 The sacrifice that is 
planned as a thanksgiving to the deity over a success, in 
fact, only leads to the doom of the doer. Maeander receives 
a similar fate as Idomeneus. It remains uncertain whether 
we can conclude that Greek mythology has a motive to reject 
the practice of human sacrifice either by revealing the 
doom of the doer or the escape of the human victim. But, at 
least, we can see that even though human sacrifice is 
offered to the deity, it still cannot be accepted 
unanimously. Secondly, the sacrifice is, in the end, 
unrewarded; instead, it leads to a tragic fate for the 
doer. Both Jephthah's and Abraham's stories disagree about 
these facts, the sacrifices of the men's daughter and son 
receive no challenge, they have divine consent as well as 
reward either before the sacrifice (Jephthah's victory over 
the Ammonites) or after the sacrifice (the blessings 
brought about by mal'ak Yahweh in the end of the Akedah). 
However, while iephthah's daughter seems to be killed (not 
9Graves, ibid., p. 177. 
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all interpretations maintain this killing), since this is 
the irrevocable vow of the father, Isaac's fate is 
indecisive. He certainly does not rejoin his -father and the 
ser vants at the closing of the story. But, the divine 
interference and the sacrifice of the surrogate ram, seem 
to suggest the survival of Isaac. Many legends do suggest 
the death of Isaac, even though the same legends would also 
disclose Isaac's resurrection. After all, Isaac, indeed, 
reappears in the subsequent episode when he is about to get 
married (Gen. 24: 62ff). 
The reappearance of Isaac in the aftermath of his sacrifice 
seems to be good ground for the development of mythical 
understandings since myth basically speaks about the 
(re)new(ed) life after crisis. or, as Reng Girard puts it, 
I'myths are the retrospective transfiguration of sacrificial 
crises, the reinterpretation of these crises in the light 
of the cultural order that has arisen from them". 10 There 
is no doubt that the ancient legends about the resurrection 
of Isaac themselves had already conveyed the mythical 
message in which the Akedah was believed to bring atonement 
for the sins of Isaac's descendants and Isaac's 
resurrection was understood as a proof of the people's 
resurrection. 11 It is all made possible if Isaac survives 
the sacrifice that formed a crisis in his life. However, 
myth is paradoxical in the way that, besides telling about 
10R. Girard, Violence and the Sacred, tr. Patrick Gregory, 1977, 
p. 64. 
11-For the legends, see Spiegel, The Last Trial: on the Legends 
and Lore of the Cbmnand to Abraham to offer Isaac as a Sacrifice: The 
Akedah, 1967, pp. 28ff. 
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survival, it is hardly ever detached from violent 
depiction. In myth, an awareness of violence is 
conspicuous. Isaac would have never effected the atonement 
had he not been subjected to the sacrifice. The violence is 
in fact shared by the biblical story. Even though we take 
the story as a nissah of Abraham, it remains doubtful if we 
can erase the violent impression of Isaac's sacrifice. A 
nissah, of Abraham is an 'olah of Isaac's life. 
IV. 2. Entering the paradoxes in the Akedah 
Edmund Leach makes the claim that the Bible is a product 
that has "the characteristics of mytho-history" rather than 
"a record of history as it actually happened"012 Skeptical 
about the attempts to prove the historicity of the Bible or 
even if such things ever existed at all, Leach argues that 
the subliminal meanings of biblical stories can be grasped 
following a recognition of the structural similarity of the 
. stories with other myths. In 
his view, the Bible still 
remains a sacred tale. The sacredness of the Bible for the 
religious communities (old Testament for the Jews, old and 
New Testament for Christians) is not to be based upon the 
fact that the characters in the story were historical. 
"They (the characters) are there because they fill a 
particular role in the totality of the sacred tale and not 
12Ednmd Leach, "Anthropological approaches to the study of the 
Bible during the twentieth century", in Structuralist Interpretations 
of Biblical Myth, ed. E. Leach and D. Alan Aycock, 1983, pervasive in the 
article, for exanple, p. 21. 
231 
because they actually existed in history". 13 Nor does it 
arrive as a conclusion on the sensibility of biblical 
stories as a whole. "If we take all the stories together, 
and assert, as a matter of dogma, that they are all 'true' 
at the same time, then we arrive at a nonsense because, in 
detail, the collectivity of stories is self- 
contradictory. "14 The biblical world, perhaps more 
precisely the book of Genesis, is depicted as being a 
liminal world, the mixture of terrestrial and celestial 
existences, a betwixt and between, therefore, shrouded by 
paradox and ambiguity. Yet, "it is precisely the self- 
contradictions which carry religious significance" claims 
Leach. 15 It is the self -contradictions of biblical stories 
that form their sacredness. And according to him, the task 
of the analyst, therefore, is to find some way of 
discovering the sense behind the self -contradictions, the 
sense behind the non-sense. "There is a theological meaning 
(or perhaps several theological meanings) which is other 
than the manifest meaning of the narrative as such. "16 
Whether we agree with Leach that the sacredness of the 
Bible is determined by its paradox or that the paradox can 
be reduced to a particular meaning or meanings, biblical 
studies after Leach have at least to be open to the 
awareness of the paradoxical nature of the Bible. Biblical 
stories often frustrate the readers who seek for a coherent 
13 Leach, ibid. , p. 10. 14 Leach, ibid., p. 25. 
IsLeach, ibid., p. 25. 
16Leach, ibid., P. 23. 
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understanding of them. The readers can find that their 
expectations, either in terms of their preunderstandings or 
something that is built up during the reading process, are 
eventually disrupted by irreconcilable paradoxes. It is in 
this realisation that we are trying to enter the world of 
paradox of Genesis 22, that is, the world that contains 
images that are incongruous, sometimes conflicting but at 
the same time, depending on each other for existence. We 
may notice oppositional relationships either on the 
semantic level or on the symbolic level (the two levels are 
often intermingled) as between morning (Abraham's 
departure) and night (the supposed time of God's presence), 
celestial and terrestrial, master and servant, father and 
son, foe ( 'oyabhaw) and friend, command and counter- 
command, death and life, separation (vv. 5,19) and unity 
(wayyelekhu s5enehem yahdaw), spiritual and material. 4 
Spiritual vs. material 
1jugh White, in his recent reading of Genesis 22, discusses 
a symbolic tension between material and spiritual in the 
promissory life of Abraham that may motivate the sacrifice 
of Isaac. 17 The relationship between Abraham and his God is 
understood as between the recipient of promise and the 
giver of promise. When the object of desire contained in 
the promise takes on material form in the fulfillment, that 
is, by the birth of Isaac, the bond of faith between the 
17Hugh C-White, Narration and Discourse in the Book of Genesis, 
1991. 
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promissor and the promisee is thought to be superseded by 
the relation which unites the promisee with the promised 
object. The fulfillment also puts the promise and all 
effects caused by the promise to an end. "The mediating 
function of the word of promise is made irrelevant by the 
fulfillment precisely because - the tension between the 
spiritual and material, which the promise transmuted into a 
tension between the present and the future, disappears with 
the material fulfillment. "Is If the promissory relationship 
between Abraham and God is to persist, i. e., if Abraham has 
to maintain his spiritual attachment to God, either Isaac 
should never have been born, which obviously would have 
shed doubt on the credibility of the promise, or else, the 
fulfillment is given up after its materialization. The 
sacrifice of Isaac would have a consequence of the 
dematerialization of the promised son. 19 
prior to the exposition of Gen. 22, White discusses briefly 
sacrifice in religion and literature in which, in agreement 
with Ortigues, he argues that in semiotic terms all 
sacrifices assume- a fundamental cleavage between the 
symbolic and material realms and serve to annihilate the 
chief difference between the two realms (spirituality and 
materiality) so as to achieve mimetic unity. 20 The aim of 
sacrifice is, therefore, according to White, for man to 
attain unity with the deity. In spite of his repudiation of 
18White, ibid., P. 190. 
19For further discussion of White's essay, see Chapter III, 
pp. 211f f. 
20 White, ibid. , p. 150. 
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applying this aim to Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac- as 
he 
says , 
"the command for Abraham to sacrifice his 
son,..., should not be placed within the general framework 
of cultic sacrifice that aims at achieving unity 
between 
the divine and human"21- White seems to maintain the 
dichotomy of spiritual and material in which the sacrifice 
of Isaac is seen as an attempt to elevate Abraham's 
relationship with his God to the spiritual level, 
by 
annihilating the object of materialistic desire that is 
supposed to be the obstacle of the spiritual attainment. In 
other words, by sacrificing the one in whom his former 
loyalty to God is, now, absorbed, Abraham would achieve 
(re)unity with his God. If this is the case, asks White, 
"if Abraham is obedient to this Word, will absolute 
sacrifice of desire not also undermine his difference from 
the divine and transform a verbally mediated, 
intersubjective relation into a relation of spiritual unity 
(mystical absorption)? "22 This is one of the radical 
tensions that White sees working beneath the surface of the 
narrative. But, White does not seem to consider it more as 
a real achievement than as a merely underlying potency that 
contributes to the dynamics of the story. Abraham would 
never reach such a mystical absorption although, if we are 
to follow White, he was in the process of reaching it. The 
question is obviously, Why Abraham would never obtain the 
spiritual unity with the deity, if his sacrifice assumes it 
as the highest possible achievement? This is, we might 
21white, ibid., p. 189. 
22White, ibid., p. 191. 
235 
think, not so much a problem of White's exposition of the 
story as of his theoretical basis of sacrifice. If White is 
to be consistent with his sacrificial theory, then Abraham 
is to be seen as someone who tries to gain unity with his 
God. White might have difficulty in getting the evidence 
for what will happen if Abraham obtains unity with his God 
because the story itself changes course by the cancellation 
of Isaac's sacrifice. Since then the sacrificial object is 
no longer Isaac whose existence is thought to create the 
barrier for Abraham's spiritual relationship with his God 
as a promisee and promisor, but the ram, the surrogate 
victim. White accepts the substitution with a (new) logic 
that Isaac must have survived unless the continuity of 
Abraham's family, through whom the promissory life is to be 
performed, would have been jeopardized. If this is right, 
however, then the cancellation of Isaac's sacrifice by the 
divinity would have been enough to assert the survival of 
Isaac. The divine utterance states the fact that Abraham 
has been regarded as having sacrificed Isaac- it in fact 
fits White's argument that Isaac is, himself, plunged into 
experiencing the dematerialization of the promise which 
rneans that he has to die, although, symbolically- and does 
not have, furthermore, to implement it in reality. This 
could have been taken as a signal that the continuity of 
Abraham's family is guaranteed. In this light, the 
sacrifice of the ram would have been an unnecessary double 
assertion. After all, the evidences from Abraham's life do 
rjot obviously support the depiction of someone who pursues 
spiritual unity with God, unless it is seen in correlation 
236 
with his richness. Since he went out of his father's house, 
he has done everything to increase his wealth, even selling 
his wife if it gives him in return plenty of cattle, 
silver, gold and land (Gen. 12: 10-13: 2,20). 
Thus, the weight of White's understanding of the tension 
between spiritual and material should have not been 
connected primarily with the aim of Abraham's sacrifice 
since as such the aim will always remain obscure, but, with 
the existence of Isaac as a symbol of the materialization 
of spiritual promise. Isaac is the embodiment, the physical 
representation of the spiritual promise of God. In him, God 
bound himself with the history of humanity. As long as the 
promise has not been fulfilled, God may do whatever he 
wants, he may keep the promise as long as he wants to, or, 
perhaps, even not fulfil it at all. But, once the promise 
has materialized, God has opened a possibility for man to 
be involved in keeping it. In the drama of the Akedah, 
however, it is shown that the physical appearance of the 
promise does not automatically entitle Abraham, the 
recipient, to a full right upon it. Abraham still has to 
clepend on God in the matter concerning Isaac. In fact, 
since the Akedah, Isaac makes Abraham depend solely on God 
for the continuation of his son's life. God who gives 
Isaac, still can take him at anytime and by any means. 
Thus, in the relationship of Abraham (in the material 
world) and God (in the spiritual world), Isaac functions as 
a mediating term that communicates between both parties. "A 
viediating term, according to structuralist theory, 
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intervenes between the poles of an irreconcilable 
opposition and partakes of the nature of both; for each it 
represents the other. Thus it is rendered ambiguous. "23 In 
this ambiguity, however, there is always an echo of God's 
demand of unlimited right on the thing/man that he has 
given. God is jealously watching the material fulfilment of 
his promise as if he does not give it voluntarily. This in 
effect can endanger the material fulfilment himself since 
God may destroy him. This is the violent desire of God that 
is faced by Abraham and which ultimately turns him into 
acting the same violence. We do not know whether by 
violating and exterminating Isaac, Abraham would have 
gained a spritual attachment with God. If this were the 
case then we could only realise how costly is the effort. 
13ut then the obedient life of Abraham has always proved to 
be very costly: separation from his father's family, 
wandering around all the time and now the killing of the 
bearer of his future. 
While the spiritual unity between Abraham and God is not as 
apparent as White might suggest, in other words, one would 
hardly see the difference in the relationship of Abraham 
and God before and after the event, one thing that remains 
irrepressible in this sacrifice is the violence both of 
Abraham's action and of God's command. Rene Girard's theory 
of sacrifice as implementation of the violent nature of man 
would help with the understanding of violence in the 
23F. Landy, "Narrative Techniques and Symbolic Transactions in 
the Akedahr"' in Signs and Wonders: Biblical Texts in Literary Focus, 
ed. J. Cheryl Extrn, 1989, p. 28. 
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Akedah. White himself disagrees with Girard who, for him, 
gives the primacy to absolute violence in human nature and 
maintains the fundamental role played by violent sacrifice 
in human culture. 24 For White, Girard has devalued, due to 
his interest in the negative, prophylactic social function 
of ritualized violence, the positive goal of sacrifice as 
suggested by the Indian Vedantic philosophers, namely, the 
unity with the divine. Nonetheless, the Akedah is, in fact, 
fraught with negative desire to annihilate "the only and 
beloved son" of Abraham while the aim or the positive aim 
in White's understanding of Isaac's sacrifice remains 
vague. The sacrifice of the surrogate victim demonstrates 
that the violent desire that has accumulated all along has 
to be released. 
Father vs. son 
The command of God in Gen. 22: 2 is a repeat of the previous 
one: lvgo from your country and your kindred and your 
father's house to the land that I will show you" which 
rnarks the separation of Abraham and his father. The present 
command, however, as if history repeats itself, affects 
isaac's separation from his father. The verb lekh-lakha is 
gesturing the separation of the father and his son. If in 
the first event, the death of the father shadows the 
departure of the son, in the second, the death of the son 
is to be the cause of the separation. Terah and Isaac are 
bound within a similar fate, namely, they are to die in 
24White, Narration, p. 152. 
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front of Abraham. Money-Kyrle, in the application of 
Freudian theory, says that the sacrifice of Isaac 
is 
unconsciously patricide, since the son 
is the reincarnation 
of his grandfather, as well as suicide, since 
Abraham 
identifies with his son. 25 This interpretation might lack 
conspicuous evidence in the narrative, 
though, 
unmistakably, as Landy claims, 
"conflict between 
generations, often linked with jealousy, 
is all-pervasive 
in Genesis. 1126 As a matter of fact, the generation gap and 
conflict can be seen as a universal theme 
in literature. 
Harold Fisch explains, 
Parents are mortally threatened by their 
children in King Lear and Hamlet (we 
remember Hamlet "speaking daggers" to his 
mother and only with difficulty restraining 
himself from using them and thus acting the 
part of Nero); children are threatened by 
parents in Richard II and Merchant of Venice 
("would she were hearsed at my foot, and the 
ducats in her coffin"). It is a seemingly 
universal archetype. Oedipus is the 
prototype of the murderous son; Agamemnon, 
of the murderous father. Chronos devours his 
children; Medea destroys hers; Orestes kills 
his mother. There is something inevitable 
about the pattern, making parricide and 
infanticide something like a law of 
nature. 27 
on the narrative surface we are told that Abraham leaves 
his father's house because of God's command. But, the 
journey also contains a motive of obtaining a better future 
as reflected in divine promise s: a land (becomes more 
obvious in the later accounts, for instance, 13: 14ff), 
25 See Landy, op. cit., p. 5. 
26Landy, op-cit., p. 5. 
27Harold Fisch, A Remanbered Fluture: A study in Literary 
mythology, 1984, p. 82. 
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great nation, great name, national pride 
before other 
nations. As Terah's son, Abraham lived a life that 
is far 
from that condition. Terah apparently was not a famous man, 
he had only three sons, one of them, Haran, died before 
him. His aim of entering the land of Canaan had never come 
true in his entire life, instead he was stranded in Haran 
(11: 26ff). Prompted by God's command, Abraham launches a 
journey in order to pursue a better life than his father's 
which he might undergo unhappily. But, it all begins only 
with the death of the father. The announcement of the death 
of Terah just before the command is important to notice. 
Terah symbolizes the old generation whose death brings the 
freedom for the next generation to arrange their own way of 
life. The death of Terah, for Abraham, is like the death of 
Abraham, for Isaac (Gen. 25: 7-12). "After the death of 
Abraham God blessed Isaac his son (waythi 'ahare moth 
Fabhraham wayabharekh 'elohim 'eth-yishaq beno). " The death 
of the fathers sets a new life for the sons (although, it 
is not fully realised, the divine promises are not 
completely fulfilled during the life of the Patriarchs and 
probably never so). In the larger narrative context of 
Genesis, the death of Terah also marks the new era where 
human attempts and skills gain a more important role than 
before, whereas the divine becomes more and more resident 
in heaven and his presence is virtually represented by his 
promises. 28 Semantically, the coexistence between divine 
28 It is described by Hugh White as it is, "in juxtaposition to 
the =rbid cycles of huran existence portrayed in the first eleven 
chapters of Genesis, the narrative now initiates a new sequence which 
begins with a new type of word event: the giving of a prcudse". 
Narration, p. 169. 
241 
promises and human desire to pursue the state of condition 
described by the promises allows the recurrence of violence 
in the narrative. The violence which is seemingly ended 
merely by death. 
The Akedah is, however, a story before the father is dead. 
It is a story before the son is free to stand on his own. 
And -it is also the story 
in which conflict between the 
father and the son is represented. As Crenshaw notes on the 
assonance of Hebrew words in the story, "since the father 
becomes an enemy to his son, the unexpected allusion to 
enemies ('oyebaw) in the repetition of the promise recalls 
the frequent references to a father ('ab, 'abi, 'abiw)". 29 
He furthermore writes, "an a deeper level the conflict 
depicted in Genesis 22 bears witness to opposing forces: 
father versus son, parental love versus fear of the gods, 
and intention versus actual deed. The trained ear can 
barely distinguish an echo of the Oedipal struggle: in it 
Abraham abandons his father in favor of a higher 
allegiance". 30 To imagine with Kierkegaard that Abraham is 
a monster in front of his son when he is about to slaughter 
him 31 is a plausible depiction of the father, which the 
son would have no doubt to believe. Whatever the motive 
behind the sacrifice, when it is performed it is absolutely 
terrorizing. 
29Crenshaw, "Journey, " p. 251. 
3OCren. shaw, "Journey, " p. 253. 
31See Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, tr. Howard V. Hong and 
Edna H. Hong, 1983, p. 10. 
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Nonetheless, Abraham is not like the one from whom we may 
demand moral responsibility. We simply are not informed 
what kind of moral standards Abraham holds. He does not 
even seem to consider that sacrificing his son is 
problematic. But, to say that Abraham recognizes no love 
for his children is contradictory of the fact that he is 
dismayed by the expulsion of Ishmael (Gen. 21: 11). He also 
saves Lot, for whom he is in loco parentis, from the kings 
(Gen. 14) and protects him from divine wrath (Gen. 18: 22-33). 
The only question is does Isaac have the love of his 
father? It is certainly difficult to answer. it is 
similarly difficult to know whether Abraham is pleased by 
the existence of Isaac whose prediction he receives 
contemptuously (Gen. 17: 17,18). Genesis 22 is, in fact, the 
only account in which Abraham and Isaac are seen in 
communication. In other words, this is the only place 
where, if possible, we can perceive Abraham's love of 
Isaac. But, his words to Isaac are minimal and hardly are 
evidence of his love. His reply to Isaac (v. 8) is even 
evasive as if he only thinks of his own intention, never 
mind misleading his son. Apart from his evasive words, 
Abraham's action is entirely destructive for Isaac. The 
preparation of the sacrifice that occupies virtually half 
of the story is exactly the harbinger of the death of 
Isaac, besides its ritual performance. The divine blessings 
assume the death of Isaac, "because you have done this, and 
have not withheld your son, your only son, I will indeed 
bless you" (vv. 16,17). Thus, the story is shrouded by the 
desire to kill the son. Perhaps the only exemption is the 
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divine prohibition of the killing of the son (v. 12), but, 
even this also justifies the opposite, "I know that you 
fear God, seeing you have not withheld your son, your only 
son, from me". While we have no proof of Abraham's love, we 
are led to acknowledge his destructive impulses towards 
Isaac. 
The narratives preceding the Akedah seem to be in support 
of the father's desire to kill his son. Gen. 21: 1,2 reports 
the process that surrounds the birth of Isaac. After Yahweh 
visited Sarah, it is said, she was pregnant and bore 
Abraham a son. The strongest implication of this report is 
that Yahweh himself is the cause of the birth of Sarah's 
son. The narrator for some reason apparently leads the 
readers to receive Isaac as Yahweh's son. The son is 
eventually named "he laughed" by Abraham. 32 The name 
reminds us of the event in Gen. 17: 17,18: 12ff in which the 
divine prediction of the birth of the son is laughed at, 
rather than, one may say, Gen. 21: 6, the laugh of a happy 
mother. The depiction of the reluctant father continues. No 
indication that he treats Isaac as a special son, the 
things which, on the other hand, we can see in Sarah's 
role. Isaac is seemingly never a special son for Abraham, 
as for him Ishmael possesses the same right as Isaac 
(perhaps more). But, Isaac is a special son for God since 
he is chosen to continue the promissory life after Abraham 
32The style of the report makes. the present events understood as 
the fulfillrmnt of divine pra-nises, except the naming of Isaac (21: 3) 
which should have also been correlated with God's action in the past (Gen. 17: 19). The narrator apparently deliberately portrays the process 
of the naming as solely Abraham's business. 
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(Gen. 17: 19,21: 12). 
Here, we may catch a glimpse of contradiction between God 
and Abraham on the matter of Isaac. The contradiction 
becomes wider as Sarah, who is conspicuously on God's side, 
perhaps more for biological reasons, 
demands the expulsion 
of Ishmael. Abraham is said to be unhappy about 
it. Thus, 
on the one hand, we have Abraham and Hagar who are 
in 
favour of Ishmael's existence in the family, and, on the 
other hand, God and Sarah who defend the exclusive right of 
Isaac. In ch-21, we are told that Abraham accedes to the 
expulsion of Ishmael, so does Hagar (after all, she 
is only 
a slave who has to remain silent throughout the story). The 
expulsion of Ishmael can be seen as an attempt to resolve 
the contradiction which becomes a real conflict as Sarah 
gives no alternative but the expulsion of Ishmael as well 
as his mother (Gen. 21: 10). In the meantime, Gen. 22, as if 
to maintain a balance, reveals the sacrifice of Isaac. 
interestingly, while Hagar, in ch. 21, never emerges to 
defend herself and her son, Gen. 22 omits the involvement of 
Sarah altogether. The sacrifice of Isaac is the 
reminiscence of Ishmael's near death of exposure 
(Gen. 21: 15ff), after the expulsion. Reading chapters 21 and 
22 simultaneously gives us a mythical understanding, that 
is, a development from conflict to resolution, from chaos 
to order. The expulsion of Ishmael and his mortal danger 
provides only a temporary solution to the original conflict 
before it adds another crisis. The sacrifice of Isaac seems 
to be the appropriate solution with respect to the present 
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crisis, i. e., the imbalance as a result of Ishmael's 
expulsion, and to the original crisis that is created by 
the birth of Isaac. If the conflict starts with the 
existence of Isaac, the resolution demands the annihilation 
of Isaac. Here, the myth seems to come full circle, but 
only by subscribing to violence. A violence of the father 
who, perhaps, is afraid of being emulated by his son, the 
bearer of divine covenant as well as his name. or, a 
violence that is caused by a desire to take revenge on 
behalf of the expelled son he actually wants to be with. on 
the other hand, for God, it is perhaps a violence that is 
based on a kind of solidarity. As Abraham has conceded the 
expulsion of his own flesh and blood son (Ishmael), God, in 
his solidarity, responds with giving up "his son" (Isaac). 
There is some kind of inevitability that the sons have to 
go through a mortal danger and the fathers cannot prevent 
the danger. 
Child initiation and the quarrel between Abraham's wives 
The survival of Isaac raises a possibility of reading 
Genesis 22 as a myth about child initiation, i. e., the 
gaining of maturity and independent life through a 
sacrifice or symbolic death followed by redemption or 
resurrection. It becomes more obvious with several other 
pieces of evidence. First, the existence of the two young 
men (ne'arim), apart from accompanying Abraham, they may 
also represent, as in the initiation rite, a class of 
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young, recently initiated men who serve as guardians or 
guides for the novice during the ritual. 33 Secondly, 
by 
directing the perceptive question to his father, Isaac can 
be thought of as mature enough to comprehend fully the rite 
his father is about to perform. 34 His eventual acceptance 
of the sacrifice describes the moment when the child faces 
his own imminent death emotionally which is the 
significance of the symbolic death in the initiation rite. 
It follows that Isaac is forced to enter the promissory 
history and this story cannot end without some indication 
of the continuity of the promise into the generation of 
isaac. 35 The promises at the end of the story, that seem to 
refer to the future state, may serve to establish the 
promise to Isaac and in this way to ground the continuity 
between the generations. The maturity of Isaac is, 
therefore, obtained, violently though, by his being made 
aware of his father's religion and the taking over of the 
divine promises from his father. 36 Moreover, the absence of 
Sarah from'the Akedah might further indicate the depiction 
of the initiation rite. Since "In the archaic initiation 
rites, the separation of the mother and child constitutes 
the first element in the initiation drama. The mother gives 
331JUgh C. White, "The Initiation Legend of Isaac, " ZAW, 91(1979), 
p. 14. This class is usually mentioned in connection with orders to 
rwrder someone. In the Bible, Absalom has his na 'ar kill ATmon in 
revenge for the rape of Tamar (II Sam. 13: 28,29). David chooses one of 
his ne'arim to execute the Armlekite who brings the news of Saul's 
death (II Sam. 1: 15). That the na"ar constitutes a certain class is made 
clear by the report that David kills every man among the An-alekites, 
except four hundred 'ig-na"ar. 
34White, "Legend of Isaac, " p. 15. 
35White, "Legend of Isaac, " p. 17. 
36The proniises that are specifically addressed to Isaac echo the 
deeds of Abraham (Gen. 26: 4,24). 
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up the son as if he had died. In the second part of the 
ceremony he is subjected by the father or the initiands to 
symbolic death in a variety of ways"37 
Hugh White demonstrates how the Akedah can be understood as 
witnessing to an ancient ritual of child initiation, by 
making a comparison with a Greek myth about Athamas and 
Phrixus which he believes to belong to the myth of 
initiation. The myth is quoted by White from R. Graves who 
also considers it as a significant parallel to the story of 
Isaac's sacrifice by Abraham. 313 Graves also interestingly 
suggests that the comparison will solve three important 
problems raised by Genesis narrative: since Abraham is not 
founding a city- the common motive that lies beneath the 
practice of human sacrifice in ancient society- what 
emergency prompted him to sacrifice his grown-up son? Also, 
why is his firstborn Ishmael not chosen in preference to 
Isaac? Lastly, does the quarrel for precedence between 
Sarah and Hagar, so important in the introductory chapters, 
bear any relation to the sacrifice? 39 
The myth tells us about Athamas, King of Boetia, who is 
forced by Hera to marry Queen Nephele of Pelion, a phantom 
whom Zeus created in Hera's likeness. Two sons, Phrixus and 
Leucon, and a daughter, Helle, are born by Nephele. 
Athamas, subsequently falls in love with Ino the Cadmean 
and begets two sons, Learchus and Melicertes (Melkarth: 
37White, "Legend of Isaac, " p. 6. 
38White, "Legend of Isaac, " p. 4. 
39Graves, HebrewHyths, p. 176. 
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"ruler of the city") by her. When Nephele hears of this, 
she curses Athamas and Melicertes. To combat Nephele, Ino 
creates famine by secretly parching the corn seed. Athamas 
sends a messenger to the Delphic oracle to learn what must 
be done to handle the famine. Meanwhile Ino has bribed the 
priestess to announce that the land will recover its 
fertility only if Athamas sacrifices Phrixus to Zeus on 
Mount Laphystium. Athamas then takes Phrixus to the top of 
the mountain and is at the point of killing him when 
Heracles intervenes, crying: "My Father, Zeus, King of 
Heaven, loathes human sacrifices! " Zeus then sends a golden 
ram down who bears Phrixus away and deposits him in the 
land of Colchis. 40 Phrixus in the end sacrifies the golden 
ram, the deliverer. Athamas learns of Ino's plot. He is, 
then, driven mad by Hera and shoots Learchus, another son 
of Ino, with an arrow and ýtears his body into pieces. Ino 
flees with Melicertes before Athamas can kill them, and 
both jump into the sea off the Molurian Rock and drown. 
Both are then deified by Zeus. 
There are many differences between the Greek myth and the 
. Akedah which 
basically make the events in the Greek myth 
seem more dramatic and plausible with regard to the 
revealed motives. It is conspicuous as to why Phrixus is 
going to be sacrificed by his father. The reason for the 
sacrifice, unlike the enigmatic Hebrew, lies in the human 
affair that provides us with the familiarity we need to 
grasp the semantic direction of the story. Concerning the 
40 White writes Hera as the one who sends the golden rarn. 
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characters, there is an obvious difference between the 
performances of Ino and Hagar which indicates that the 
Greek does not assume a secondary role for the unblessed 
wif e as does the Hebrew (let alone if she is a slave and 
foreigner). We can only wonder what was the response of 
Hagar against Sarah's harsh demand of her second expulsion 
(Gen. 21: 9ff), even what had made Sarah react that way? 41 It 
was not impossible if Hagar had acted contemptuously 
against Sarah as she did before (Gen. 16: 4). But the 
narrator is simply silent about Hagar's manners in her 
relation with Sarah. 
Despite the lack of clarity of the Hebrew story, there are 
still some similarities that we can perceive in both 
stories. Athamas can actually be parallelled to Abraham. 
13oth of them have two wives, except that Nephele and Ino 
have more than one child. There are also points of 
similarity between Nephele and Sarah. Both are favoured by 
the deity. God chooses Sarah to be the mother of the 
promised son. This implies that God nominates Sarah as 
Abraham's only wife, besides the fact that Abraham gets 
41 In Jan Victors' (closely related with Rembrandt) painting 
about the expulsion of Hagar and Ishmael, Hagar is depicted as a young 
and beautiful woman, wearing a beautiful dress. In contrast to that, 
. sarah 
is a weak old woman, wearing a simple black dress, appears only 
obscurely in the background (a witch-like figure in the fairy tales). 
This interpretation rmy fill the gap of the tension in Hagar's 
relationship with Sarah. Hagar's beauty and youth might attract Abraham 
closer to her than to Sarah, which in turn provokes Sarah's jealousy 
and anger. Looking at the painting, however, one rrdqht think that it 
was Sarah who was abandoned by Abraham (Abraham, like Hagar, is wearing 
a fine robe, he also looks strong and healthy). At any rate, it 
Undermines the biblical description of Sarah as a powerful first lady 
whose beauty attracts foreign kings. For the painting see C. Brown, 
j. Kelch, P. van Thiel, Reinbrandt: the Master & his Workshop, Yale U. P. 
in association with National Gallery Publications, London, 1991, p. 341. 
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Married again to Hagar and eventually, to Keturah. Like 
Nephele's reaction to Ino, the intruder, Sarah is also 
displeased by Hagar and Ishmael. But Ino and Hagar succeed 
in pleasing Athamas and Abraham. If Nephele curses 
Melicertes, Sarah insists that Ishmael must leave Abraham's 
house. Accordingly, as also hinted by Graves and Patai, we 
may assume that the attempt to sacrifice Isaac is Hagar's 
revenge just like Ino plots Phrixus' death. Hagar wants the 
death of Isaac as a revenge f or what Sarah did to her and 
Ishmael. We, certainly, can only see Hagar's role in the 
background, that is, as one of the tensions which underlies 
the sacrifice of Isaac. In the foreground this tension is 
omitted and replaced by God's command. The unprecedented 
command of God which seems to have lost its reason, might 
be rendered as a deliberate attempt by the authors to 
repudiate the impression that the sacrifice is purely 
rnotivated by the desire to revenge. After all, God is the 
giver and taker of life in the Bible, no necessary reason 
is required when he wants to take somebody's life (cf. the 
attempt to kill Moses by Yahweh in Exodus 4: 24). However, 
as we have discussed before, the involvement of God in this 
event invokes the conflict between Abraham in coalition 
sjith Hagar and God in coalition with Sarah, concerning the 
status of Ishmael and Isaac (chapter 21). Thus, the quarrel 
between the wives cannot be ignored even though it is only 
alluded to. 
The sacrifice of Isaac constitutes a shockinq eruption of 
, legativity into Abraham's family which seems to 
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counterbalance the negativity of Ishmael's expulsion. It is 
"a threat against Sarah's child that offsets the previous 
threat to the -child of Hagar. 1142 As a matter of fact, 
Ishmael's experience in mortal danger is also suggested by 
White as another child initiation story. 43 -Thus, the 
experiences of both Abraham's sons exhibit the process of 
initiation which ends up with their escape from death and, 
therefore, their separation from the father. "The 
similarity in the surface structure of both Hebrew legends 
would indicate that their final formulation took place at 
the same stage in the growth of the tradition, i. e. the 
stage identified as >E<. It was at this stage that the 
figure of Isaac was moved to the periphery of the story so 
as to permit his symbolic death to serve as a trial of the 
faith of Abraham. "44 
The last sentence is important to notice since it gives us 
a warning that in the present form of Genesis 22 the myth 
of initiation is no longer central. it has been overcome, 
though not entirely, by the story of Abraham's test. In 
other words, the main focus of Genesis 22 is on Abraham 
rather than Isaac. This inevitably changes our impression 
of the lethal danger faced by Isaac which becomes more 
urgent in demanding the son's death than if it were a pure 
initiation story with Isaac as the focus. We cannot just 
ignore the ultimate horror of the event which arises 
42White, "Legend of Isaac, " p. 22. 43Hugh C-White, "The Initiation Legend of Ishmael", ZAW 
S7(1975), pp. 2p7-305. 
44White, "Leqend of Isaac, " p. 29. 
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particularly from seeing Abraham's conduct. 
While Athamas 
is certainly a reluctant father who is compelled to 
sacrifice Phrixus to overcome the famine; Abraham 
looks 
confident during the preparation, the three 
days journey, 
the building of the altar even when he is about to kill 
Isaac. He does not share Athamas' reluctance (he does so in 
Ishmael's case only, Gen. 21: 11). It is not a poiqnant 
moment that we find in following Abraham and Isaac's 
journey but a harrowing one. Abraham is seeminqly not like 
the one whose conduct symbolizes the role of the caring 
father in the initiation rite. The mal'ak Yahweh cannot 
ignore the seriousness of Abraham in sacrificing Isaac that 
he has to recognize it ultimately overtly while halting the 
sacrifice (v. 12). Perhaps to deflect Abraham's intention to 
kill Isaac, the mal'ak Yahweh needs to vocalize the 
acknowledgment (why a revelation if the test is actually a 
hidden plan? ) as well as to grant the flatterinq credit 
"God fearinq man". When Isaac passed the crisis and became 
an independent man, he could never delete from his memory 
the violence of his father. 
IV. 3. Violence in the Akedah 
There has been a suggestion that the Akedah reflects a myth 
of the birth of a new nation (Israel ) .45 Hyam Maccoby, f or 
45Structurally, one my see that this myth corresponds to the 
initiation myth. They both underline the escape of Isaac frorn death. 
The importance of the depictions in the myth of the, birth of a new 
nation becm-tes apparent in literature in which Isaac is usually used as 
a symbol of the recent generation (the generation of the writers) in 
contrast to the old one represpnted by Abraham, often described as 
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instance, shows that the paradox that Isaac is the promised 
and miraculously born child through whom the perpetuation 
of the tribe is to be secured, and yet at the same time the 
inevitable victim of the sacrifice, is, in fact, typical of 
the dilemma of founding a nation, a city or a tribe. 46 
Myths reveal several solutions for such a dilemma. The 
device of having twin founders so that one is sacrificed, 
as in the case of Romulus and Remus, is one way of solving 
the dilemma. Another way is by qiving the nextborn child 
the same name as the sacrificed child, thus, regarding him 
as the resurrected or the incarnated lost one. In both 
ways, the success of the new tribe can only be assured by 
complete surrender to the will of the deity. The chief hope 
of the new nation must be destroyed and it must be left to 
the deity to renew the hope in some unpredicted way. 47 
Maccoby may find his understanding appropriate to the 
Akedah in which the complete surrender of Isaac, the 
supposed chief hope of the new nation ends with the divine 
interruption of the sacrifice (cf. v. 12). By the 
interruption, the hope of the new nation can be seen as 
renewed. 
However, the story tells us nothing of such a complete 
surrender of Isaac. Isaac is never actually destroyed by 
Abraham. On the other hand, the real sacrifice only takes 
dying or out-of -date tradition that the new generation want to be 
independent f rm. See interpretations of the Akedah by modern writers 
and artists in Chapter II. 
46 Hyam Maccoby, The Sacred Executioner: Humn Sacrifice and the 
Legacy of Guilt, 1982, p. 75. 
47Maccoby, ibid, p. 75. 
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place with a ram as the victim. The ram functions as the 
surrogate victim which is not only being sacrificed in 
Isaac's stead, but, saves Isaac's life. By this 
substitution only, and apparently not necessarily by a real 
destruction of the real victim, the new nation can be 
delivered. From this viewpoint, the renewal of the hope of 
the new nation (if we are to accept Maccoby's reading which 
itself is mythical) is obtained merely by the killinq of 
the scapegoat. Thus the birth of the new nation involves in 
itself violence. The violence that is both in a form of the 
mortal danger in the life of the chief hope of the new 
nation and in the sacrifice of the (innocent) ram. 
In the Akedah, the sacrifice of the surrogate victim is a 
crucial attempt- at the continuation of the life of Isaac. 
The divine interruption alone may not be enough to avert 
the sacrifice. The event that begins with a demand of and a 
will to sacrifice needs to conclude with a sacrifice. The 
sacrifice (of Isaac) in imagination, if any, is to be 
completed with the real one (of the ram). It is the force 
that lies beneath the original sacrifice that is exposed in 
the process of the surrogate sacrifice. The victim may be 
changed but the force is the same. The force demands 
expression. That is why, the existence of the surrogate 
victim is undoubtedly significant, since by way of making 
itself the target of the force, it has protected the 
original victim. The death of the surrogate victim amounts 
to the survival of the original victim. The survival of 





victim demonstrates an appeasement of 
threatened Isaac's life) by means of 
The sacrifice of the surrogate victim is, however, 
illusory. It would never actually replace the original 
sacrifice. The ram is only a scapegoat of Abraham's desire 
to kill (according to Girard, the destructive desire is the 
origin of sacrifice). The spontaneous sacrifice of the ram 
in the story may endorse its existence as a scapegoat. The 
ram was the only object that happened to be near Abraham 
and that was thought of as appropriate as a substitute for 
Isaac. The scapegoat mechanism functions to prevent a total 
catastrophe that would happen if the original victim, the 
human one, were sacrificed. But, it may not represent 
entirely the original sacrifice. 
We can hardly imagine that the value of the sacrifice of 
the ram could equal the value of Isaac's sacrifice. As 
J. H. M. Beattie observes in the substitution of sacrificial 
victim in Nuer society, "thus if a Nuer does not happen to 
have an ox available he may sacrifice a species of cucumber 
instead ... I suspect, that he (the Nuer) knows that what he 
is performing is a rite, a drama, and not a commercial 
transaction; his gift, that is to say, is symbolic, not 
'real'. It is the thought, the intention, that counts, as 
we (and perhaps the Nuer also) might say". 48 Similarly, in 
48J. H. M. Beattie, "On Understandinq Sacrifice, " in Sacrifice, ed. 
M. F. C. Bourdillon and Meyer Fortes, 1980, p. 31. 
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the sacrifice of an ox, the animal acts as a vicarious 
sacrifice of man, the sacrificer. The material form of the 
sacrificial victim could be a serious economic 
consideration to the sacrificer, but, at the metaphysical 
level, economics is not the issue. What matters is the act 
of sacrifice itself, which is a symbol of gift giving, but 
gift giving as an expression of reciprocal relationship 
rather than material exchange. "Gods do not need presents 
from men; they require signs of submission. "49 
It is said by Edmund Leach that, "one view, which quite 
often appears to be supported by the language in which 
people describe their own sacrifices, is that a sacrificial 
offering is a gift, or tribute, or fine paid to the gods. 
The performance is an expression of the principle of 
reciprocity. By making a gift to the gods, the gods are 
compelled to give back benefits to man". 50 This system can 
be proved as existing in the Akedah as the sacrifice of the 
ram that symbolizes the sacrifice of Isaac is Abraham's 
obedient response to God's will, which in return, as in the 
reciprocal relationship, God proclaims his blessinqs to 
Abraham. It is the sign of submission from Abraham that 
disarms God who then in some way ceases his evil desire. 
This is the state where the life of human beinqs is 
restored to normality. 
49Edmmd Leach, "The Logic of Sacrifice, " in Anthropoloqical 
Approaches to the Old Testawnt, edited with an introduction by 
BemhardLang, 1985, p. 139. 
sOLeach, ibid., p. 139. 
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The scapegoat mechanism works only symbolically. It does so 
by manipulation, that is, by concealing or distorting the 
real nature of things. It assumes that the crisis is over 
and the order (of the sacrificer's environment) is restored 
without the actual sacrifice of the original (man) victim. 
This symbolical process works within the limit of 
imagination or in metaphorical associations. In reality 
there could be some discrepancies as the chaotic moment in 
the crisis does not lead to the intended end. The crisis 
may even end up with the original victim being sacrificed. 
The demand of the original sacrifice at any rate cannot be 
tricked by the subjective imagination of the substitute 
sacrifice. There is some sort of provisionality in the 
implications of the scapegoat mechanism which allow them to 
work only for a limited time. That is why this mechanism is 
closely linked with sacrificial rites which are performed 
again and again. At times the rites have even to be 
replaced by the original sacrifice. Thus, in human 
consciousness the horror and violence that surround the 
original sacrifice remain unforgettable. We are inevitably 
related to them, either as something that we try to shrug 
off or conduct consciously or not (the degree might ranqe 
from family abandonment to war). "Nothing, perhaps, could 
be more banal than the role of violence in awakeninq 
desire. Our modern terms for this phenomenon are sadism or 
masochism, depending on its manifestation; we regard it as 
pathological deviation from the norm. We believe that the 
normal form of desire is nonviolent and that this 
nonviolent form is characteristic of the qenerality of 
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mankind. But if the sacrificial crisis is a universal 
phenomenon, this hopeful belief is clearly without 
foundation. "51 This awareness may bring us to understand 
the violence in the Akedah better since it is often ignored 
or masqueraded behind too optimistic theological arguments 
(the least admission of violence is usually given by 
placing it as a part of the ancient barbaric times of 
Abraham in contrast with the modern civilization of the 
commentators). 
How do we then understand the sacrificial crisis in the 
Akedah? As a matter of fact, nothing is clear about the 
cause of the crisis. But, as we know, the story reveals a 
focus on the relationship between a father and a son on the 
eve of the son's sacrifice. A father and his son who are 
united in the journey to the sacrificial site (cf. 
wayyelakhu sonehem yahodaw in vv. 6,8). At the same time it 
tells us that the father is the executioner of the son and 
is also the one who abandons his son on his journey home 
(wayyagabh 'abhraham 'el-ne'arayw... {v-19), but, where is 
Isaac? ). This might indicate what becomes a classic 
portrayal of a father who endangers his own son's life. The 
motive that lies behind this scene could be that the son is 
the harbinger of the death of the father. The very 
existence of the son- in the case of Isaac, he is the 
bearer of Abraham's name- reminds the father of his leading 
position in the world that soon has to be changed by the 
son, which only amounts to the death of the father. It is 
5'Girard, Violence, p. 144. 
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not impossible, therefore, that the father sees his son as 
the rival that he tries to get rid of. By the same token, 
the son can become the rival of his father just because he 
longs to identify with his father. This is what Girard 
calls the mimetic desire of a child, though it inhabits 
adult life too, because of its basic nature in human life. 
Girard discusses this matter in his criticism of Freud and 
the Oedipus Complex. 52 in his view, the mimetic desire is 
rooted neither in the subject nor in the object, but in a 
third party whose desire is imitated by the subject. 53 "It 
is the father who directs the son's attention to desirable 
objects by desiring them himself', thus, the boy's desires 
are inevitably directed toward his own mother-1154 In this 
case Girard differs from Freud who says that a son is 
obsessed by the desire of killing his father because he 
wants to take over his mother from his father; so that the 
object, i. e., the mother is, here, the source of the son's 
hatred of his father. According to Girard the underlying 
violence of a relationship with such desire is 
unpredictable, it is endless violence with an uncertain 
object. The son will always want something that his father 
wants. Because there is only one thing that both of them 
want, the son will eventually regard his father as his 
rival and vice versa, the father may also regard his son as 
challenging him. Moreover, Girard claims that the mimetic 
52 See his Vi ol ence, pp. 169f f. 
Akedah which uses psychoanalytical 
Oedipus Conflict in the Akedah, " in 
the Developtwnt of a Literar7 Tr- 
nu-rber. 
53Girard, Violence, p. 170. 
54Girard, Violence, p. 172. 
For an interesting analysis of the 
categories, see E. Wellisch, "The 
The Sacrifice of Zsaac: Studies in 
Rdition, ed. Eli Yassif, no paae 
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desire is, in fact, a basic desire of human beings. He 
says, flonce his basic needs are satisfied (indeed, 
sometimes even before), man is subject to intense desire, 
though he may not know precisely for what. The reason is 
that he desires being, something he himself lacks and which 
some other person seems to possess. The subject thus looks 
to that other person to inform him of what he should desire 
in order to acquire that being". 55 This kind of desire 
undoubtedly brinqs a danger of violence with it although 
the reason for the violence itself once it happens is not 
important anymore. It is not the object which attracts 
one's desire but the desire of another person for the 
object. If such blind violence threatens somebody or even a 
community, then, there will be a chaotic situation which 
Girard identifies as a sacrificial crisis. In the 
sacrificial crisis, there is no difference anymore between 
one person and the other. There is no difference between 
the son and the f ather in which the son may behave towards 
his father reverently and the father respects his young 
one. "At the height of the sacrificial crisis man's desires 
are focused on one thing only : violence. 1156 
Because of his innocent appearance, Isaac may also become a 
universal symbol of the innocent young child who does not 
realize the danger following him. Girard argues that, "the 
adult is quick to sense a violent situation and answer 
violence with violence; the child, on the other hand, never 
55Girard, Violence, p. 146. 
56Girard, Violence, p. 145. 
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having been exposed to violence, reaches out for his 
model's objects with unsuspectinq innocence". 57 Isaac might 
not have thought that his father would have ever killed 
him. For this reason, when Abraham was about to execute him 
on the sacrificial altar, he might suddenly have seen 
Abraham as a completely different person from the one he 
used to know. Instead of a loving father, Isaac has to face 
the monstrous one. At that moment, Isaac is urged to 
recognize the other side of his father's nature. In 
Girardian thought, this is the son's first experience of 
encountering the violence that inevitably is aroused by his 
own father. Through this experience, Isaac started to learn 
how to live in and with violence. "The son is always the 
last to learn that what he desires is incest and patricide, 
and it is the hypocritical adults who undertake to 
enlighten him in this matter. "58 
The double attitude of Abraham to Isaac actually conforms 
to the double attitude of the divinity. In the Aqedah the 
divinity is the demander of human sacrifice which gives him 
a monstrous image. He, therefore, also acts as a destroyer 
of his own promise. But, the divine is also the one who 
cancels the sacrifice. By doinq this, he guarantees the 
continuation of his promise in Isaac. This reminds us of 
the double nature of all ancient divinities, the blending 
of beneficient and maleficient. Dionysus is at one and the 
same time the 'most terrible' and the 'most gentle' of the 
57Girard, Violence, p. 174. 
58Girard, violence, p. 175. 
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gods. There is Zeus who hurls thunderbolts and Zeus 'as 
sweet as honey'. In fact, there is no ancient divinity who 
does not have a double face. If the Roman Janus turns to 
his worshippers a countenance alternately warlike and 
peaceful, that is because he too reflects the same 
alternation; and if he comes in time to symbolize foreian 
war, that is because foreiqn war is merely another form of 
sacrificial violence. 59 In the Bible itself, God is best 
known as the source of life, order, peace as well as death, 
disorder and war. in the end of the Akedah the divine 
blessings are given only with regard to the total 
surrender, i. e. death of the only son. 
If the divinity has a double face, so do the mythical 
characters who involve themselves in mortal affairs. "There 
is no essential difference between the monstrous aspects of 
Oedipus and the monstrous aspects of Dionysus ... Both have 
incorporated into themselves differences normally 
considered irreconcilable". 60 The similarity between the 
double attitude of the divine and the mythical characters 
is not accidental since both come from man's experience of 
his ambiguous existence. The double attitude of the 
divinity represents the double attitude of man towards 
violence. Violence may destabilize a community that results 
in a crisis but, in order to appease violence and restore 
the order, violence has to be used. 
59Girard, Violence, p. 251. 
6OGirard, Violence, p. 251. 
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Although the Akedah tells us about the sacrifice of the ram 
instead of Isaac, it does not mean that we can dismiss the 
violent performance of Abraham and God. The ram is not 
Isaac, but the desire to sacrifice the ram is actually the 
same desire, directed primarily to Isaac. The sacrifice of 
the animal instead of Isaac cannot be taken as an evidence 
of a non-violent gesture. Nor can it be successfully hidden 
by arguinq that it is only a means of Abraham's trial. This 
is, if we take Leach's point, a part of the paradox that 
determines the sacredness of the biblical account. If, as 
Girard says, "violence is the heart and secret soul of the 
sacred"61. it is also the heart and secret soul of the 
Akedah. 
61Girard, Violence, p. 31. 
CHAPTER V 
THE PROBILEM FOR MODERN READERS 
WITH A FOCUS ON KIERKEGAARD'S 
J7'. C" Aff., V 
The literary work is essentially 
paradoxical. It represents history and at 
the same time resists it. 
Roland Barthes, SIZ 
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In the last chapter we were brought to a realization that 
violence is basically inseparable from the Akedah. This, 
one way or another, creates uneasiness with us since it may 
offend our conscience. We will- now see how modern readers 
have to deal with the moral dilemma in the divine command 
to sacrifice Isaac and the implementation of the command by 
Abraham. 
The sacrifice of Isaac as a scandal for modern readers 
From the point of view of people who live in the modern 
world, a demand to sacrifice one's own child even as a 
religious duty is simply unacceptable. But when the demand 
is part of the Scripture which is supposed to be the source 
of religious life in Christianity as well as in Judaism, 
the problem would not be as easy as having to abandon the 
story and forget it. There are struggles as the 
commentators who are faced with the immorality of human 
sacrifice attempt to look for a way by which the story can 
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be morally justified and therefore defend it as a biblical 
passage. 
S. R. Driver, among others, distinguishes the world of the 
Bible where Abraham lived from the modern world. 1 While 
human sacrifice was acceptable for Abraham and his 
contemporaries, it is by no means tolerable nowadays- the 
notion: "it's fine for other people but not for us". It 
might not be unusual for Abraham if God demands human 
sacrifice but it certainly is aberrant for us. A similar 
argument can be found in R. Davidson's commentary. He says, 
"what to us is unthinkable', that God would demand human 
sacrifice, is not unthinkable to Abraham. He makes no 
protest". 2 Despite the view of the archaicness of the 
sacrifice, Davidson continues so as to demonstrate the 
relevance of the story for today's life. Although the faith 
that is related to the practice of human sacrifice is alien 
("this faith speaks to us from an alien world") and 
unacceptable we can, however, grasp the depth of the faith. 
His suggestion is that "a deeper insight and a fuller 
knowledge of God... only come to those prepared to live to 
that limit of vision they possess, however imperfect that 
vision may be". 3 Thus, for Davidson, even though we cannot 
in any way practise human sacrifice, we are still asked to 
live just like Abraham when he had to sacrifice his own 
son. This argument clearly leads us to understand the story 
symbolically. The emphasis on the symbolical meaning of the 
I S. R. Driver, The Book of Genesis, 1911, pp. 221-2. 
2R. Davidson, Genesis 12-50,1979, p. 95. 
3Davidson, ibid., p. 95. 
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story can consequently prevent the 
divine command of human 
sacrifice from being perceived as real. But, can we really 
plunge ourselves into the depth of Abraham's 
faith if the 
command is no longer real? can we substitute 
the image of 
human sacrifice with something else and still derive the 
same impact? Surely, the experience of someone who 
has to 
sacrifice his own son can barely 
be transformed into 
another experience without reducing its essence. If 
the 
sacrifice cannot be replaced by arguing for the 
difference 
of awareness between the ancient time of Abraham and 
the 
modern time, ' it would remain a scandal. 
Von Rad does not directly put the command of human 
sacrifice in confrontation with modern values. 4 He sees 
some kind of dialectic in the narrative if the readers 
perceive the events f rom two independent perspectives, that 
is, -from Abraham's perspective and the narrator's 
perspective. From the narrator's perspective the events in 
the Akedah are a test which, according to von Rad, 
indicates that the sacrifice of Isaac is not meant to be 
real. Meanwhile Abraham has no reason whatsoever to think 
that the sacrifice is not real. Von Rad also indicates that 
for Abraham, God's command is incomprehensible not in terms 
of the immorality of human sacrifice but in the awareness 
that Isaac who has just been given to him after a long 
delay has now to be given back. Here von Rad does not put 
forward a discussion of how Abraham would reckon the 
4 For von Rad's cannentary on Genesis 22, see his Genesis: A 
Ccmwntary, 1972, pp. 237-245. 
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practice of human sacrifice itself. The command can only 
become non-sense in terms of the contradiction of God who 
fulfils his promise in a special way but demands the 
fulfilment back. Abraham who has separated from his whole 
past (Gen. 12) has, now, to relinquish his whole future. 
This is the agony of Abraham that is seen by the readers 
through his silence. According to von Rad, this silence is 
the narrator's technique which suggests the inner emotional 
circumstances of Abraham. It becomes apparent that von Rad 
tries to emphasize Abraham's admirable endurance in doing 
the test. For this purpose he employs the play of the 
perspectives. When the readers identify themselves too 
closely with Abraham in which the sacrifice becomes too 
real, von Rad will warn the readers through the narrator's 
view that it is nothing but a test. Conversely, a 
relaxation affected by the knowledge of the test is 
hindered by revealing the agony of Abraham who is not aware 
that this is a test. In this way, von Rad can direct the 
readers towards an acceptance of the greatness of Abraham's 
faith without having to look at the moral dilemma of the 
sacrifice. The ultimate target of von Rad's reading is 
admiration for Abraham's loyalty to God. At the same time, 
the problem of human sacrifice and its impact on modern 
readers is suppressed. 
Westermann disagrees- with von Rad and others whose 
interpretations are focused on holding Abraham up as an 
exemplar and who read the narrative as a song of praise of 
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the Patriarch. 5 In Westermann's view, those conclusions are 
made possible if the readers are not really 
involved in the 
events (which is only partially true in von Rad's case). 
It 
is a misunderstanding if we act as an onlooker of the 
events. The narrative can only be understood with our 
participation in the experiences of the characters, Abraham 
in particular. This can be regarded as a criticism of von 
Rad's reading from higher/the narrator's point of view 
which, besides the dialectic, proves to be prevailing at 
the end. By binding ourselves regularly with Abraham's 
viewpoint, it is possible for us to plunge into the 
bitterness of Abraham's experience. This can only mean that 
we must not be doubtful that the sacrifice of Isaac will 
soon take place. This thought of Westermann is similar to 
that of Speiser who argues that although we are informed 
about the test, "there is no way of assuring the father 
that he need have no fear about the final result; one can 
only suffer with him in helpless silence". 6 Speiser does 
not see how the world of Abraham can in any way be related 
with the world of the readers or the narrator as done by 
von Rad. The view that one can see from Abraham's viewpoint 
should never be interchanged with the view from the 
narrator's angle. When we are ourselves bound with Abraham, 
our reading experience will have to end up in a despairing 
suffering. Abraham, in fact, does not turn away from such a 
condition. Speiser sees that the severe experience of the 
Akedah is not unique in the Bible. "The fact is that short 
5Claus Westen-nann, Genesis 12-36: A Cannentary, tr. John 
J. Scullion, c-1985, p. 364. 
6E. A. Speiser, The Anchor Bible Genesis, 1964, P. 164. 
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of such unswerving faith, the biblical process could not 
have survived the many trials that lay ahead. "7 Speiser 
therefore understands the test in the Akedah as a suffering 
undergone by Abraham in which one may not f ind any sort of 
consolation. This kind of test opens widely to an end where 
the father sacrifices his son by his own hands. The faith 
of Abraham is his endurance in this inconsolable suffering. 
If we follow Speiser and Westermann then the tragic end of 
the sacrifice of Isaac has to occupy the mind of the 
readers. 
However, the immorality of human sacrifice itself is never 
specifically assessed by either commentator. Any reading 
that is designed for the readers to involve themselves in 
the story world must deal with the problem of human 
sacrifice. The commentators may assume that such sacrifice 
is not problematic for Abraham so that the readers have 
only to follow this ancient prejudice in order to guarantee 
the success of their engagement with the character's 
experience. But it is always questionable whether the 
commentators can dissociate the readers or themselves from 
modern prejudices. In Speiser's commentary for instance we 
can register phrases such as "melancholy pilgrimage", "the 
most poignant and eloquent silence in all literature"I "the 
harrowing test", "this shattering ordeal" which doubtlessly 
are a manifestation of modern feelings; Abraham may not 
have shared those feelings (after all no one knows how or 
what exactly were his feelings at the ýmoment of the 
7Speiser, ibid., p. 166. 
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Akedah). Although our commentators do not seem to be 
disturbed by the immorality of Isaac's sacrifice (neither 
does Abraham) we should not automatically be convinced 
that, as they claim (to partake in Abraham's experience), 
their understandings merely represent Abraham's emotional 
circumstances. The ordeal of Abraham is more like a modern 
reflection which may also have been influenced by 
Kierkegaard's reading. While it is clear that we are asked 
by our commentators to experience Abraham's suffering it is 
still not clear how we should understand the cause of the 
suffering, that is, the human sacrifice. Is it worth for us 
to take on suffering whose nature is not clear for us? 
Should we suffer for a problematic command? Even though our 
reading of the Akedah will ultimately face this kind of 
ambiguity, to disregard the problem in the first place is 
hardly acceptable. We cannot pretend that a command to 
sacrifice one's own -son is not problematic, this is not a 
scandal that we can conceal and forget as if such thing 
never happened. 
As it is mentioned above, Kierkegaard's reading of the 
Akedah may have had some influences on Westermann's and 
Speiser's interpretations. But, unlike the other 
commentators, Kierkegaard brings the problem of the 
immorality of the sacrificial command into deep 
consideration. Fear and Trembling discusses at length the 
ethical responses to God's unethical command. It is 
assumed, however, that Abraham would have the same way of 
thinking, prejudices, preferences as that of modern man. 
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one may say that without this assumption it would 
be 
impossible for Kierkegaard to write as detailed and deep as 
he did. On the other hand, one of the motives that drives 
Fear and Trembling may arise from a tension between the 
hope that Abraham would act in accordance with modern 
rational values and the fact that biblical Abraham behaves 
otherwise. The journey to search for moral 
justification of 
the sacrifice- symbolically coinciding with the three days 
journey to Mount Moriah- leads to a "cul-de-sac" which 
ultimately demands a suspension of the ethical. At this 
point Abraham has to leave his "modern understandings" 
behind and enter the world of absurdity. From the ethical, 
that is, from a modern point of view Abraham becomes a 
monster. But Kierkegaard does not stop here as the journey 
to search for justification of Abraham's faith continues 
until it finds a proper place which is not in the ethical 
nor is it in accordance with modern understanding, but in 
the eccentric world of the religious. 
The worldliness of faith 
in the reception history we have seen briefly Kant's 
refusal to believe in the legitimacy of the divine nature 
of Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac. In Der Streit der 
Facultabgn Kant says: 
For if God really were to speak to man, the 
latter could after all never know that it is 
God who is speaking to him. It is utterly 
impossible for man to apprehend the Infinite 
through his senses, to distinguish him from 
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sensible objects and thereby to know him. He 
can, though, no doubt convince himself in 
some cases that it cannot be God whose voice 
he believes he hears; for if what it 
commands him to do is contrary to the moral 
law, he must regard the manifestation as an 
illusion, however majestic and transcending 
the whole of Nature it may seem to him to 
be. 
For example, consider the story of the 
sacrifice which Abraham was willing to make 
at the divine command by slaughtering and 
burning his only son- what is more, the poor 
child unwittingly carried the wood for the 
sacrifice. Even though the voice rang out 
from the (visible) heavens, Abraham ought to 
have replied thus to this supposedly divine 
voice, 'It is quite certain that I ought not 
to kill my innocent son, but I am not 
certain and I cannot ever become certain 
that you, the 'you' who is appearing to me, 
are God. 8 
Kant makes a clear suggestion that Abraham does not have to 
heed the supposed revelatory command of God since the 
content of the command contradicts the moral law that he 
understands and applies to all human beings. To kill 
someone, never mind one's own son, is obviously immoral and 
can never be accepted as a divine command. Religious 
practices should, for Kant, coincide with the will to 
achieve the universal summum bonum. The summum bonum 
reflects the utmost happiness which is the natural desire 
of every human being. 
As we submit our wishes to the moral law, according to 
Y, ant, we are in rational pursuit of happiness. However, in 
practical experience, this concept cannot always come into 
sIm-nanuel Kant, Der Streit der Facultaten in Werke, Band VII 
(Berlin: 1902-), p. 63. Translated by David Pailin, "Abraham and Isaac: 
A Hermeneutical Problem before Kierkegaard" in Kierkegaard's Fear and 
Trembling: Critical Appraisals, ed. Robert L. Perkins, 1981, p. 32. 
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being as originally thought. The virtuous from time to time 
is miserable while the wicked prosper. This could be the 
antinomy of Kant's moral philosophy. 9 But, to get away from 
the difficulty Kant suggests that the conjunction of virtue 
and happiness "does not occur in this world, but that there 
may be another type of existence, another level of 
existence where the conjunction would be not merely 
fortuitous and contingent but necessary". It is in the 
world other than our world that the virtuous can obtain his 
proper rewards. While the virtuous still lives in this 
visible world, he should persistently believe in the truth 
of the conjunction; he can therefore conceive of himself in 
a state where virtue and happiness would have to be 
combined. 
Kierkegaard, on the other hand, tends to think of faith as 
a problem in this visible world. His attention is focused 
on how a man becomes (or is becoming) faithful amidst 
challenges he faces in his existence in this world. A faith 
in God is not to be based on a belief in a promise of 
happiness in the afterlife. Abraham serves God for no other 
reason than that God is God. "Kierkegaard's argument is 
uncompromising in its assertion of religion's autonomy from 
ethics and even from the common human expectations for 
hapPiness. "10 The essential difference between Kant and 
Kierkegaard in their views of faith and God is summed up by 
9Robert L. Perkins, "For Sanity's Sake: Kant, Kierkegaard, and 
Father Abraharrý' in Kierkegaard's Fear and Treffbling: Critical 
Appraisals, 1981, p. 51. 
IOPerkins, ibid., p. 59. 
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Perkins, "for Kant, the religious is narrowly constricted 
by the limitations of his moral philosophy; his view of the 
religious has no place for the demonic and consequently no 
place for the idolatrous. Phenomenologically, Kierkegaard 
is in the stronger position, for the religious, as he 
understands it, does contain possibilities of the demonic 
and idolatrous. Kierkegaard faces the facts, the 
ambiguities, the murkiness of the historical phenomenon of 
religion; whereas Kant legislates from an ad hoc position 
what can count as religious". 11 
It is important to notice that Kierkegaard does not write 
his understanding of Abraham in a "telling fashion" such as 
one may find in a philosophical or theological discourse 
but in a "showing f orm" of what is supposed to be in 
Abraham's mind during the events. Fear and Trembling12 is a 
story about someone (the narrator) who tries to follow 
every step of Abraham in the journey to Mount Moriah. The 
form of story itself might indicate an awareness of the 
irreducible paradox of Abraham's experience that can only 
be reflected through such a fashion. 13 
]APerkins, ibid., p. 59. 
12 The translation that is used here is that of Howard V. Hong and 
Edna H. Hong, 1983 
13The contýast between story and philosophical discourse is 
explained by Don Cupitt as this, "story bound you into the huran world 
of the temporal succession and change, whereas philosophy aimd higher, 
rising above time and story in order to represent genuine knowledge as 
consisting in the tirmless conteffplation of the unchangingly and 
objectively Real. This was a very grandiose idea, and one that religion 
readily adopted! '. Don Cupitt, What is a story?, 1991, p. xii. 
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In search for justification of Abraham's faith 
There are three stages of life that Abraham has to go 
through in looking for justification of his faith. The 
first stage is the aesthetic. In Problema III of Fear and 
Trembling Johannes de Silentio (Kierkegaard's pseudonym for 
the authorship of Fear and Trembling) distinguishes the 
immediacy of faith from aesthetic immediacy. In fact, these 
immediacies have a similarity in the sense that they could 
make people speechless. They are so absurd and indefinite 
as if they have no points of beginning nor end. However, 
there is a discrepancy between the two immediacies. If 
aesthetic immediacy happens because a person does not 
reflect on his existence, then the immediacy of faith 
happens when, after some reflection, a person realises that 
he cannot express his existence and that he cannot make 
himself comprehensible. The example of aesthetic immediacy 
is Don Juan who is a musical character in Mozart's opera. 
]Don Juan in Mozart's opera is depicted as a person who 
seeks only pleasure in his lifetime. His life is intended 
to search for satisfaction in his sexual desire which, in 
fact, never ceases. In addition to that, he seems never to 
fail in seducing women with whom he wants to gratify his 
sexual desire. Kierkegaard calls him the "sensuous- erot ic 
genius". 14 Don Juan is so driven by the power of passion 
that he cannot properly be called an individual person. 
14Kierkegaard, Eitherl0r, vol. I, tr. David and Lillian Swenson, 
1971, p. 86. 
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Rather his life is a reflection of desire, a concrete 
expression of the natural force of sensuousness. 
Kierkegaard gives his impression of Don Juan, "if I imagine 
a particular individual, if I see him (Don Juan) or hear 
him speak, then it becomes comic to imagine that he has 
seduced 1,003; for as soon as he is regarded as a 
particular individual, the accent falls quite in another 
place. When, on the contrary, he is interpreted in music, 
then I do-not have a particular individual, but I have the 
power of nature, the demonic, which as little tires of 
. seducing or 
is done with seducing as the wind is tired 
blowing, the sea tired of billowing, or a waterfall of 
tumbling downward from the heights". 15 
"Language involves reflection, and cannot therefore, 
express the immediate. Reflection destroys the immediate 
and hence it is impossible to express the musical in 
language. "16 For Kierkegaard, music provides the best place 
for the immediate since music does not need any reflection 
in order to exist. "There sound only the voice of elemental 
passion, the play of appetites, the wild shouts of 
intoxication; it exists solely for pleasure in eternal 
tumult. 1117 Don Juan's sensual gratification cannot be 
expressed through language. It must be enjoyed in silence. 
Silence here does not mean the absence of sound. Sensual 
passion has many sounds. Silence might better be understood 
15 Ei therldr, p. 91. 
16Kierkegaard, Johannes Clirmcus, or De Crmibus Dubitand= Est, 
tr. T. H. Croxall, 1967, p. 147. 
17Eitherl0r, p. 55. 
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as the absence of communication or of speech. So long as 
Don Juan continues to be fully immersed in prereflective 
sensual immediacy, he knows nothing- nothing about himself, 
his world, or other persons. 
What is lacking in Don Juan's expression is reflection 
itself. Don Juan is incapable of speaking about his 
experiences because he has never reflected on those 
experiences. Only by reflection can he eventually 
communicate his experiences to others. Reflection may drive 
an individual out of his closed individuality and bring him 
to the universal. Although reflection is likely to be done 
individually, it also includes the universal demands, i. e. 
the ethical itself. 
If we return to Problema III, it apears to us that a person 
like Don Juan in his immediate form of life is considered 
to be vulnerable to the Hegelian criticism. For Hegel, 
every individual has a social responsibility and must act 
according to the rules of his society. Unlike Don Juan, 
Abraham, according to Kierkegaard, has gone through the 
process of reflection but he finds ethics insufficient to 
explain his personal experience. Abraham's conduct needs a 
justification from something other than or beyond ethics. 
it is obvious that in a drama the duty of the players is to 
present some role, which means that they must pretend to be 
someone else. The performance of drama players exemplifies 
another expression in the aesthetic stage, that is, the 
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playful. Playful expression aims simply at entertaining 
people. It does not involve dialectical thinking or 
reflection. 
Another kind of aesthetic expression is the deceitful. 
Pretending is still the outer sign of the person who lives 
in this realm. But as the name tells, the motive of 
pretence is to deceive. It is a selfish motive which 
underlies the pretence. The example of it is the merman in 
the legend about the merman and Agnes. "The merman is a 
seducer who rises up from his hidden chasm and in wild lust 
seizes and breaks the innocent flower (Agnes) standing on 
the seashore in all her loveliness and with her head 
thoughtfully inclined to the soughing of the sea. "18 The 
merman is a skilful seducer who never wants to reveal his 
tragic existence (that he is a monster). His princely 
performance, however, has made Agnes believe he is the 
perfect man that she has been longing for. The figure of 
the merman has reminded us of Don Juan who is also a woman 
seducer. Unlike Don Juan, though, the merman has 
deliberately arranged his acts. He makes use of his skill 
to deceive Agnes and many other women. To obtain a personal 
pleasure the merman has allowed himself to be deceitful. 
Johannes de Silentio, furthermore, develops the legend 
about the merman and Agnes to give a description of what he 
would call the demonic effect of the aesthetic. Here, the 
merman is haunted by his guilty feelings. After Agnes is 
I $Fear and Treffbling, P. 94. 
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willing to go with him, to give herself to the stronger 
one, to entrust her whole destiny to him in absolute 
confidence, the merman breaks down, he cannot seduce Agnes 
anymore. "He cannot withstand the power of innocence. .. 
"19 
The merman can no longer overcome Agnes with his seductive 
power. "The merman is a seducer, but when he has won Agnes' 
love, he is so moved by it that he wants to belong to her 
entirely. "20 The seducer is crushed, he has submitted to 
the power of innocence, he can never seduce again. "But 
immediately two forces struggle over him: repentance, Agnes 
and repentance. If repentance alone gets him, then he is 
hidden; if Agnes and repentance get him, then he is 
disclosed. "21 After being aware of his irresponsible 
conduct towards Agnes, he may be faced with repentance. 
Yet, this repentance does not necessarily result in 
disclosing his former intention to Agnes. The repentance is 
not followed by confession. He does not want to spoil 
Agnes' pure love for him - he therefore conceals the truth. 
At the same time the merman becomes very unhappy for he 
loves Agnes with a complexity of passions and a new guilt 
to bear. "Now the demonic in repentance probably will 
explain that this is indeed his punishment, and the more it 
torments him the better. "22 Still in silence, he can try to 
save Agnes by provoking her to hate him. He can do this by 
belittling her, ridiculing her, disregarding her love or 
even by arousing her pride. He uses demonic ways to enable 
19 Fear and Trenbling, p- 94. 
20 Fear and Trenbling, p. 242. 
2 'Fear and Trenbling, p. 96. 
22 Fear and Trenbling, p. 96. 
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Agnes to stand on her own again. He does not let Agnes 
surrender herself to him on account of his love and his 
tragic existence. By pretending to be an enemy, the merman 
may rescue Agnes from her blind love to him. "Indeed, it is 
not inconceivable that in reality it might come to pass 
that a merman by his demoniac shrewdness has, humanly 
speaking, not only saved an Agnes but brought something 
extraordinary out of her; for a demon knows how to torture 
I 
powers out of even the weakest person and in his way he may 
have the best intentions toward a human being. "23 Having 
saved Agnes, the merman remains in his hidden sufferinqs. 
He, actually, can speak to Agnes openly and possibly 
receive her forgiveness. If he did so, he would have had a 
chance to overcome his suffering; but he prefers to keep 
silent. "His relation to his suffering is ambivalent. On 
the one hand, he is repelled by it and wants nothing more 
than to be free of it, while on the other hand, he is 
attracted to it and refuses to part with it. The attachment 
to one's own corruption and suffering that leads a person 
to guard silence and to turn his back on the possibility of 
forgiveness is what Kierkegaard means by the demoniC"24 
The other expression of silence of the reflective aesthetic 
stage is heroic silence. This is supposed to be the most 
noble form of aesthetic silence. The purpose of the 
silence is to save other people from misfortune. It 
23 This is Walter Lowrie's translation: Fear and Trembling: A 
Dialectical Lyric, '1952, p. 150. 
24Mark C. Taylor, "Sounds of Silence" in Kierkegaard's Fear and 
Trembling: Critical Appraisal% ed. R. L. Perkins, 1981, p. 175. 
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represents the reverse of the selfish motivation usually 
rendered to the figure of deceitful or demonic silence. 
Heroic silence willingly incurs suffering in its attempt 
to make others happy. Heroic silence occurs in the example 
derived from a story in Aristotle's Poetics. The story is 
about a young bridegroom who consults the Delphic oracle on 
his wedding day. He eventually finds out that a misfortune 
will follow his marriage, namely his life will be in 
danger. The prediction is revealed to the bridegroom 
personally by the augurs. Nevertheless, the bridegroom 
understands that the matter is not only his, but also 
concerns his marriage life. He has two choices of whether 
he explains it to his bride or he conceals it. If he 
remains silent, "should he remain silent and get married, 
thinking : Maybe the disaster will not happen right away, 
and in any case I have maintained love and have not feared 
to make myself unhappy". 25 Johannes de Silentio considers 
this decision as offending the bride in a way that the 
bride is not allowed to share the problem and finally make 
the decision, "... for if she had known of the prophecy, she 
certainly would never have given her assent to such an 
alliance. "26 The other possibility in which the bridegroom 
may remain silent is that while he does so, he cancels the 
wedding. He thinks by silently cancelling the wedding he 
has saved the bride from the disaster predicted by the 
augurs. In this case he might be called a silent hero who 
hopes that the bride will sooner or later forget her sorrow 
25 Fear and Treffbling, p. 90. 
26 Fear and Trembling, p. 91. 
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while he himself remains suffering in his concealment. 
Having thought that his bride should not know the impending 
herald, he hides it for himself. The bride who knows 
nothing about the prediction will only think that the 
bridegroom has abandoned her. 
Nevertheless, Johannes de Silentio refuses the bridegroom's 
idea that his concealment is purely private. According to 
de Silentio, consulting the augurs before marriage was 
popular in the time of the bridegroom. The augurs, 
furthermore, would forecast the destiny of marriage in the 
future which could either be good-luck or bad-luck. It was 
a usual tradition among young marriage couples. Therefore, 
albeit the message was conveyed privately, it would be of 
public knowledge in time. So the concealment of the 
bridegroom about the disaster would become in vain. His 
people could in time recognised what he is hiding. on the 
contrary, if he had spoken of the prediction, he would have 
been well understood. It was not hard for the people to 
understand the impending herald since this is one of the 
possibilities of the augurs' message. Johannes de Silentio 
thinks, if only the herald were not popular so that the 
people would never have knowledge of it, the silence of the 
bridegroom would have been in the same situation as 
Abraham's. The bridegroom would have been in the paradox. 
But the actual case of the bridegroom is different. He is 
simply an aesthetic hero who wants to silently suffer for 
the sake of another but is unaware that once he speaks, 
people will understand him well. If he is silent he thinks 
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that by so doing he can make his bride happy. He does not 
want to share the sufferings he has incurred after hearing 
the impending herald as well as in cancelling the wedding 
he has wished right to the time when he listens to the 
augurs' message with anyone near him. 
The tension between public knowledge and the bridegroom's 
attempt to be silent leads to the problem of the ethical 
demand. In the bridegroom's case, the ethical demand is 
expressed by the demand to speak. It has been shown that 
the bridegroom's concealment of the -impending herald is 
actually unworthy because people have already been 
accustomed to hearing such a message from the augurs. 
Therefore, the best choice for the bridegroom is to speak, 
to unveil his knowledge about the herald and its 
consequences for him. It is in this way that he can seek 
comfort. If, in the end, he decides to cancel the marriage, 
he will see that his decision is justifiable in the eyes of 
his people provided that he explains the reason. Ethics 
demands revelation. It is important for the bridegroom to 
reveal his problem, lest he is misunderstood. 
By revealing himself a person has entered the universal 
world where he belongs to others rather than to himself as 
in the aesthetic. As a consequence, he also has to live 
according to the universal law which will limit him from 
doing anything privately. Every individual has a duty to 
apply the universal law in their individual life. The aim 
of the universal law as it is claimed is to bring the whole 
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human being into the highest good, the ideal life, so to 
speak. Since it is concerned with the whole human being, 
the universal world, each individual is asked to bind his 
personal wishes to the law, otherwise he is guilty. As soon 
as the single individual asserts himself in his singularity 
before the universal, he sins, and only by acknowledging 
this can he be reconciled again with the universal. But it 
is also guaranteed that the universal law or ethics will 
equally represent individual necessity, it is in other 
words, a democratic law. It is also for everybody's good. 
Therefore, no transgression is necessary. "If this is the 
highest that can be said of man and his existence, then the 
ethical is of the same nature as a person's eternal 
salvation. 1127 
The concept of personal salvation through ethical life is 
found by Johannes de Silentio in Hegel's philosophy. Hegel, 
according to de Silentio, qualifies man as the individual 
and considers this qualification as a "moral form of evil", 
which must' be annulled in the teleology of the moral (the 
conformity of one's life with the regulations given by his 
social institution where he is) in such a way that the 
single individual who remains in that stage either sins or 
is immersed in spiritual trial. 28 
Meanwhile, it is also understood that the universality of 
ethics is defined by its applicability to all conditions. 
27 Fear and Trembling, p. 54. 
28 Fear and TreffbI ing, p. 55. 
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The morality of a proposed action is determined by its 
ability to be universalized, to be applied under any 
circumstances. In the same way a person must be able to 
show the universality of his conduct, that he behaves in 
accordance with moral principles. In the ethical stage, it 
is obligatory not only to act ethically but also to explain 
to others the ethical basis of certain conduct. It is only 
by this way that the conduct can be seen as having been 
rooted in moral laws. 
Johannes de Silentio uses the story of Agamemnon and 
Iphigenia by Euripides as the example of the dialectical 
process of the ethical stage. For Agamemnon it has been 
revealed that he must sacrifice his daughter, Iphigenia, 
for the welfare of the state as a whole. Agamemnon's 
dilemma is whether he had better keep silent about this 
duty or should he inform the people around him. "Esthetics 
demands silence of Agamemnon, inasmuch as it would be 
unworthy of the hero to seek comfort from any other 
person. .. 1129 It is the heroic act of Agamemnon that he 
undertakes suffering for the sake of the whole state's 
happiness. From the aesthetic point of view, Agamemnon does 
not need others' sympathy for doing such bravery, thus, he 
should remain silent. But ethics disagrees with silence; 
ethics demands disclosure. Agamemnon has to inform 
Iphigenia and even the people. If he does so, he will 
become a tragic hero. "The tragic hero demonstrates his 
ethical courage in that he himself, not prey to any 
29 Fear and Trembling, p. 87. 
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esthetic illusion, annouces Iphigenia's fate to her. 1130 
After she knows her father's reason to sacrifice her, 
Iphigenia will understand how tragic Agamemnon is in his 
position and in the end will agree with him. For the whole 
state, his disclosure is inspirational. In other words, he 
strengthens the moral fabric of the state by his strong 
determination to do his duty. If Agamemnon, as the leader 
of the country, willingly renounces his personal desire to 
the moral duty, should not his people follow his nobility 
by devoting themselves to the account of their duty? 
Therefore, it is necessary that the tragic hero declares 
himself. If he remains silent, it will not be clear to 
others what the motive of his sacrifice is, even worse than 
that, people will think Agamemnon has acted immorally, he 
can be thought of as a murderer. 
It becomes clear to us that ethics tends to pull a person 
out of his complex and indeterminant desires and brings him 
into subjection to the universally binding rules. In this 
stage a person can no longer hide his individual reason - 
he must actualize himself. His act can only be justified 
if its motives are revealed. Consequently, man is seen as a 
social being who is responsible to his society and its 
principles or rules. His will is, then, subjected to those 
rules although it must be done as a free act, as a result I 
of his consciousness that public rules are the absolute 
reflection of the highest good. 
30 Fear and Trefnbl ing, p. 87. 
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Nonetheless, ethics cannot actually escape from paradox, 
neither can reason. Kierkegaard wants to show us that 
paradox is, as a matter of fact, unavoidable in every form 
of life, be it aesthetic, ethics or even religious form. 
Each form of life is destined to struggle in paradox which 
is an inevitable part of human life. Life is always seen as 
a paradox between two oppositional desires, "good" and 
"bad". Ethics, however, seems to deal with only the "good" 
side and excludes the "bad" side. According to the 
ethicist, the ideal life is something that must be grasped 
beyond paradox. 
The failure of ethics to admit the existence of paradox as 
essential in and for human life urges de Silentio to 
continue the search for the acknowledgement of the 
paradoxical to another stage of dialectical thinking called 
religious- a stage in which Abraham's faith is supposed to 
gain its justification. In this stage, silence reemerges 
although it has a different nature from that of the 
aesthetic. The double face of silence is described by de 
Silentio, "silence is the demon's trap, and the more that 
is silenced, the more terrible the demon, but silence is 
also divinity's mutual understanding with the sinqle 
individual". 31 If aesthetic silence because of its ultimate 
demonic expresssion cannot resist ethical demand, this is 
not the case with the religious silence. As soon as ethics 
enters the religious realm, it is no longer demanding 
because religion has its own telos which is different from 
31 Fear and Trembling, p . 88. 
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that of ethics; but it is also caused by paradoxical 
performances of religion which will inevitably remove 
ethics from its central consideration. Ethics cannot 
understand the paradoxical silence manifested in religious 
realm. or that ethics alone cannot enable us to understand 
the religious silence. Ethics ironically claims itself to 
be universal. But it is apparent that its universality 
fails to incorporate religious experience. Having shown 
that ethics is unable to define religious experience within 
its own categories, Johannes de Silentio brings us to 
another stage of life which is likely to compensate the 
lack of ethics itself so that the two together (ethics and 
faith) may dialectically constitute the whole existential 
description of man. 
It is possible that the religious point of view is actually 
created by Kierkegaard to introduce the failure of ethics 
in a way that ethics cannot accommodate an individual 
inwardness which is thought as indispensable in the act of 
Abraham. "Despite the rigorousness with which ethics 
demands disclosure, it cannot be denied that secrecy and 
silence make a man great simply because they are 
qualifications of inwardness. "32 Inwardness is man's 
potential quality whose existence deserves attention. It is 
actually the source of the greatness of man. Kierkegaard 
obviously disagrees with the ethical solution which regards 
man's greatness from outward, that is, according to his 
moral behaviour and the explanation of it. It is also 
32 Fear and Trenbling, p. 88. 
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hinted that Kierkegaard is in Opposition to all forms of 
dogmatical solution as shown by ethicists. For him dogma, 
principle, rule, system have hindered man from standing as 
an individual. Individuality is reckoned as higher than 
universality. 
Faith is about the individual that is higher than the 
universal. This claim can be made because faith is 
paradoxical and only the single individual (individual as 
individual) can understand a paradox. In faith, there is an 
absolute duty to God which, as happened in Abraham's life, 
is contradictory of ethics. In this contradiction, however, 
ethics must be reduced to the relative. To show the paradox 
of faith de Silentio has also quoted another controversial 
biblical (New Testament) verse (besides the Abraham and 
Isaac story), that is, Luke 14: 26 which contains Jesus' 
utterance that in order to be Jesus' disciple one must hate 
his whole family, even his own life. Faith would accept 
Jesus' demand as an absolute duty which must be done. 
Ethics, conversely, could never teach one to hate one's own 
family, it even forbids and punishes such hatred. Thus, 
although a believer may hold Jesus' demand as an absolute 
duty, he cannot do it without being in paradox because of 
his awareness of the ethical demand. Providing he ignores 
the ethical demand he has been in the aesthetic, namely, he 
has abandoned his family for the sake of his (selfish) 
ambition to be Jesus' disciple. After all if he tells his 
family about the requirement for being Jesus' disciple, he 
rnight well be understood by his, family who will by then 
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reckon his decision as noble but in doing so he can no 
longer be the knight of faith, instead he has placed 
himself as a tragic hero whose tragic act is not only 
understandable but also admirable. The knight of faith, 
would rather bear the tragedy of his life on his own 
because no one can understand his impossible belief that by 
abandoning his family (for his absolute duty to God) he 
also loves them. 
De Silentio can be seen as attempting to challenge the 
principle of ethics- that the highest duty of life is to 
exercise ethical demands- by proposing the duty to God as 
the actual highest duty. Ethics and the duty to God end up 
irrevocably in tensional relationship. The dialectical 
movement of that relationship is, however, significant for 
de silentio, that is, in order to understand the existence 
of a believer or the subject of faith. But as the 
dialectical movement is not intended to arrive at a 
synthesized knowledge, it will, therefore, only present an 
always-paradoxical phenomenon. A person, once being in 
faith, is forever a paradoxical being. He can never reduce 
the paradox to a certain knowledge by which he can let 
another understand him. Faith is the paradox, that the 
individual absolutely cannot make himself 'intelligible to 
anybody. The paradox of faith may , only shipwreck 
understanding which in the ethical is unavoidable. 
Moreover, the paradox by which faith expresses itself is in 
fact inherent in human life. It is actually found in 
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contemplation of human consciousness therefore it is 
necessary to admit its basic existence. But to admit its 
existence means to place the individual higher than the 
universal. Faith is a private matter which cannot be shared 
with another. There emerges a problem that faith can be 
mistakenly observed as the same as an aesthetic expression 
because of the stress on privacy. In this light Johannes de 
Silentio employs the ethical argument that functions as a 
parameter which distinguishes the aesthetic from the 
religious. The silence of faith is not motivated by 
personal desire since it is related to ethical 
considerations that would break such a desire. A faithful 
person must have relinquished even the best thing he ever 
had for others in which ethics finds its expression. He has 
emptied himself, that is to say, he is the knight of 
infinite resignation but in further contemplation he is 
aware that ethics cannot rightly justify his duty. However, 
"Precisely because resignation is antecedent, faith is no 
esthetic emotion but something far higher; it is not the 
spontaneous inclination of the heart but the paradox of 
existence. 1133 Faith is immediacy after reflection. 
Vonetheless, like aesthetic immediacy the immediacy of 
faith is also necessary, something that one cannot argue 
otherwise. Both are speechless experiences. After all, 
"while bearing a certain formal similarity to each other, 
the necessary silence of the sensuous erotic genius and of 
the believer are quite different. These two sounds of 
33 Fear and Tranbl ing, p. 47. 
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silence represent opposite stages on life's Way"34 that is, 
the stage before and after the ethic. 
it is important to bear in mind that Kierkegaard's notion 
about man's knowledge of God is specific in that it is 
gathered as a result of man's (the subject) own perception 
of his experiences. We may find the basis of this notion in 
Kierkegaard's view of subjective perception which as 
R. Z. Friedman observes, "Kierkegaard's indebtedness to 
Socrates is very great. From Socrates, according to 
Kierkegaard, comes the notion of the subjective 
relationship, the subject's commitment to an object of 
whose truth he is ignorant, and the shift of emphasis from 
the existence of the object to the subject's perception of 
the object, the subject's inwardness or psychological 
development". 35 In this regard, God's existence is not 
argued on the basis of his own (objective) existence but as 
it is perceived by man in his psychological development. 
14an as the subject of perception decides the existence of 
God. It is from here that Kierkegaard comes to the 
conclusion that God is as paradoxical as faith itself. 
Accordingly, we can never make the existence of God 
certain. Like faith, God is different from, even 
contradictory of, ethics. His existence can be experienced- 
that is as a conflict with ethics- but is inexplicable. 
Concerning Abraham, Johannes de Silentio recasts the story 
34Taylor, "Sounds of Silence, " p. 186. 
35R. Z. Friedman, "Looking for Abraham: Kierkegaard and the Knight 
of Anxiety, " International Philosophical Quarterly, 27(1987), p. 251. 
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of Genesis 22 in four different possibilities. 36 The main 
focus is Abraham, how he handles God's command to sacrifice 
his son and how one would see him. In the end, it is 
revealed that one can only admire Abraham's courage without 
being able to comprehend him. one of the stories tells 
about Abraham as he is in unbroken silence: 
It was early in the morning when Abraham arose: 
he embraced Sarah, the bride of his old age, and 
Sarah kissed Isaac, who took away her disgrace, 
Isaac her pride, her hope for all the generations 
to come. They rode along the road in silence, and 
Abraham stared continuously and fixedly at the 
ground until the fourth day, when he looked up 
and saw Mount Moriah f ar away, but once again he 
turned his eyes toward ground. Silently he 
arranged the firewood and bound Isaac; silently 
he drew the knif e- then he saw the ram that God 
had selected. This he sacrificed and went home. -- 
--From that day henceforth, Abraham was old; he 
could not f orget that God had ordered him to do 
this. Isaac flourished as before, but Abraham's 
eyes were darkened, and he saw joy no more. (my 
emphases)37 
Silence appears to be the only choice Abraham can express 
in the above story. Surely, de Silentio is preoccupied with 
Abraham's silence which is clearly expressed by the above 
story as well as throughout Fear and Trembling. But it does 
not mean that de Silentio, is not aware of Abraham's 
dialogue with Isaac (Gen. 22: 7,8). He knows that Abraham 
answers Isaac's question but "his (Abraham) response to 
Isaac is in the form of irony, for it is always irony when 
I say something and still do not say anything". 38 De 
Silentio does not regard Abraham's enigmatic answer as 
36 Fear and Trembling, pp. 10-13. 
37 Fear and Tranbling, p. 12. 
39 Fear and Treffbl ing, p. 118. 
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untruthful althouc; h Abraham 
is well aware that Isaac is 
going to be sacrificed and although 
he has at that time 
relinquished Isaac and 
done no more. "He is not speakinci an 
untruth, because by virtue of the absurd 
it is indeed 
possible that God could 
do something entirely different. " 
De Silentio continues, "so he does not speak an untruth, 
but neither does he say anything, for he is speaking in a 
strange tongue". 39 
Abraham wants to share his agony (as a result of God's 
command) with his wife, his servants and even with Isaac 
himself. He realizes that if he speaks to another he will 
be understood. And that if he remains silent, his deeds 
will only demonstrate a horror, he will even be condemned 
as a murderer. But, Abraham just does not have something to 
share with others. His absolute relationship with God 
cannot be described in common language. He speaks no 
ordinary language but an alien, incomprehensible language. 
His words remain concealed. "Abraham remains silent - but 
he cannot speak. Therein lies the distress and anxiety. 
Even though I go on talking night and day without 
interruption, if I cannot make myself understood when I 
speak, then I am not speaking. This is the case with 
Abraham. He can say everything, but one thing he cannot 
say, and if he cannot say that- that is, say it in such a 
way that the other understands it- then, ý he is not 
speaking. "40 It is implied that the universal expression 
39 Fear and Trenbl ing, p. 119. 
40 Fear and Trenbl ing, p. 113. 
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through language is actually necessary. There 
is nothing 
wrong with trusting the 
importance of language in making 
oneself intelligible. Abraham would 
have loved to be 
intelligible, but his faith in God has hindered him from 
being so. His faith cannot be mediated through language or 
rational thought. From the point of view of rational 
thought Abraham's faith is absurd. 
Abraham wants to sacrifice Isaac "for God's sake and- the 
two are wholly identical- for his (Abraham's) own sake. He 
does it for God's sake because God demands this proof of 
his faith; he does it for his own sake so that he can prove 
it". 41 This refers to an exclusive reciprocal relationship 
between God and Abraham. God's demand and Abraham's 
response demonstrate nothing but the incommensurability of 
the relationship. only God and Abraham understand the 
rneaning of this relationship. In other words, Abraham 
incurs the absoluteness of his duty from his solemn 
relationship with God. That intimate relationship 
eventually makes a barrier for reason to demystify 
Abraham's obedience. 
moreover, the uniqueness of faith makes Abraharý 
incomparable with the tragic hero. The tragic hero's act 
which at first seems to be immoral does, however, express a 
moral demand. The tragic hero may sacrifice his own 
daughter or son but for the sake of others, for the 
welfare of the state. The unselfish sacrifice of the tragic 
4 'Fear and Treirbling, pp. 59,60. 
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hero has, as a matter of fact, a higher, moral impact 
reflected by the happiness of others. Abraham's case is 
different as de Silentio says, 
By his act he (Abraham) transgressed the 
ethical altogether and had a higher telos 
outside it, in relation to which he 
suspended it. For I certainly would like to 
know how Abraham's act can be related to the 
universal, whether any point of contact 
between what Abraham did and the universal 
can be found other than -that Abraham 
transgressed it. It is not to save a nation, 
not to uphold the idea of the state that 
Abraham does it; it is not to appease the 
angry gods. If it were a matter of the 
deity's being angry, then he was, after all, 
angry only with Abraham, and Abraham's act 
is totally unrelated to the universal, is a 
purely private endeavor. Therefore, while 
the tragic hero is great because of his 
moral virtue. Abraham is great because of a 
purely personal virtue. 42 
Being in private relation with God, Abraham does not 
entirely detach himself from ethical consideration. 
Abraham's ethical expression takes form in his truly and 
fatherly love of Isaac. As a father he owns the common 
fatherly figure. He loves Isaac in a way a father normally 
loves his son. That is why, when Isaac is spared from the 
sacrifice, he receives him with such a great joy. He is 
happy because his beloved son has been returned to him, 
lience, he may love Isaac more than ever; this, according to 
johannes de Silentio, can only be understood if Abraham 
lives in paradox. Since in paradox, even though Abraham 
willingly sacrifices Isaac, he does it with a (absurd) hope 
that Isaac will one way or another return to him. This is 
42 Fear and Tranblinq . 59. 'T, p 
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clifferent from the tragic hero as when he sacrificed his 
claughter he could never hope to get her back. The tragic 
IýIero has renounced his hopes to his daughter's life and he 
r_ould never have thought of her future anymore. The 
. sacrifice 
is just the end of his daughter's life. Abraham, 
on, the other hand, has the future in mind for Isaac since 
he still thinks of and hopes for Isaac to be saved. 
; ýccordingly, we may see Abraham as a father who, in his 
ethical duty, loves his only son. However, the test is 
, precisely about 
this ethical duty. The test has Put Abraham 
i. n paradox between loving his son and loving God, between 
ethical duty and love of God. R. Z. Friedman- describes the 
. Struggle of 
the faithful as this, "the individual who 
professes faith is a Knight, one who does battle with, or 
who has life in terms of, the struggle of the will. He 
recognizes that his life is this struggle, the endless task 
of confronting and choosing in terms of the either/or of 
faith and reason". 43 Friedman furthermore argues that the 
. Struggle will never settle 
down since the choice, once 
inade, disappears with the moment. "Each new moment requires 
new choice, and the will, free and undetermined by those 
clecisions which the individual has made in the past, must 
again declare itself. But then, the content of faith 
becomes the choice for faith. The Knight may choose hope 
and promise, as Kierkegaard assures us, but does not 
actually live in hope and promise. He does not get beyond 
the choice. "44 
43Friedman, "Looking, " p. 254. 
44Friedn, an, "Looking, " p. 254. 
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3: t is clear that the absolute duty to God as shown by 
Abraham would never escape from paradox, it would endlessly 
be in a dialectical tension with the ethical duty. Had the 
cluty to God 
become established, it would be nothinq else 
than a dead doqma : 
Thus it is proper to say that every duty is 
essentially duty to God, but if no more can 
be said than this, then it is also said that 
I actually have no duty to God... in the 
duty itself I do not enter into relation to 
God. For example, it is a duty to love one's 
neighbor. It is a duty by its being traced 
back to God, but in the duty I enter into 
relation not to God but to the neighbor I 
love. If in this connection I then say that 
it is my duty to love God, I am actually 
pronouncing only a tautology, inasmuch as 
"God" in a totally abstract sense is here 
understood as the divine- that is, the 
universal, that is, the duty. 45 
,,, Fear and Trembling" consists of a fundamental doubting of 
the dogmatical way of thinking. It shows that in existence 
there is always something else that is naturally different 
or even incomprehensible; and faith 
is part of this thing. 
Faith consists of many possibilities, even of the 
i1npossible possibility. Abraham believes in the possibility 
that Isaac will return to him which is in itself impossible 
with regard to the sacrifice. A similar absurdity may also 
happen when Isaac really comes back since he only returns 
to Abraham after Abraham "has sacrificed" him. In his mind 
1ýbraham has already sacrificed Isaac as his unmoved 
clecision in response to God's command. Paradox seems to 
45 Fear and Trerrzbl ing, p. 68. 
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appear in every condition which in the 
nowhere. The eternal tension between 
possibilities exists forever in the life 
which will only destabilize any hope of 
Kierkegaard, the life of faith is the 
enactment of the trial of Abraham. "46 
end brings him 
the oppositional 
of the believer 
certainty. "For 
continuous re- 
How, then, is Abraham to be justified? "His justification 
is the paradoxical, for if he is, then he is justified not 
by virtue of being something universal but by virtue of 
being the single individual. 1147 It is implied here that the 
justification of faith cannot be declared as such. Faith 
requires privacy and it is only by agreeing to such privacy 
that the justification of faith can be made possible. 
However, privacy is at the same time tantamount to 
concealment from the outside world. As soon as faith comes 
to the fore, it has renounced its paradox and cannot be 
regarded as faith any more. In the concealment, though, 
faith becomes unintelligible. The knight of faith is 
ultimately a dumb knight. No one can understand him in his 
silence. Looking at his acts only one may think he is mad 
or worse, that he is a murderer. Even the narrator himself 
states, "Abraham I cannot understand; in a certain sense I 
can learn nothing from him except to be amazed. "48 And to 
those who claim that they can learn about faith from 
Abraham, that is to say, they can understand Abraham, 
Johannes de Silentio says, "if someone deludes himself into 
46FriedTan, "Looking, " p. 254. 
47 Fear and Trembling, p. 62. 
48 Fear and Trembling, p. 37. 
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thinking he may be moved to have faith by pondering the 
outcome of that story, he cheats himself and cheats God. "49 
Kierkegaard (Fear and Trembling) and Genesis 22 
There are probably two apparent aspects about Fear and 
Trembling in its relation to the Bible as explained bY 
Friedman, "Kierkegaard rescues Scripture from those who, 
like Spinoza, dismiss it as moral teaching which, while 
containing an element of universal truth, is, nevertheless, 
poorly reasoned and imaginatively presented, and those who, 
like Hegel, believe that Scripture is a primitive statement 
which, while true, is yet superseded by literary and 
philosophical forms more pure and conceptual". 50 From the 
way he treats the biblical story, Kierkegaard seems to 
suggest that the use of the Bible as a source of moral laws 
is highly problematic. The Bible may turn out not only to 
be logically untenable but morally absurd. And if one hopes 
that the Bible can make him understand something out of 
reason, he will be disappointed by its ambiguity. It is not 
a rational understanding that the Bible can offer but a 
paradox, an indeterminate conflicting phenomenon. However, 
if we are persuaded by Kierkegaard that absurdity or 
paradox is the basic nature of life then we may find that 
the Bible discloses this truth. But, of course, paradox or 
absurdity is not something that we can perceive or explain. 
To do that, according to Kierkegaard, is to let ourselves 
49 Fear and Treabling, p. 37. 
5OFrietWan, "Looking, " p. 259. 
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be deluded. Fear and Trembling, after all, persuades its 
readers to openly involve themselves in Abraham's 
experience as the only possibility other than to grasp him 
logically. It, however, leads to despair as one would never 
achieve any certainty. In this involvement the readers are 
led to an existential experience, that is, belief in God 
paradoxically. 
Only poetical imagination, as Kierkegaard would argue, can 
bring Abraham's experience alive (Johannes de Silentio 
claims himself to be a poet). Abraham's experience reveals 
antinomies, that is, positions each of which is understood 
to be true but which are, nevertheless, in contradiction 
with each other. Reason cannot live with such antinomies as 
it always seeks a solution, a synthesis. Reading 
poetically, however, attempts to present the antinomies as 
they are. Johannes de Silentio is a poet who witnesses the 
dialectical movements of Abraham's faith but who does not 
intend to reduce it or to produce a synthesis of it. 
Johannes de Silentio considers antinomy as an inevitable 
condition of human existence which one can read from 
Abraham's story. Ultimately Kierkegaard's reading of 
Abraham is a reading which aims to give Rn alternative to, 
if not to undermine, a dogmatic and authoritative reading 
as commonly put into practice by both philosophers and 
theologians. 
Fear and Trembling in its specific way might demonstrate 
what is usually called a symbolic/idealistic reading of the 
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Bible. It is one of the main lines in biblical 
interpretation in the mid-nineteenth century. John Rogerson 
says, "the symbolic interpretation regards the story as the 
expression, in narrative form, of 'ideas' which the 
interpreter is called upon to separate out from the form. 
This is a sophisticated version of the alleqorisinq of the 
early and pre-Reformation Church. It shifts attention from 
the surface of the text to its underlying ideas". 51 Because 
Fear and Trembling focuses on the underlying ideas of the 
story so that it can argue about knowing Abraham's mind 
which is not in any way apparent on the surface, there are 
some discrepancies- that we may see between the knowledqe 
from the depth and from the surface of the text. The most 
obvious difference between what we are informed by 
Kierkegaard and what we can see in the narrative is about 
Abraham's morality. The biblical Abraham is scarcely a 
character who can contemplate moral consideration as deeply 
as Kierkegaard might have led us to think. Abraham does not 
seem to have any doubt whatsoever concerning the sacrifice 
of Isaac. His performance is likely to remind us of the 
character(s) in the aesthetic stage of Fear and Tremblinq, 
the character(s) who does not reflect on his deeds and 
lacks an ethical commitment. Kierkegaard himself seems to 
represent Abraham in many similar ways as the aesthetic 
hero rather than the tragic hero of the ethical staqe. The 
only quality that distinguishes Abraham from the aesthetic 
51John Rogerson, 'Urestlinq with the Angel: A Study in 
Historical and Literary Interpretat ion! ' in Hermeneutics, the Bible and 
Literary Criticism, ed. Ann Loades, and Michael McLain, Studies in 
Literature and Religion, 1992, p. 136. 
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hero is the enqaqement of the kniqht of faith with ethics. 
But when the ethics is finally suspended, as assumed by the 
religious stage, then there is no longer a difference 
between Abraham and Don Juan! Indeed, biblical Abraham is 
more comparable to the aesthetic hero than to the tragic 
hero. His deeds may seem as precipitous as the aesthetic 
hero (does he ever think about the sacrificial command 
before he makes his journey to Moriah? ). But, of course, 
Kierkegaard would not suggest that Abraham is one of the 
aesthetic heroes. His Abraham is a careful thinker who, 
however, is different from the Abraham that we find an the 
surface of the story. His Abraham is a result of a reading 
on a deeper level of the story. But one may wonder as to 
how Kierkegaard could come to that deeper level of the 
story. How can we know that Kierkegaard's Abraham does 
arise from the depth of the story and not from 
Kierkegaard's own imagination? We do not deny the depth of 
Abraham's religiosity in Kierkeqaard's reading but, at the 
same time, we find on the surface of the story (as the only 
visible thing we have) an Abraham that is reminiscent of 
the aesthetic hero. 
Kierkegaard's reading, after all, aims at findinq R 
Justification for Abraham's faith although for this reason 
one has to face the murkiness of faith. The sacrifice of 
Isaac by Abraham can finally be vindicated only by 
sacrificing (suspending) ethics/morals first. There is no 
relevant question of the rightness or the wrongness of the 
sacrifice because in so doing Abraham believes in paradox. 
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It is impossible for us therefore to judge the sacrifice 
unless we also believe in the paradox. But, can we have 
such a belief? or even, is there any such belief at all? 
Kierkegaard says that this belief demands that the believer 
leaps from the ethical world, that is, the comprehensible 
world where one can be understood by others, into the 
religious world, that is, the absurd world. This is a kind 
of blind leap which abandons reason. It is a leap into a 
vacuum where human knowledge is simply unavailable. As a 
result we, the readers, are faced with a kind of perplexing 
impossibility: while we know that only by leaping into the 
absurdity can Abraham be justified, we can never understand 
the nature of this justification. So can we really justify 
Abraham in the manner of the Knight of Faith? Apparently 
the justification demands our commitment to be like 
Abraham- which is very unlikely. Who among us wants to 
sacrifice or to be commanded to sacrifice his own son? Who 
nowadays can tolerate human sacrifice? In the end we have 
to be very skeptical if we are to be able to justify 
Abraham's deeds at all. it does not mean that we have to 
transform the immorality into some kind of action of a more 
tolerable fashion, as conducted by some commentators above, 
so that we can justify it. But we may argue that readina 
does not necessarily have to be followed by such a 
justification. And, indeed, to measure, let alone to 
justify, Abraham's deeds is very tricky. Abraham's as well 
as God's morality is very ambiguous in the Bible. 
However, if Kierkegaard comes to the conclusion that he 
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cannot understand Abraham because of the continuous paradox 
that the knight of faith has to live in, we also find it 
impossible to understand Abraham amidst the lack of 
certainties and ambiguities the text presents us with. The 
paradox of Abraham in Fear and Trembling, although bound up 
with Kierkegaard's own understanding, seems to coincide 
with the aporia that we find as the nature of the narrative 
in Genesis 22.52 
Did Abraham not mishear God? 
kind of aporetic reading of the Akedah is also 
demonstrated by Kafka. 53 But, Kafka works or plays rather 
on the aesthetic stage, if we use Kierkegaard's cateqories, 
that is to say, while Kierkegaard. is busy dealinq with 
ethical questions about the sacrifice of Isaac by Abraham 
in order to gain justification, Kafka takes another stance 
by asking whether Abraham has rightly judged God's 
intention in the first place. Kafka observes uncertainties 
in the story concerning Abraham's reception of God's 
command, for which he finds many possibilities of reading. 
His approach may remind us of midrashic interpretations. 
And, indeed, if he talks about Abraham who misiudqes God 
and goes to sacrifice his son, there is an equivalent 
52The term aporia (adi. aporetic) indicates a final inpasse or 
paradox: a point at which a text's self contradictory meaninqR can no 
longer be resolved, or at which the text undermines its own Most 
fundan*ntal presuppositions. It 1 eads to the claim of the 
undecidability of the meanings of the text. See chris Baldick, The 
Concise oxford Dictionary of Literary Term, 1991, p. 15. 
53Apart from notes in his letters to friends, Kafka never wrote 
a detailed reading on Abraham in the Akedah. 
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midrash. This midrash focuses on the event of the intrusion 
of the malak Yahweh in v. 12. After the malak Yahweh 
proclaims the divine message to Abraham, 
Rabbi Abba said: Abraham said to God: "I 
will lay my complaint before you. Yesterday 
(on an earlier occasion) you told me 'In 
Isaac shall thy seed be called to thee' 
(Gen. 21: 12), and then again you said, 'Take 
now thy son' (Gen. 22: 2), and now you tell me 
'Lay not thine hand upon the lad! "' The Holy 
one, blessed be He, said to him, in the 
words of Psalm 89: 35, "'My covenant will I 
not profane, nor alter that which is gone 
out of my lips. ' When I told you 'Take thy 
son, ' I was not altering that which went out 
from my lips, namely, my promise that you 
would have descendants throuqh Isaac. I did 
not tell you 'kill him, ' but 'brinq him up' 
to the mountain. You have brouqht him up- 
now take him down again. "54 
When Abraham compl'ains about the contradictions that God 
appears to produce in his first and second commRnds, it is 
disclosed to him that it is not God who contradicts himself 
but that he has misunderstood God. The reason used by God 
to defend his intention is related to the meaning of the 
phrase ha"alehu Sam (v. 2) which is literally: cause him to 
go up there or bring him up there. Although, followed by 
le'olah (as a burnt-offering), the whole phrase indicates 
that Isaac is commanded to be sacrificed, God in thin 
midrash denies this understanding. God holds to the literal 
meaning of the phrase that he only asks Abraham to bring 
Isaac up to the mountain. Abraham's misunderstanding leads 
him to be seen as a kind of a fool or someone who is 
fooling himself by not making sure of God's intention 
54Cited by Rashi, Pentateuch with Taro= cnkelos, Haphtaroth and 
Rashi's Ccmrentary, tr. M. Rosenbaum and A. M. Silbermam. 
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before he is doing the formidable task. As a result, this 
midrash can be reqarded as parodyinq Abraham's zealous 
obedience which is commonly reckoned as the hiqhest 
achievement of man's faith in God. 
Meanwhile, Kafka in his letter to his friend, Robert 
Klopstock, in 1921 says: 
But another Abraham. one who wants to 
sacrifice altogether in the right way, and 
who has the right mood in general for the 
whole thing, but who cannot believe that he 
is the one meant, he, the repulsive old man 
and his child, the dirty boy. The true faith 
is not lacking to him, he has this faith, he 
would sacrifice in the right f rame of mind 
if he could only believe that he is the one 
meant. He fears, he will ride out as Abraham 
with his son, but on the way he will 
metamorphose into Don Quixote. The world 
would have been horrified at Abraham if it 
could have seen him, he however fears that 
the world will laugh itself to death at the 
sight of him. But, it is not ridiculousness 
as such that he f ears- of course, he f ears 
that too, and above all his laughinq alonq 
with them- but mainly he fears that this 
ridiculo usness will make him even older and 
uglier, his son even dirtier, more unworthy 
really, to be summoned. An Abraham who comes 
unsummoned! 55 
Abraham is described as being doubtful if he is really 
summoned by God to sacrifice his son. The appearance of the 
father as a repulsive old man and the son as a dirty boy 
itself already creates a feeling of pity as well as 
indicates an unconvincing performance of the characters. 
But Abraham does have faith in God. He is able to do 
55 Translated by Jill Robbins f ran Geman. Jill Robbins, "Kafka's 
Parables, " in Midrash and Literature, ed. Geoffrey H. HartmAn and 
Sanford Budick, 1986, p. 276. 
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whatever God wants him to do. only that he is unsure if 
he 
is meant to do the sacrifice. This hesitation becomes a 
possibility that Abraham is actually never commanded by God 
to sacrifice his son. At the end this possibility is 
accepted as a fact, "an Abraham who comes unsummoned! ". And 
Kafka continues to write: 
An Abraham who comes unsummoned! It is as if 
at the end of the year, the best student is 
ceremoniously supposed to receive a prize, 
and in the expectant stillness the worst 
student, as a result of an error of hearing, 
comes forward from his dirty last desk and 
the whole class explodes. And it is perhaps 
no error of hearing, his name was really 
called, the rewarding of the best is 
supposed to be, according to the intention 
of the teacher, at the same time the 
punishment of the worst. 56 
An analogy is made between "Abraham who comes unsummoned" 
with the worst student in the class who perhaps because of 
sleepiness or carelessness (typical of the worst student? ) 
mishears his name beinq called. Tt is R real emhRrrassmAnt 
for the student since the whale class laugh at him. But 
then Kafka thinks of another possibility that there is 
actually no error of hearing. This possibility becomes a 
fact since the student is indeed called by the teacher 
although for the purpose of punishing him rather than 
rewarding -him. By the same token, Abraham might not come 
unsummoned. He is really commanded by God but for a 
different reason from the one that he knew. But this reason 
or in the analogy, the teacher's intention is not to be 
taken as it is. It is not the intention of somebody by 
56Jill Robbins, ibid., pp. 276-7. 
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which we can isolate it from others which are not intended. 
In Kafka's unfinished novel The Castle we have character K. 
who visits the Mayor asking about the terms of his 
employment as Land Surveyor. It turns out that nobody has 
summoned K. to come. Upon a question from the bewildered K. 
sit the Mayor in the end says, ... errors don't happen, and 
even if once in a while an error does happen, as in your 
case, who can say finally that it's an error? "'. 57 The 
effect of the question of the Mayor "who can say finally 
that it's an error? " echoes in the intention of the teacher 
or the different reason for which Abraham is called. Thus, 
as Jill Robbins says, "that intention (of the teacher) is 
not like the intention of a subject, but the kind of 
intention that is a law of Kafka's writing: the road to the 
Castle 'did not lead up the Castle hill; it only led near 
it, but then, as if intentionally (dann aber, Wie 
absichtlich), it turned aside, and if it did not leRd away 
from the Castle, it did not lead nearer to it either"'. $$ 
We are left with uncertainty about whether Abraham does the 
right thing in sacrificing Isaac. There is a sense of 
otherness in Abraham which always multiplies itself and 
never settles down. Abraham who comes unsummoned, Abraham 
who is summoned but for another reason and surely it can 
continue uninterruptedly since this other reason itself is 
not a final word. There is always a possibility of Abraham 
being different from what he previouslY was. At the same 
57 Cited by Jill Robbins, ibid., p. 265. 
58 Jill Robbins, ibid., p. 280. 
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time this differing process seems to lead us nowhere just 
like the road to the Castle. It is precisely the ambiguous 
characteristic that we can find in the Akedah narrative, 
although in different fashions from that of Kafka's or even 
if Abraham has rightly judged God's command. There are, to 
borrow Geoffrey Hartman's words, "interesting asymmetries 
and superfluities in so economical a story- the entire 
story itself, in fact, introduces something bafflinq on the 
level of narrative that cannot be smoothed over or 
harmonized without further redactional or interpretive 
moves". 59 
59 This is Hartman's comnent on the story about Jacob's wrestlinc. 1 
with a mysterious man (Gen-32: 24-32) which can also appropriately be directed to the Akedah. Geoffrey H. Hartman, "The Struqqle for the 




THE INDETERMINACY OF THE TEXT 
AND HER14ENEUTICS 
A mythos must never be reduced to a 
discursive summary of its contents and 
purposes. Its power is presented through the 
total interaction of its images, sequences, 
and values. 
Michael Fishbane, Text and Texture 
of making many books there is no end,... 
Ecclesiastes 12: 12 
"Hear and hear, but do not understand; see 
and see, but do not perceive. " 
Isaiah 6: 9 
We have come to the realisation that because of the lack of 
motives behind the actions of the characters as well as the 
limited information about the events, there is hardly any 
sense of determination of how the story of Genesis 22 has 
to be understood. Does Abraham merely accomplish the divine 
command? or is he a vengeful father who has lost his real 
beloved son and tried to kill his son's, that is Ishmaolls, 
rival? The sacrifice begins with the command from cod but 
when, where, how and why the command is given remains an 
unanswered puzzle. There is only the "what" question that 
can be answered, that is, the existence of such the command 
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itself. No matter how mysterious it is, it really takes 
place. What was probably available to the writer was only 
the act of the command itself based on which the story of 
the binding of Isaac was made. While we can imagine that 
the process of development that led to the existence of the 
story we have in the Bible was very complicated and has 
undergone several refinements, our story is still by no 
means unambiguous. The many and different readings produced 
throughout history give an obvious proof of that. The 
command of God is still mysterious besides the narratorial 
attempt to frame the story as a nissah, so is the content 
of Abraham's mind, Isaac's response to his sacrifice, the 
servants' reaction. to Abraham's message and to the 
disappearance of Isaac. 
Surely, the absence of Isaac at the end of the story 
prompts a dire question about the survival of Isaac. But 
there is no clue to the answer to that question: Isaac's 
life remains uncertain. The narrative inevitably leads us 
nowhere by not mentioning Isaac. Some expositions of the 
absence of Isaac are given in the midrash which describes 
the death of Isaac in the sacrifice followed by his 
resurrection, or alternatively, Isaac is taken to Paradise 
to be healed there. In another version, Isaac is sent away 
from Abraham to study Torah. These are a kind of completion 
needed by the narrative, were it to produce a closure that 
could clarify all important events while preventing an 
impasse. The rabbinic interpretation makes certain what is 
uncertain in the narrative. Apart from the sheer 
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inventiveness of the midrashic expositions, there is, at 
least, an admission that the role of Isaac is critical to 
the story so that one cannot forget him. our attention is 
attracted by what Abraham might say to his servants 
concerning Isaac when he goes down the hill to meet them 
again since-the servants are expecting that they will see 
both masters (cf. v. 5). But no information whatsoever can we 
hear about it, not even a single word is spoken. The 
servants do not seem confused by the disappearance of Isaac 
but the readers- who are aware of Abraham's message (v. 5)- 
ought to ask what should have been the question of the 
servants, "where is Isaac? ". Looking back to the previous 
verses we may think that if the word tahath (ch. 13) is to 
be understood not in its spatial but temporal dimension: 
"af ter" . the word might indicate that the ram was 
sacrificed after Isaac (is sacrificed). 1 So there are two 
sacrifices delivered by Abraham on the site. It may give a 
textual explanation for the disappearance of Isaac. Any 
expectation of the survival of Isaac would certainly be 
undermined by this understanding. Nevertheless, it is 
merely one possible interpretation which seeks a certainty 
about the fate of Isaac, though it is the tragic onet while 
the narrative offers no such certainty. 
A cloud of mystery also hangs about concerning the prompt 
obedience of Abraham to the controversial commandf, the 
command which has provoked various comments over the 
IFor the twofold or m3nifold denotations of Hebrew words, see 
Georg Fohrer, "Twofold Aspects of Hebrew words, " in Words and Reaningst 
ed. P. R. Ackroyd and Barnabas Lindars, 1968, pp. 95-103. 
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centuries but which still cannot provide a satisfactory 
explanation of its scandalous character. As background, the 
feud between Sarah and Hagar demands attention in spite of 
the non-existence of womanly voices in the Akedah. The 
closeness between the mothers and their sons revealed in 
the previous story makes the rivalry that ends up in the 
harassment -of each son rendered appropriately to them; 
Abraham, in sacrificing Isaac, might represent the wish of 
Hagar as God represents the wish of Sarah in allowing 
Ishmael to be expelled. Rivalry within a family is not 
unsual in biblical stories that is often complicated by the 
involvement of other parties, including God, as proponent 
or opponent; but the rivalry appears only in the background 
vanishing from the foreground of the Akedah Just like the 
voices of the women. There is only the immediate agreement 
of Abraham to kill Isaac that leaves one no doubt of his 
harmonious relationship, rather than rivalry, with God. It 
is however important to question why such a tense 
relationship between Sarah/God and Hagar/Abraham in ch. 21 
is absent in ch. 22 while there is a similar outcome of tho 
events in which the sons are put in mortal danger. Did the 
writer deliberately omit the quarrel between God and 
Abraham because it is wicked in the context of Israels 
faith? It is necessary for the readers to ask not only what 
is in the narrative but also what is not in the narrative. 
The voice of the narrator should be read along with other 
dissenting voices which may be suppressed in one way or 
another but still remain and which can be analysed. 
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Abraham's immediate and unwaveri-ag obedience has not always 
been taken for granted especially in Christian tradition 
since the Reformation. Calvin described the struggle in 
Abraham's mind in sacrificing his own son as it consists of 
oppositional wishes. Abraham is not particularly seen as 
blindly consummating the sacrifice, his heart is torn 
between obeying God and loving his son. Abraham has 
therefore to suffer in this experience. The suffering of 
Abraham became a crucial theme in the work of Kierkegaard 
which in its profundity may represent the zenith of 
Christian understanding of Abraham's sorrowful exrorience. 
In Fear, and Trembling Abraham is reflected as a figure that 
is too difficult to be understood, his will is multilayered 
and absurd. This reflection is in contrast with another 
interpretation of Abraham in Christian tradition which 
tends to simplify the understanding of Abraham's faith. The 
common acceptance of Abraham as the father of the faithful 
has a strong implication that one can comprehend Abraham's 
faith and exercise it in one's own life. This obviously 
demands an impossible task since no one could give his 
approval to the practice of infant sacrifice as obedience 
to God. But, as a proponent of the argument might sayo the 
application of the faith of Abraham to real life does not 
necessarily mean sacrificing one's own child. It may not be 
so but could the fear, the anxiety, the anguish that 
blanket the sacrifice of son be the same had it been 
replaced by another form of expression? it is highly 
doubtful. Thus, to follow the above argument, that is, if 
Abraham's act should remain exemplary to the faithful, its 
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demand ought to be reduced to the achievable dearee, 
something that normal human beings cRn bear. To arque for 
the comprehensibility of Abraham's faith therefore amounts 
to the denial of the- impossibility of obeyinq the command 
to sacrifice one's own descendant. Reading Abraham as an 
example to the faithful inevitably reduces the sense of 
fear and horror experienced by the father, unless the 
faithful are ready to actually reduplicate the sacrifice, 
for which the experiences of the Jews during the crusades 
are unique and incomparable. The view that puts forward the 
boldness of Abraham's faith also obscures the ambiguity, 
the incomprehensibility of AbrRham's act in the Akedah. 
The simplistic understanding of the Akedah as a story that 
plainly tells of the admirable faith of Abraham in doinq 
the most difficult duty one could imagine is also 
challenged by Auerbach's reading. Mimesis proves that the 
brevity of the story, rather than providing an obvious 
picture of Abraham's faith, is full of ambiguities, qRp. q of 
knowledge that call for interpretation. The awarAness ot 
Complexity is not only in relation to the content of 
Abraham's mind but also to the realm of the story %s a 
whole. Auerbach's close reading shows that there are many 
contradictions in the Akedah as it is read against the 
background of the surrounding storips. This reRdinq wntild 
certainly undermine the interpretation thRt puts Abraham's 
act as a straightforward response to God's command, that in 
as plain as it appears in the narrative itself. This IRttor 
image is presupposed by the Christian typoloqicRl 
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interpretation that sees Abraham's voluntary sacrifice of 
Isaac similar to that of God's voluntary sacrifice of 
Christ. The emphasis on the voluntariness of Abraham's act 
denies the multilayeredness discovered by Auerbach in 
Abraham's mind. There must be some reservations about 
Abraham's willingness to kill Isaac as he remembers God's 
promises that Isaac will bear the divine covenant as well 
as his name, which obviously contradict the present 
command. Contradictions between previous and present 
experiences dwell upon Abraham's mind, his journey to mount 
Moriah is loaded by the heavy burden. Auerbach's Abraham is 
after all reminiscent of Kierkegaard's tragic hero, 
although, instead of having the ethical preoccupation, 
Auerbach's Abraham is shadowed by his past experiences as 
the receiver of God's promises that seem to be obliterated 
by the command to sacrifice his only son and hope. The 
ultimate point of Auerbach's reading is the thought that 
the equivocality that is characteristic of the Hebrew Bible 
reflects its belief about God or its religion itself. It is 
a religion that demands the readers to believe in it, to be 
involved in its world. Reading the Hebrew Bible, for 
Auerbach, is believing, but it is a belief merely in the 
incoherent, many-sided world. It is a very different 
version of the belief in Abraham as an example for the 
faithful. 
The stress on the voluntariness of the characters in the 
sacrifice of Isaac, as shown by Abraham as a father who has 
to lose his son and by Isaac himself as a grown son who 
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realizes the dreadfulness of the sacrifice, also dominated 
Jewish interpretation for centuries. The situation is 
different in Jewish experience from the Christian's as the 
Jews were ready to imitate the sacrifice of Isaac in actual 
life during the Crusades or pogroms of Hedieval Europe. 
Nonetheless, in modern awareness particularly after the 
Shoah the willingness to sacrifice one's own son is 
regarded merely as weakness that has to be repudiated. A 
new Israeli generation can no longer accept the value that 
legitimizes the sacrifice of Isaac by Abraham. The Akedah 
is, ' here, interpreted differently from the previous 
interpretation as it is not seen as a document of faith but 
as a document of suppression, that is, a suppression of 
humanity itself. As a challenge to that suppression, the 
modern Israeli --artists maintain that Isaac has to stand up 
to confront the bold obedience of his father to God as well 
as to defend his right to conduct his own life. 
The scandal in the Akedah is very much realized by modern 
interpreters particularly after Kant. The vicious command 
of God has been variously debunked or justified. Not long 
ago Woody Allen has Abraham pose a question to God# "how am 
I supposed to know when you're kidding? ". 2 In God kidding? 
or is he serious with his command? If he is kidding. it 
would certainly be difficult to be merely described as 
funny or tragic bearing in mind the impact on Abraham and 
I Isaac, it may be tragicomic altogether. If serious, why 
eventually does he let the sacrifice be cancelled? There is 
2 Cited by Jill Robbins, "Kafka's Parables, " p. 278. 
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no doubt that the cancellation contradicts the first 
command. Commentators tend to explain that the 
contradiction is necessary because after all it is 
impossible for God to allow an immoral act. The second 
command justifies the moral rightness of God while the 
first command is seen to be held only temporarily. This 
conclusion, as we have seen before, has put aside the 
sacrificial command in favour of the cancellation. It has 
ignored, at least from Abraham's viewpoint, the seriousness 
of the sacrificial command. If God is kidding, Abraham is 
madly serious (that is why Kierkegaard could make a 
profound discourse out of Abraham's solemn act). Our 
response to the contradiction is more pragmatic: God has 
changed his mind since he issued the first command, he 
cannot bear the fact that Abraham is very steadfast in his 
obedience, he feels pity for Isaac. Or that God is 
surprised that Abraham can be so adamant- perhaps because 
Abraham is susceptible and thoughtless, never thinks twice 
of any command God wants him to do, if we take the story as 
a satire- and appalled by it. It is as if we have to ask 
whether God is really in favour of having thoughtless 
figures, like Abraham, to be his people. Perhaps God 
expects Abraham to be more resistant to the command to 
sacrifice. It did not happen, so he has to intervene in 
order to save Isaac. 
To let the text of the Akedah stand on its own is to let 
all its oppositional motives appear without any attempt to 
reduce them to a particular closure. God is at the same 
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time destructive and protective of human life. our readerly 
experience of- his world is ambiguous; his acts may be 
unprecendented and shocking. This brings us to a 
realisation of the violent picture of God and man in the 
story. The violence is rarely alluded to by commentators 
although it is always there in the narrative and possibly 
in the mind of the commentators too. The commentators tend 
to explain away the violence for the sake of (therefore 
reducing the oppositional motives) belief in the moral 
goodness of the message of the story; the thing which has 
been rejected by Kant and doubted by Kierkegaard. We cannot 
get rid of violence which is pervasive not only in the 
Akedah but in the many biblical stories. It is perhaps the 
paradox of the Bible in which, in the language of Abraham's 
story, it can be said that there is no fulfillment of 
divine promises which is not entwined by the desire to 
destroy or to jeopardize them. 
With the awareness of the aporetic nature of the Akedah, 
what should its interpretation be? 3 First of all, we may 
have to agree to the necessity of interpretation with its 
tendency to seek a closure, subjectively though, simply 
because it is impossible for us to live in uncertainty 
forever. The suffering of the readers of a text that does 
not provide a clear or sufficient interpretative angle by 
which the readers can understand the story world and derive 
a conclusion from it is explained by Hugh Pyper thus: 
3For the understanding of aporia (adj. aporetic), see Cbapter V, f. n. 52. 
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Human beings can be distressed by the 
inability to find an interpretation of the 
world that will enable them to make 
consistent predictions within it. That world 
can be the world evoked by a text. Reading 
is a process of inference, and a text may 
not provide sufficient clues, or provide 
ambiguous clues, and thus def er a coherent 
interpretation. Up to a certain point, this 
can be stimulating and enjoyable. The 
popularity of crossword puzzles and 
detective novels is evidence of this. Above 
that level, it becomes frustrating; the 
unpopularity of some modern verse arises 
from its resistance to inferential 
processes. This either leads to boredom and 
an abandonment of the effort at 
interpretation, or else to frustration and 
anger. The reaction will depend on the 
perceived rewards of deciphering the text. 
if the reader is merely seeking 
entertainment, he will quickly seek it 
elsewhere. If, however, the text encodes the 
only way of escape from a perilous 
situation, then the reader will persist to 
the point of extreme rage and despair. 4 
As a matter of principle we do not want to deny the rage 
and despair caused by the inconclusive world of the Akedah. 
At the same time, we see that at some point the suf f ering 
can no longer be bearable and the reader has to survive 
through his own interpretation. This usually amounts to 
manipulation or twisting of the text by the interpreter. 
Because the motive of this kind of interpretation is 
pragmatical then we have to accept that an interpretation 
can only be accepted for a limited time and context. There 
is no interpretation that can represent all aspects of the 
text and derive authority from such a claim. This is to 
argue that discussions and debates over a reading of a text 
are always inevitable and necessary. It can also mean that 
4 Hugh Pyper, "The Reader in Pain: Job as Text and Pretext, " in 
Text and Pretext: Essays in Honour of Robert Davidson, ed. R. P. Carroll, 
JSOTSS 138, '1992, pp. 235-6. 
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we have to always be suspicious of the truth claims of any 
interpretation, including our own interpretation. This 
makes interpretation an endless task which in the end would 
reflect the indeterminacy of the text itself. 
Frank Kermode in his The Genesis of Secrecy says, "the 
desires of interpreters are good because without them the 
world and the text are tacitly declared to be impossible; 
perhaps they are, but we must live as if the case were 
otherwise". 5 Like Pyper above, Kermode uses the world as an 
analogy to the text because in the world, events often 
happen unpredictably without human control of them. What we 
often find is a network of events in which anything can 
happen at any time. It is not only about the present or 
future events in the world but should also be seen in 
relation to the history of the past. There is a global 
tendency of history books to assume the objectivity of 
their conclusions about past events but it will involve 
wishful thinking if the world remains logically 
uncontrollable and their conclusions only represent one 
opinion. Yet we have ways of working through the 
uncertainty of the world. In relation to a text, we have 
ways of explaining the unfollowable text. For Kermode, any 
certainty with which we think about the world is a 
fictional construct ("as-if" fact) for which we have to 
prepare ourselves to be dissapointed if it clashes with 
another fact. 6 
SFrank Kermode, The Genesis of Secrecy: Ch the Interpretation of Narrative, c. 1979, p. 126. 
6A philosophical argument of this kind can be found in 
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Kermode assumes that interpretation 
activity that involves manipulations, 
is a hermeneutical 
even deceptions, to 
frame and construct an understanding out of an 
indeterminate narrative. This activity is related to the 
mythical figure Hermes, 
Hermes is cunning, and occasionally violent: 
a trickster, a robber. So it is not 
surprising that he is also the patron of 
interpreters. Sometimes they proclaim an 
evident sense, like a herald; but they also 
use cunning, and may claim the right to be 
violent, and glory in it. The rules of their 
art, and its philosophy, are called 
"hermeneutics. " This word itself, after 
centuries of innocent use, turns out to have 
secret senses; for it is now thought by some 
to connote the most serious philosophical 
inquiry, to be the means whereby they effect 
a necessary subversion of the old 
metaphysics. Even in its more restricted 
application, which is related to the 
interpretation of texts, the word covers a 
considerable range of activity, from the 
plain proclamation of sense to oracular 
intimations of which the true understanding 
may be delayed for generations, emerging in 
historical circumstances quite unlike those 
in which the oracle spoke. Such operations 
may require the professional exercise of 
stealth or violence. 7 
Kermode observes, the hermeneutical act as it is conducted 
by interpreters who assume a duty of explaining the meaning 
of -their texts. The way the meaning is presented by the 
interpreter is not something that we can obviously see in 
Vaihinger's The Phi I osophy of '%s If" with one of its claim that the 
whole world of ideas is an instrunent to enable us to orientate 
ourselves in the real world, but is not a copy of that world. 
H-Vaihinger, The Philosophy of 'As W: A System of the Theoretical, 
Practical and Religious Fictions of Mankind, tr. C. K. Ogden, 1924, 
pp. 15-16. This distinction makes our knowledges irqpossible to represent 
the real world and therefore should proceed indeterminately and not to 
be frozen as a dogma. 
7Kermode, op. cit., p. l. 
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the text. The text may provide some evidence for the 
reading but the more demanding contribution, if the meaning 
is to be as it is, is the cunning of the interpreter. It is 
because the text itself is, after all, polysemiotic while 
interpretation has to be monosemiotic. Writing an 
interpretation therefore is virtually the same as writing a 
fiction that assumes a control over the world by allowing 
the expected events to take place, while at the same time, 
negating all other possibilities. "The control may indeed 
be illusory, a wishful projection of authorial power; but 
it reflects an awareness that texts exist from the outset 
as ground to be competed for by various strategies of self- 
promoting knowledge. "O The text therefore becomes a pretext 
for the interpretation, though by no means tameable. 
The degree of acceptability of an interpretation depends on 
its degree of successfulness in satisfying its public; 
since it is doubtless that, like a story, an interpretation 
is made (up) for specific audiences (be it common people, 
academic or ecclesiastical). In this case, the more 
manipulative the interpreter, i. e., the more followable and 
interesting the story is for the addressee, the more likely 
the interpretation is to be satisfactory and acceptable. No 
wonder then that an interpretation can be much more popular 
than the original text that has no conclusive meaning and 
is therefore confusing. 
8 Christopher Norris, Deconstruction: Theary and Practice, 
c. 1982, p. 88. 
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Interpretation generally assumes that the uncertainties of 
the text can in one way or another be eventually overcome. 
In the reception history we may see that if there were some 
degree of awareness of the obscurity of the narrative it 
would hardly be accepted as such. It would be considered 
primarily as a problem that has to be solved by the 
interpreter, so that the narrative can become 
understandable. one of the ways to make the narrative 
appear understandable is by arguing for its deep or latent 
meaning rather than depending on the ambiguity of its 
surface. This thought is based on a dichotomy of what is 
hidden in the narrative that is coherent and comprehensible 
and what is manifest that is polyphonic and equivocal. 
However, "while we seek our intimations of latent order we 
may omit to notice that our text has a manifest 
gratuitousness, a playfulness- we might add a blindness, a 
deafness, a forgetfulness- that tells against our scheme". 9 
The "our scheme" can also refer to readings that tend to 
maintain the belief of an overarching theme that will 
assemble the whole biblical discourse into a particular 
logic. In other words, each narrative is not analyzed in 
its detail but is framed in a certain direction in 
consultation with other narratives. But when we analyze the 
narrative closely all the gratuitousness and playfulness 
make the overarching theme(s) absurd or, at least, 
secondary. 
Kermode would rather take the conflicting and unstable 
9 Kermode, Secrecy, p. 17. 
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elements of the text as a challenge that in effect is 
disappointing the meaning-oriented interpreter. He does not 
seem to suggest that one should hold perpetually onto the 
playful aspects of the text. it seems that after all 
Kermode argues for a fixation of meaning by the 
interpreter, though only temporarily and imperfectly. It is 
apparent in the final words of his book, "our sole hope and 
pleasure is in the perception of a momentary radiance, 
before the door of disappointment is finally shut on us". 
This wish perhaps can be described thus: amidst the 
continuous suffering of reading of an indeterminate and 
self-conflicting text, as Pyper puts it, Kermode asks for a 
break of pleasure which, as he knows, will however not last 
long and be a private matter. But there is also another 
Kermodian pleasure, though it has less importance than the 
first one for the author, which is implied byý this 
sentence, "the largest consolation is that without 
interpretation there would be no mystery". 10 It is a 
consolation or pleasure for the interpreter to find that 
the indeterminacy or mystery of the text begins with and 
exists only by interpretation. The question is why, after 
all the pleasure of finding the mystery, one has to let 
himself suffer or be disappointed because of searching for 
the meaning that is never permanent? Can the readers go on 
in the pleasure of finding the mystery? In any case, a 
pleasure may not be had only by escaping from the mystery 
of the text which will, as opposed to the hope of the 
escape, again and again appear but also by uncovering and 
'OKerniode, Secrecy, P. 126. 
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probing the mystery. 11 One can probably play with the text 
in its gratuitousness and playfulness without having to 
suffer or be disappointed because the meaning that he has 
been searching for never actually exists or unstable. The 
task of interpretation may be aimed at recognizing and 
demonstrating the polyphony of the text. And as it is not 
directed at grasping the meaning or at bringing the 
conflicting elements of the narrative into conformity, an 
interpretation is more prepared to face all possible 
phenomena reflected by the narrative, conflictual though 
they may be. "Interpretation is no longer turned back in a 
deluded quest for origins and truth. Rather, it assumes the 
vertiginous freedom of writing itself: a writing launched 
by the encounter with a text which itself acknowledges no 
limit to the free play of meaning. "12 Kermode himself says, 
"to be blessedly fallible, to have the capacity to subvert 
manifest senses, is the mark of good enough readers and 
good enough texts". 13 
The Akedah consists of clashing possibilities, not only 
that Abraham successfully passes the divine test and yet 
receives Isaac back as is usually argued; but that the 
(signified) meaning of the word nissah itself is ambiguous 
IlWhat we find in dealing with the polyphony of the text is not necessarily a despairing suffering or disappointinent which motivates 
sameone to cry for pleasure. It may be that Pyper and Kermode mist 
engage with the suffering and disappointment of the reader because of the nature of the books that they read, namely, the book of Job (Pyper) and the gospel of Mark (Kermode). In contrast, we may carmare Roland Barthes' reading on Genesis 32, "The Struggle with the Angel" which deals a great deal with the pleasure of reading. Barthes' reading can be seen in Image Music Text, tr. Stephen Heath, 1977, pp. 125-41. 12Norris, Decmstruction, p. 70. 
13Ken, node, Secrecy, p. 14. 
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while Abraham has a violent desire to kill Isaac, God 
contradicts his own command and Isaac's fate is uncertain. 
Wilfred Owen's The Parable of the old Man and the Young has 
I 
the old man (Abram) slay his son (Isaac): 
So Abram rose, and clave the wood, and went, 
And took the fire with him, and a knife. 
And as they sojourned both of them together, 
Isaac the first-born spake and said, My Father, 
Behold the preparations, fire and iron, 
But where the lamb for this burnt offering? 
Then Abram bound the youth with belts and straps, 
And builded parapets and trenches there, 
And stretched forth the knife to slay his son. 
When lo! an angel called him out of heaven, 
Saying, Lay not thy hand upon the lad, 
Neither do anything to him. Behold, 
A ram, caught in a thicket by its horns; 
offer the Ram of Pride instead of him. 
But the old man would not so, but slew his son, 
And half the seed of Europe, one by one. 14 
We may rightly say that the last stanza of the poem 
describes a twist of the biblical version. It correlates 
with Owen's Sitz im Leben in the middle of the First World 
War. The twist reflects the frustating time of the war, 
seeing a lot of young soldiers die at the hands of (because 
of the policy of) the old men (the old politicians who 
themselves never go to war and so are never threatened by 
death). In turn, the horror and appalling portrayal may 
bring a message to us that war is inhumane, sacrificing a 
lot of innocent people and is therefore unnecessary. The 
tragic end of the poem may also demonstrate the possibility 
that Isaac actually gets killed. And the coldness of the 
old man in executing his son does not miss the depiction of 
the boldness and steadfastness of the Patriarch in the 
p. 42.14The 
Collected Poerm of Wilfred owen, ed. C. Day Lewis, 1971, 
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biblical version. It is all clear if the Akedah has to end 
tragically, just like the portrayal in Owen's Poem. But, 
was Isaac really slaughtered by Abraham? Who knows? Nobody 
does, neither does the text. Interpretation has not yet 
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